[In 1956 the American left faced many of the same problems it faces today.
The 1950s were a period of political retreat accompanied by a boom that
showed no signs of slowing down. A discussion broke out in the pages of the
radical National Guardian newspaper about the relevance of Marxism to the
new situation. Harry Braverman responded to the Guardian in the pages of
the American Socialist in a manner that would seem relevant to our
situation today which presents the American left with many of the same
sorts of imponderables. Braverman and co-editor Bert Cochran had split with
the American Trotskyist movement over perspectives following WWII. The
party leadership held the view--alluded to in Harry's article--that "The
end of World War Two was firmly expected to produce a return to the
depression of the thirties." As a corollary, the Trotskyist Socialist
Workers Party would recruit thousands if not millions of trade unionists to
its ranks and overthrow the capitalist system. Ironically, the Cochranite
faction not only included the most seasoned trade union militants, but also
the most talented Marxist economists starting with Braverman and Cochran
themselves. The American Socialist was probably the first Marxist
publication to reject the kind of "depression era" mentality that
characterized groups like the SWP as well as the naked revisionism of
groups like the Communist Party and the new left ideologues who would soon
make an appearance. The magazine not only featured perceptive economic
analysis from Braverman and Cochran, but those from other traditions such
as the ex-CP'er William Mandel and "council communist" Paul Mattick. For
the new Marxist left which we need so urgently in this country, those are
the kinds of standards we should aspire to.]

American Socialist, April 1956

The prolonged period of full employment has shaken the Left's confidence in
Marxist economics, and given rise to all sorts of "coalitionist" notions in
politics. This discussion of socialist perspectives sets forth a program
for the coming period.

Which Way to a New American Radicalism? 
by Harry Braverman

BY this time, the fact that the American Left has suffered a serious
decomposition--in numbers, spirit, organization, and ideology--is no longer
anybody's private secret. The problem is being discussed from time to time
in periodicals and organizations of the Left, and even those groups which
try hardest to maintain an outward demeanor of calm and unruffled composure
show signs of a shaken confidence.

As an important example of such recent discussions, the two series of
articles in the National Guardian by Tabitha Petran represented a healthy
reaction against shortcomings of the American radical movement which have
weakened it in its present crisis. The Communist Party took a heavy and
well-deserved slugging for its long-time penchant for dealing in slogans
and maneuvers without regard for their basic soundness; for its failure to
base its work, these many years, upon a serious and sustained advocacy of
socialism in America; for its latest hapless adventure in the form of a
so-called "coalition policy"-- this last being nothing but a fancy name for
a pathetic attempt to become a tail on a capitalist donkey.

It is widely understood that some of the major causes for the Left's
decline were outside its own control: the stabilization and expansion of
the capitalist economy after World War II, and the red-scare hysteria
connected with the cold war. No tactical recipes can drastically change our
situation, and infuse glowing health and rapid growth. But what such a
discussion can produce, if it is honestly and fearlessly pursued, is a
renewal of perspective, with- Out which no movement can thrive, and a set
of tactics which can meet the most pressing present problems, restore a
secure footing and balance, and open the way for progress on a small scale
today and on a larger scale when the situation in the country is more
favorable.

MUCH of the discussion has rightly centered around prospects for the U. S.
economy. Many reasons been adduced, both on the Left and elsewhere, why we
can no longer expect any serious economic debacle in America. Government
intervention and stabilizers, production, new industries, have all figured
in the argument. But undoubtedly the weightiest of all considerations has
gone unmentioned: the conservatism of the human mind. Much economic
reasoning that passes itself off as based on deep and technical cogitation
rests on no than the difficulty on the part of the reasoner of conceiving a
sharp turn in a situation which has continued without break for a
relatively long period of time. Realism is a quality of thinking much to be
admired and striven after, but where it lacks an essential leavening of
flexibility and dynamism it tends to see the future as a simple indefinite
continuation of the seemingly solid and impressive trends of the present.
In an epoch which is subject to sharp changes--without notice--the better
prophets have often been the "unrealistic visionaries."

The truth of the matter is that the long prosperity has shaken the
confidence of many American socialists in Marxist economic analysis. The
end of World War Two was firmly expected to produce a return to the
depression of the thirties. Later, the '49 slump was regarded as the
definitive turn in the economy, and again in 1954 expectations were
renewed. Leaving aside whether analyses--which all on the Left shared in
common were justified at the time they were made and just what altered the
picture in each case, the effect in the Left in every instance a further
weakening of confidence. The hypnotic effect of a long-sustained boom which
began to involve many people on the Left personally in its workings didn't
help matters much ideologically either, although financially the effect was
salubrious in individual cases.

IN the process, much of the Marxist conviction leaked out and left a hollow
shell of ceremonial phrases filled by a kind of left-Keynesian content.
Many ex-radicals working as research directors for labor unions may
secretly believe that they are surreptitiously bringing Marxism to America
when they throw out a few superficial remarks about "the worker not being
able to buy back what produces" but a serious American left wing has to
grounded on more solid ideas.

Thus the first requirement of a discussion is that we stop nibbling at the
edges of the problem of the American economy and go in for a thoughtful
consideration of core of the problem: Has the fatal imbalance of the
capitalist structure of production and distribution been corrected, or can
it be basically corrected, by the governmental measures that have been
taken or which are in prospect? If that question is answered in the
affirmative then the traditional Marxist perspective must be set down as no
longer valid, and a snail's-pace program reform put in its place as the
only practical course the indefinite future. In that case, the posture of
distinct separation from liberalism which the Left now maintains ought to
be altered, and the program of merging with liberals in the Democratic
Party becomes a proper or at least a possible course of action.

It has by now become pretty widely accepted in several schools of economic
thought that every capitalist boom period is accompanied by certain
features which lead to its downfall: The boom carries the seed of its own
destruction. The Keynes school saw the trouble in a "psychological law" by
which people don't increase their spending as fast as their incomes go up
during a prosperity; this leads to a growing gap which investment fails to
bridge, and this in turn leads to a downward spiral. But statistical
observation in many periods of rising income has stubbornly to confirm the
existence of such a "psychological law."

The over-simplified theory of the laborites is that in a boom, profits rise
faster than wages, thus producing a shortage of purchasing power. While
this cuts closer to the heart of the matter, it takes effect for cause, and
fails to dig deeply enough for the underlying reasons. The theory falls
down when one considers that the remedy it proposes--rising wages--is a
feature of every boom period has never yet succeeded in preventing the
collapse.

THE unique feature of the Marxist analysis is that it describes a basic
disproportion in capitalist economy which cannot be lifted out of the
system short of doing with capitalism. Every boom hits its stride because
of a growing strength in purchasing power, but this in turn produces a
frenzy of competition and expansion in industry which is bound to far
outrace the population's consuming power. The mechanics which force
capitalism to this end are not primarily psychological, although that
element plays a role in the later stages of an upswing, but are directly
economic in character. In the anarchy, planlessness and jungle law of
capitalist competition, each capitalist is forced to fight for his profit
position and competitive standing; the race of technology and productivity
grows exceedingly swift; every possible particle of capital and credit is
drawn into the maelstrom in which money miraculously breeds money; and
every encouragement in the way of a boost in purchasing power drives the
boom to more dangerous speculative heights and over-expansion of industry.
To eliminate depression by a rise in wages adds a trifle of consuming power
and keeps the bubble going a while, but only inflates it bigger in the long
run. 

Are we in such a speculative boom today? There is no purpose here to dive
once more into a juggling of figures about the national income, investment,
consumption, etc., as, this material has already been paraded extensively
in the press to the point where people are getting to know those facts as
well as they know their own wages, and, in any event, what can be drawn
from them has a limited value. One feature of the attack which has been
made upon the economic problem is worth considering, however.

IF we retrace our steps over the analysis which was made by the Left during
the past decade, we find that our starting point was this: The boom, it was
postulated, is due to the vastly expanded military program which was
inaugurated with the cold war. This first axiom was undoubtedly correct.
But from there we went on to others which may not have been so correct.
Take away the expanding war sector, we said, and the boom will fall as a
tree when its trunk is severed. We now have the experience of the past
years in which the budget of Federal expenditures has leveled off; the
boom, instead of collapsing, went on to a new height.

Why did the boom walk so easily past the grave we had ready-dug for it? The
answer, apparently, is that, like every boom in capitalism, when once under
way it had a great internal power to exhaust by its own natural
development. We forgot what the Marxists since Marx have always readily
admitted: that capitalism in its upswing disposes of an enormous expansive
force which revolutionizes production and consumption for the duration of
that part of its cycle. That there was no inherent reason why this was no
longer possible in mid-Twentieth Century America has now been substantially
proven, although it may well have been impossible without the priming
effect of the huge war program to get it started.

Actually, the war program, by devouring the speculative surpluses thrown
off by the boom, may have restrained the feverish excesses for a while.
There is much evidence to show that this is so, and there is also evidence
which may indicate that the pattern of the twenties is only now beginning
(see: "Is the Boom Losing Its Balance?" American Socialist, March 1956).
Corporations, having attained the necessary glow of reassurance which is
always most dangerous in a boom, are starting a competitive expansion and
modernization of their plants which the consumer-government markets do not
appear to warrant.

OUR purpose here is not to deny that the laws of capitalism may be modified
in their action. The laws which Marx discovered are the skeletal bones of
the structure; they have been repeatedly modified. Britain's long
Nineteenth Century stranglehold of the world market postponed the operation
of the basic trend in that land, and the Marxists were forced to take
account of that. The broad growth of imperialism in the three decades
preceding the first World War, by coercing into existence a vastly
profitable field of trade, investment, and super-exploitation of colonial
labor and markets, brought about still another and bolder modification of
Marxist economics, brilliantly accomplished by Lenin, Rudolph Hilferding,
and others. The special circumstances making possible the flowering of
American capitalism in the twenties when world capitalism was already in
decay, again forced a re-adjustment of Marxism, although this last has
never been accomplished in the U. S. as well as it should. In every case,
there were many who wanted to throw out the entire Marxist system, and made
their revisionist pronouncements to that effect--generally just before the
new economic collapse.

In any case, Marxism is not a ready-made slot-machine dogma, but a broad
theory of social development which requires application and
re-interpretation in every period. In the present period, we are up against
the problem of the effect of a permanent war economy upon the evolution of
capitalism. Such a big war sector as we now have can bring a great boom
into existence where none was before; that we have already seen in action.
But there is no evidence to show that the continuation of a big war sector
at a maximum level can suspend the basic laws of the system entirely. On
the raised plateau to which the war sector has lifted it, the economy
develops the same contradictions and disproportions as previously, as we
are now beginning to witness in the U. S. If it is argued that a new slump
can be fought 'by another increase in the government sector, that can only
mean the ever-increasing governmentalization of the economy. Should this
occur in the form of ever-greater war spending, then sooner or later a
devouring of the people's living standards by the demands of Moloch begins.
And should the attempt be made in the form of welfare spending of major
proportions, that would involve a great political struggle which would
inevitably become a struggle for socialism, as the capitalist class will
never submit to that road without an all-out battle.

What's in the cards? Probably the extremes of a continuously rising war
budget which will pauperize the people while the factories are going full
blast, or a huge welfare program to save capitalism, are both out as
realistic present perspectives. More likely we will see the present level
of government expenditures maintained or expanded somewhat, and, on the
basis of this high plateau, the laws of capitalism begin to reassert
themselves and, sooner or later, cause an economic decline even while the
government sector remains large.

There is no attempt here to exhaust the question under discussion, as there
is much more to it. An economic theory which has been so brilliantly
confirmed over a period of a century in so many countries should not be
discarded as a result of the experience of a half-dozen years in one
country--that is the main proposition for Marxists to keep a firm grip on.
Taking this as the basis for our discussion, we at once confront some
further questions, the first of which is: What will be the effect of a
serious and prolonged weakening of the economy upon politics?

It has been argued (by the Communist Party and others) that radicalism
would not benefit from a depression, that fascist and McCarthyite
demagogues would be the chief beneficiaries. Even were this so it would not
prevent a depression if one were in the cards. But this is a claim that
flies in the face of all historical experience. One need only recall Europe
in the twenties and thirties, when the breakdown and stagnation of
capitalism produced a mass radicalization which has persisted and deepened
to the present day, or America in the Great Depression. The German
experience showed that it was only after a prolonged period of hardship,
during which the working-class parties proved incapable of resolving the
crisis, that fascist demagogues, born also of economic troubles, and
preaching their brand of "idiot's socialism," were given their chance by
middle classes crazed by long desperation.

In the last decade of his life Frederick Engels brought to bear a truly
admirable realism and objectivity upon the perspectives held in earlier
years, and concluded that many vistas had been foreshortened in the minds
of the founders of scientific socialism. For England, he attributed the
slowness of development to the "share" in the benefits of "England's
industrial monopoly" which fell to the working class. But, he concluded in
a sentence which he was able to quote triumphantly seven years later, "With
the breakdown of that monopoly, the English working class will lose that
privileged position; it will find itself generally--the privileged and
leading minority not excepted--on a level with its fellow workers abroad.
that is the reason why there will be socialism again in England." The same
proposition holds here. Socialism will come again to America only when
economic conditions prepare the way.

The Communists insist in their polemic with the National Guardian that with
this view the Left would seem to favor a worsening of the conditions of the
workers an aid to the Left. But Marxists are irrevocably committed--so long
as they remain Marxists--to the proposition that the capitalist system is
running up against its limits of progressive development, and will
increasingly produce an intolerable situation for the mass of the people.
That is the raison d'être of modern socialism as a mass movement and not
just an ideal in the minds of men good will. To discard all that and try to
masquerade as simple citizens, kindly puzzled souls, and
community-conscious PTA members who expect nothing but good from capitalism
and will be rudely shocked by anything else, a bit too disingenuous. It
means to abandon our role as critics of the present order and prophets of a
new on and dissolve our thinking to the level of light-weight liberalism;
doing this would court more of the same kind of disaster for the Left as it
already has met with.

Our argument that capitalism in America still faces economic crises of its
classic sort, while it forms the basis for a perspective, does not
automatically solve the tactical problems of the present. For the fact
remains that between the present and a future breakdown of American
capitalism there lies an interval of time--no one can pretend to know how
long. For a period, the present isolation of the Left will persist, and
socialists need an approach to the problem of what to do now. . .

THERE has been no attempt here at an exhaustive survey of the job of the
Left. Much good work is open to us on the civil liberties front, in the
fight full equality for the Negro people and in the fight for peace; but
these are areas of general agreement and at any rate not the core of the
problem of the present discussion. If we review our basic conclusions, we
find the following: The socialist movement needs to revivify Marxist
economic perspectives, instead of permitting them to become weakened by
disuse and diffused by too much concentration on the small-scale and
immediate as against the long-term trend. We need a re-dedication to the
task of socialist education, and a bold approach to converting youth in
particular to socialism. We need to identify selves with a labor party
perspective for the unions, try to make a mark for that perspective
wherever possible inside the unions, instead of a pro-Democrat adventure.
We are convinced that this is the correct approach re-creating a virile,
principled, and confident socialist cadre in America.

Louis Proyect
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