Mark Jones wrote:
>
> Robin Hahnel wrote:
>
> > Minimizing pollution, taken literally, means zero pollution, which means
> > not moving and not farting. That hardly seems optimal.
> >
> and
>
> > What's wrong with capitalism is no matter how hard we try to
> > achieve the optimal level of pollu
Ken Hanly wrote:
> Why would not
> those who suffer the pollution be given ownership of the permits and >then they
>would be compensated directly?
Do you give each citizen the same number of permits? If so, this will
come out the same as giving each citizen his/er proportionate share of
the gr
Robin Hahnel wrote:
> Minimizing pollution, taken literally, means zero pollution, which means
> not moving and not farting. That hardly seems optimal.
>
and
> What's wrong with capitalism is no matter how hard we try to
> achieve the optimal level of pollution reduction, we're doomed to fall
>
Robin Hahnel wrote:
> So you want to auction off the permits. Great. That's better than giving
> them away for free since it makes the polluters pay and gains the
> victims some form of compensation in the form of more tax reveunes. And
> I like the idea of a minimum price equal to the marginal
Robin Hahnel wrote:
> So you want to auction off the permits. Great. That's better than giving
> them away for free since it makes the polluters pay and gains the
> victims some form of compensation in the form of more tax reveunes.
> > > is there is only one way to answer either of these quest
Gar W. Lipow wrote:
>
> Robin Hahnel wrote:
>
> >
> > I doubt you mean "non-tradable" in the above, since non tradable permits
> > are the equivalent of regulations (that most now call "command and
> > control."
>
> No, I mean non-tradeable. Non-tradeable permits are not the same as regulation
Rosser Jr, John Barkley wrote:
>
> Paul,
> Of course.
I agree with Barkley, here: "Of course." But then I and most on this
list who have
> defended permits have done so not on the basis of free
> distribution or sale at below social cost. Again, I would
> appreciate equivalent plans being
Barkley,
> Whether you have taxes, permits, quantity controls, or
>whatever, if someone is poisoning someone else and that can
>be shown (not always an easy if, as the Kodak situation
>indicates), then the poisonees ought to be able to take the
>poisoners to court, period. This is quite
Robin Hahnel wrote:
>
> I doubt you mean "non-tradable" in the above, since non tradable permits
> are the equivalent of regulations (that most now call "command and
> control."
No, I mean non-tradeable. Non-tradeable permits are not the same as regulation
if they
are sold to the highest bidder
Paul,
Of course. But then I and most on this list who have
defended permits have done so not on the basis of free
distribution or sale at below social cost. Again, I would
appreciate equivalent plans being compared, not an ideal
non-existent tax plan with an actually-existing permit pla
Anders,
Whether you have taxes, permits, quantity controls, or
whatever, if someone is poisoning someone else and that can
be shown (not always an easy if, as the Kodak situation
indicates), then the poisonees ought to be able to take the
poisoners to court, period. This is quite beyond
Barkely and Robin,
Correct me if I am off track here, but if permits are
distributed free (based on some past pattern), or if they
are initially priced below social cost, and then a
tradeable permit market created, does this not act as
a barrier to the entry of new firms who must buy up
permits
At 06:25 PM 3/2/98 -0500, you wrote:
>Louis P.,
> Well, as a matter of fact this sort of case in
>Rochester is exactly the sort that says that there needs to
>be some very specific quantity controls. This is the kind
>of case I had in mind with my mumbling about risky
>situations and how
The problem I still have with taxing pollution, let alone with trading
permits which is the moral equivalent of trading in human beings or
worse, is that I keep asking myself how we got here in the first place?
A century and a half of similar well-meant social reforms which collectively
managed t
Since by now we have been around on this quite a bit,
just three points:
1) The French and German and Dutch subsidies paid for
by pollution taxes are to cover the installation of
pollution control equipment, not for sequestration per se.
2) I think Robin's right that firms don't
> I've already said I prefer auctions to handouts.
> Robin challenges us to say when were there auctions (they
> were proposed in Wisconsin, but not carried out).
I knew about the Wisconsin case, and must say I'm not surprised that
although auctions were proposed (obviously only by some) the
Louis P.,
Well, as a matter of fact this sort of case in
Rochester is exactly the sort that says that there needs to
be some very specific quantity controls. This is the kind
of case I had in mind with my mumbling about risky
situations and how social cost curves can suddenly go up,
tha
Concerning Eastman Kodak, it is interesting that they worked closely with the
Atomic Energy Commission in the 50s regarding fallout. The AEC was worried
that fallout, while benign to the human organism, might degrate Eastman's film.
--
Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State Unive
> Again, I have a feeling that this taxes versus permits
>debate as we have been debating it has a "rearranging deck
>chairs on the Titanic" air about it. None of this really
>deals with more deeply rooted ecological questions that get
>buried in that nice fuzzy rubric of "measuring socia
Just back from the EEA and I read my mail backward.
So here is a response to Robin H.'s latest.
I've already said I prefer auctions to handouts.
Robin challenges us to say when were there auctions (they
were proposed in Wisconsin, but not carried out). I'll
turn it around. He in
Gar W. Lipow wrote:
> Granted that parecon would generate full social and ecological price signals, I
> still don't understand why in capitalism non-tradable, auctioned, permits with a
> floor are not superior.
I doubt you mean "non-tradable" in the above, since non tradable permits
are the equi
Robin Hahnel wrote:
> I have been campaigning on this theme recently because the mainstream of
> the profession has generated an intellectual stampede in favor of
> permits and has ignored taxes completely. I think the entire reason is
> permits can be part of a massive corporate boondoggle --
Rosser Jr, John Barkley wrote:
>
> Robin,
> Well, it is your judgment that all the other arguments
> besides the one you cite are "hot air." Maybe, maybe not.
Fair enough. That's why I gave the full reference for Oates' article so
people wouldn't have to take my word for it.
> Person
> Note to Robin: I wonder if non-tradable permits auctioned with a floor aren't really
>pollution taxes.
Permits and taxes are not the same. The only thing that is "the same" is
that IN THEORY -- if there are no market failures in the permit markets
-- auctioning off a particular number of permi
MScoleman wrote:
> In a message dated 98-02-25 21:27:27 EST, Barkley Rosser asks:
>
> << Maggie,
> What about when there are both taxes and subsidies as
> we see in France and Germany?
> Actually when the major US environmental laws were put
> in place in the early 70s most of the
In a message dated 98-02-25 21:27:27 EST, Barkley Rosser asks:
<< Maggie,
What about when there are both taxes and subsidies as
we see in France and Germany?
Actually when the major US environmental laws were put
in place in the early 70s most of the profession advocated
taxes, a
Robin,
Well, it is your judgment that all the other arguments
besides the one you cite are "hot air." Maybe, maybe not.
I completely agree that the initial setup is very
important and am no particular fan of this particular form
of initial distribution. Let them buy them from the
g
Maggie,
What about when there are both taxes and subsidies as
we see in France and Germany?
Actually when the major US environmental laws were put
in place in the early 70s most of the profession advocated
taxes, an idea dating back at least to Pigou. This was
rejected in favor of wh
well, i WAS going to ignore this topic -- but, since I AM teaching micro (in
addition to my technical work at that large utility) According to Baumol
and Blinder, taxing pollution cuts pollution more than subsidies or credits.
The NEOCLASSICAL solution they propose is that subsidies increase
> Now please remind me why my
> eco-guru Wally Oates said permits are more efficient
> than taxes?
First late me quote Professor Oates. (Cropper and Oates: Environmental
Economics, JEL June 1992, p. 687) "Some interesting issues arise in the
choice between systems of effluent fees and marketable
Michael,
True, but this really relates to the broader question
of the employment impacts of more stringent environmental
controls (assuming that alternative schemes that are being
compared are reasonably put together, not a comparison with
"ideal taxes" versus some scam-ridden permit schem
Max B. Sawicky wrote:
A tax on profits or pollution that reduces employment is also a partial tax
on labor.
I respond that it can also induce more employment engaged in pollution
control.
--
Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
Chico, CA 95929
Tel. 916-898-5321
E-
In the words of Chumbawamba, I get knocked down,
but I get up again, etc. etc.
Hahnel has kicked my ass pretty well but I
have a few last words before I expire. I'm
too dumb to know when I'm licked.
I even dusted off my Baumol and Oates to
get some answers, but the book failed my ten
minute att
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