LRB | Vol. 23 No. 8 dated 19 April 2001 | Tariq Ali

Bitter Chill of Winter
Tariq Ali

(clip)

In 1944 the National Conference had approved a constitution for an
independent Kashmir, which began:

"We the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh and the Frontier regions,
including Poonch and Chenani districts, commonly known as Jammu and
Kashmir State, in order to perfect our union in the fullest equality and
self-determination, to raise ourselves and our children for ever from
the abyss of oppression and poverty, degradation and superstition, from
medieval darkness and ignorance, into the sunlit valleys of plenty,
ruled by freedom, science and honest toil, in worthy participation of
the historic resurgence of the peoples of the East, and the working
masses of the world, and in determination to make this our country a
dazzling gem on the snowy bosom of Asia, do propose and propound the
following constitution of our state . . ."

But the 1947-48 war had made independence impossible, and Article 370 of
the Indian Constitution recognised only Kashmir's 'special status'.
True, the Maharaja was replaced by his son, Karan Singh, who became the
non-hereditary head of state, but it was a disappointed Abdullah who now
sat down to play chess with the politicians from Delhi. He knew that
most of them, apart from Gandhi and Nehru, would like to eat him alive.
For the moment, though, they needed him. Since the split with the
confessional element in the Jammu and Kashmir Conference, Abdullah had
moved to the left. As the elected Chief Minister of Kashmir he pushed
through a set of major reforms, the most important of which was the
'land to the tiller' legislation, which destroyed the power of the
landlords, most of whom were Muslims. They were allowed to keep a
maximum of 20 acres, provided they worked on the land themselves:
188,775 acres were transferred to 153,399 peasants, while the Government
organised collective farming on 90,000 acres. A law was passed
prohibiting the sale of land to non-Kashmiris, thus preserving the basic
topography of the region. Dozens of new schools and four hospitals were
built, and a university was founded in Srinagar with perhaps the most
beautiful location of any campus in the world.

These reforms were regarded as Communist-inspired in the United States,
where they were used to build support for America's new ally, Pakistan.
A classic example of US propaganda is Danger in Kashmir, written by
Josef Korbel. Korbel had been a Czech UN representative in Kashmir
before he defected to Washington. His book was published by Princeton in
1954, and in the second edition, in 1966, Korbel acknowledged the
'substantial help' of several scholars, including Mrs Madeleine Albright
of the Russian Institute at Columbia University - his daughter.

In 1948 the National Conference had backed 'provisional accession' to
India, on condition Kashmir was accepted as an autonomous republic with
only defence, foreign affairs and communications conceded to the centre.
A small but influential minority, made up of the Dogra nobility and the
Kashmiri Pandits, fearful of losing their privileges, began to campaign
against Kashmir's special status. In India proper, they were backed by
the ultra-right Jan Sangh (which in its current reincarnation as the
Bharatiya Janata Party heads the coalition Government in New Delhi). The
Jan Sangh provided funds and volunteers for agitation against the
Kashmir Government. Abdullah, who had gone out of his way to integrate
non-Muslims at every level of the Administration, was enraged. His
position hardened. At a public meeting in the enemy stronghold of Jammu
on 10 April 1952, he made it clear that he was not willing to surrender
Kashmir's partial sovereignty:

"Many Kashmiris are apprehensive as to what will happen to them and
their position if, for instance, something happens to Pandit Nehru. We
do not know. As realists, we Kashmiris have to provide for all
eventualities . . . If there is a resurgence of communalism in India how
are we to convince the Muslims of Kashmir that India does not intend to
swallow up Kashmir?"

Abdullah was mistaken only in his belief that Nehru would protect them.
When the Indian Prime Minister visited Srinagar in May 1953 he spent a
week trying to cajole his friend into accepting a permanent settlement
on Delhi's terms: if a secular democracy was to be preserved in India,
Kashmir had to be part of it. Nehru pleaded. Abdullah wasn't convinced:
Muslims were a large minority in India even if Kashmiris weren't
included. He felt that Nehru shouldn't be putting pressure on him but on
politicians inside the Congress who were susceptible to the chauvinistic
demands of the Jan Sangh.

Three months later, Nehru gave in to the chauvinists and authorised what
was effectively a coup in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed by
Karan Singh and one of his lieutenants, Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed, was
sworn in as Chief Minister. Abdullah was accused of being in contact
with Pakistani intelligence and arrested. Kashmir erupted. A general
strike began which was to last for twenty days. There were several
thousand arrests and Indian troops repeatedly opened fire on
demonstrators. The National Conference claimed that more than a thousand
people were killed: official statistics record 60 deaths. An underground
War Council, organised by Akbar Jehan, orchestrated demonstrations by
women in Srinagar, Baramulla and Sopore.

The unrest subsided after a month, but now Kashmiris were even more
suspicious of India. The situation was no happier in
Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, which had the additional disadvantage of
being made up of the least attractive part of the old state, a barren
moonscape. Appalling living conditions gave rise to large-scale economic
migration. Today, more Kashmiris live in Birmingham and Bradford than in
Mirpur or Muzaffarabad. An Islamist Kashmiri sits in the House of Lords
as a new Labour peer; another Kashmiri is the Tory candidate for Bolton
East.

Sheikh Abdullah, detained for four years without trial, was released
without warning one cold morning in January 1958. Declining the offer of
government transport, he hired a taxi and was driven to Srinagar. Within
days he was drawing huge crowds at meetings all over the country, which
he used to remind Nehru of the promise he had made in 1947. 'Why did you
go back on your word, Panditji?' Abdullah would ask, and the crowds
would echo the question. By spring, he had been arrested again. This
time the Indian Government, using British colonial legislation, began to
prepare a conspiracy case against him, his wife and several other
nationalist leaders. Nehru vetoed Akbar Jehan's inclusion: her
popularity made it inadvisable. The conspiracy trial began in 1959 and
lasted more than a year. In 1962 the special magistrate transferred the
case to a higher court with the recommendation that the accused be tried
under sections of the Indian penal code for which the punishment was
either death or life imprisonment.

full: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n08/ali_01_.html

--

The Marxism list: www.marxmail.org

Reply via email to