[Rosen's letter to editor to the Atlantic, posted by Juan Cole]
http://www.juancole.com/2004_07_01_juancole_archive.html#108913458457643751
Guest Comment on Fallujah and Kaplan: Nir Rosen
Journalist Nir Rosen, who has spent most of the past year in Iraq and has fluent Arabic, recently reported on Fallujah for the New Yorker. He objects to many details and arguments in the reporting of of Robert Kaplan on Fallujah for The Atlantic Monthly. (http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/int2004-06-15.htm)
We print here by permission his recent letter to the editor at The Atlantic Monthly
'Letter to the Editor
Having spent a great deal of time in Falluja since the occupation
of Iraq began, and most recently the entire month of May for my
article on Falluja for the New Yorker Magazine, I was disappointed
by some errors I noted in Robert Kaplan's piece entitled "Five Days
in Falluja," as well as by Kaplan's unambiguous identification with
the Marines he wrote about. Kaplan describes Falluja as "the classic terrain of radicalism,"
distinguishing radicalism from conservatism. Kaplan views the
authoritarian royal courts of Morroco, Jordan and the Gulf States
as venerable for their traditions, traditions that in the case of
Jordan and the Gulf are artificial and not more than a century old.
Unlike these royal courts that represent in fact the "break in
tradition" in "the House of Islam" of which Kaplan writes, Falluja
is in fact the most traditional city in Iraq. Unlike Tikrit, for
example, where the tribes are urbanized, based inside the city, the
tribes of Falluja are concentrated in the rural areas surrounding
the city, and thus have not modernized and abandoned tribal customs
as much as other parts of the country. The tight tribal bonds of
Falluja helped preserve the city's stability following the fall of
Saddam's regime. The religious and tribal leaders appointed their
own civil management council even before American troops entered
the city. Tribes assumed control of the city's institutions and
protected government buildings. Religious leaders, whose authority
was respected, exhorted the people to respect the law and maintain
order. Thus there was a continuity of authority and tradition in
Falluja lacking in other parts of Iraq. Known in Iraq as "Medinat al Masajid," or the City of Mosques, for
the over 80 mosques that dominate the city's cultural life, Falluja
is in fact famous for its Islamic traditions, including various
orders of Sufi Islam and the very conservative Salafi brand of
Sunni Islam. One does not find the "break in tradition" of which
Kaplan speaks, nor the reinvented abstract and ideological form of
Islam he blames for radicalism. Instead one finds numerous centers
for religious study that produce many of Iraq's most important
theologians. The vast majority of the armed fighters in Falluja
were not motivated by radical Islamic beliefs, but were fighting to
defend their families, homes, city and way of life from the brutal
American onslaught and were motivated by nationalism and pride.
The fighters were not, as Kaplan has us believe by quoting
Lieutenant Colonel Byrne, men who fought in Chechnya or
Afghanistan. The vast majority of the fighters were local men who
had prior military experience in the Iraqi military. A few dozen
foreign fighters were also present, though most were too young to
have fought anywhere else. Kaplan also fails to explain how Byrne's
orders to grow mustaches and subsequently to shave them had
anything to do with cultural sensitivity. The Marines would have
been more culturally sensitive had they not offended Falluja's
residents by humiliating their fierce pride through violent
searches that terrified women and children and involved placing
boots in the heads of men. Nor were the fighters of Falluja known as Ali Babas, a common Iraqi
term for thieves, and what he claims the one Iraq he met called
them. They were known as Mujahedin or Muqatilin, which both mean
"fighters," though Mujahedin has a more religious connotation.
Kaplan repeatedly refers to the several thousand men of Falluja who
fought fiercely in self defense as Ali Babas. They were in fact,
organized efficiently thanks to military officers in their ranks,
and obeyed the commands of officers in alliance with religious and
tribal leaders who often had their own virtual armies. Loud
speakers on the mosque towers were used for communication, alerting
the fighters to where the Marines were approaching and instructing
them to move to various fronts. Kaplan comments on the dominance of southern Christian
fundamentalism among the Marines without judgment and reports that
their chaplain compares their entry to Falluja with Christ's entry
into Jerusalem, describing their impending destruction of much of
the city as "a spiritual battle and you Marines are the tools of
mercy." Kaplan admires the Marines' "matter-of-fact willingness to
die." Though he mistakenly insists that the defenders of Falluja
were cowards who used the cover of women and children to attack the
Marines, both the attackers and defenders had much more in common
than he would have us believe. Falluja's defenders believed they
were defending their religion and many bravely sacrificed their
lives in defense of their neighborhoods against a terrible and
mighty foe. They displayed the same solidarity and brotherhood
Kaplan admires so much in his Marines. Kaplan's glorification of
military values is also disturbing. Perhaps some Marines should
have questioned orders to invade a city of three hundred thousand,
pulverizing neighborhoods and killing at least 800 people, most of
them women and children. I smelled the death in the city's air from
corpses hastily buried in backyards and the five hundred bodies in
the soccer fields, I saw the hospitals riddled with bullets and
shells, I met the ambulance drivers who were wounded by snipers, I
saw children missing limbs from Marine bullets and shells, but
Kaplan either conceals or is unaware of the indiscriminate violence
the Marines he identifies with so much unleashed upon the city,
causing thousands of refugees and then preventing families from
returning home unless the fighters surrendered. Kaplan's comfort
with the word imperialism is also worrisome, but most alarming is
his repeated use of the word "us" to describe the Marines. Should
he not strive for a certain amount of objectivity? Kaplan is
maddened by the "enemy's" successful intelligence and it seems also
disappointed by the "bad news" that "politics in the form of
ceasefires" was intruding to prevent he and his Marines from
"taking down the city," a city of three hundred thousand people,
hundreds of whom he and his marines killed, along with hundreds of
homes they destroyed. Did Kaplan assimilate the urge to fight to
the end that no doubt the young Marines he was with felt? Though I
recognize the difficulty involved in remaining impartial when
living with the affable young men of the American military who risk
their lives for the whims of politicians back in Washington, having
been embedded myself, I believe it is no less, and perhaps more,
important to identify with the receiving end of American
Imperialism and military might and to question the assertions of
both military and political leaders.'Nir Rosen
posted by Juan @ 7/6/2004 01:13:52 PM
