Let me give a few answers to some comments made on my chronology of
Russian-Chechen relations.
* I refered to a Russian puppet government set up in 1996. Chris Doss took this
as a typo or an odd reference to the Maskhadov govt. Actually, it was a
reference to the puppet Chechen parliament that Russia had tried to set up in
1996. This parliament had no power as the Russian occupation collapsed, and
Russia had to sign the Khasavyurt accords with the actual Chechen government
that existed since 1991.
In 1999, the Russian government withdrew its recognition of the Khasavyurt
accords, withdrew its recognition of the Haskhadov govt., and claimed that the
puppet Chechen parliament from 1996 was the real government of Chechnya. This
shows a definite continuity between Yeltsin and Putin's war on Chechnya (even if
we ignore that Putin was Yeltsin's hand-picked successor).
* Chris Doss asked to provide evidence that Putin used the Dagestani
events as a pretext. The fact that Putin renounced the Khasavyurt accords and
immediately sought to recognize a puppet government in Chechnya is sufficient
proof. This is not a simple response to the Dagestani events -- it is the full
resumption of the war.
* Chris Doss claimed that I say everything is due simply to the wreckage
of the first Chechen war of 1994-6. Actually, I pointed to a continuing pressure
on Chechnya from 1991 to the present which took place without interruption. The
first war, 1994-96, was one of its high points, but I pointed to a campaign of
the Russian government to destabilize Chechnya from 1991 on. This included
attempts at military intervention, the use of the "half-force" option, backing
of attempts coups, economic pressure and so on. This reached a high point in
1994-6 with the first Chechen war, but Russia did not recognize Chechen
sovereignty in the Khasavyurt Accords that ended the war. Instead Russia
continued economic pressure until Putin resumed the war itself.
I also pointed to the general policy of the Yeltsin/Putin governments of
regarding the entire Caucasus, including Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as
their sphere of influence and referred to their attempting to stir up trouble in
these areas in order to present Russian interference as the alleged peacekeeper.
This has some similarities to what Putin did with Chechnya, using the Dagestani
events as a pretext.
By an answer to the Dagestani issue, however, Chris Doss seems to
understand a way for the Russian government to deal with the Dagestani situation
while preserving an imperialist policy in the Caucasus.
* Chris Doss says that Russia simply wanted to forget about Chechnya
after 1996. That's bull.
* Chris Doss doubts that Anatol Lieven is "an apologist for Russian
imperialism". I suggest that anyone who doubts this might read my review of
"Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power". Note that the significance of Lieven
being an apologist for Russian imperialism isn't that Lieven is never worth
reading. No, Anatol Lieven is a serious person as bourgeois writers go. I
examined Lieven's book precisely because it was of interest. But his attitude
shows that there isn't anything anti-imperialist in being an apologist of the
Russian bourgeoisie, since Lieven is very much a supporter of Western
imperialism as well.
*Chris Burford writes that we should put the deportation of the Chechens
"in the context of other massive population clearances which we have all
condoned...thinking of the deportation of 14 million Germans, and the clearing
of eastern Pomerania, Silesia and Prussia." This is a significant point.
Stalinism resulted in a whole series of deportations as part of the settlement
of World War II. Besides the ones mentioned by Chris, there were also other mass
deportations in other Eastern European countries, and not simply of Germans. If
I remember right, one country would deport the population of people who were
ethnically of the nationality of their neighbor. I think this happened, for
example, in Yugoslavia and either in Hungary or one of its neighbors, and
probably in other places too.
In short, a whole system of socialist-deportationalism arose. I hope Chris B.
reconsiders whether such deportations should be condoned (or perhaps Chris
raises these examples precisely because he already has reconsidered them), what
effect they had on the world proletariat, and whether they made a mockery of
either socialist or even democratic principles. Stalinism in fact engaged in an
orgy of socialist-deportationalism.
*Chris Burford also raises that we should look at matters not just from
the viewpoint of the international unity of the working people but also from the
point of view of the economic viability of political structures.
It is quite possible for a small state to exist. There are quite a few of them.
The actual fact is that the denial of the right to self-determination may well
retard the economic unity of different peoples. The Chechens, it may be
recalled, wanted to be independent, but to stay in association with Russia (for
example, in the CIS). This was the stand of General Dudayev, their leader from
1991 until his murder by the Russians in 1996. If Russia had granted the right
to self-determination to Chechnya, all sorts of economic and social links would
have flourished between Russia and an ongoing economy in Chechnya.
Similarly, if it weren't for the vicious wars waged to deny the right to
self-determination to various Yugoslav republics, it is quite likely that the
relations between the independent republics would be much closer now. This in
turn would be favorable to the unity of the proletariat across national lines.
--Joseph Green
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
www.communistvoice.org
