Re: [HACKERS] lowering privs in SECURITY DEFINER function

2011-04-11 Thread Jim Nasby
On Apr 8, 2011, at 6:17 PM, Alvaro Herrera wrote: >> In other words, if you wrap an unprivileged operation inside of >> privileged operations, it seems like the unprivileged operation then >> becomes privileged. Right? > > Well, it's in the hands of the creator of the overall wrapper function > to

Re: [HACKERS] lowering privs in SECURITY DEFINER function

2011-04-11 Thread Alvaro Herrera
Excerpts from Robert Haas's message of dom abr 10 13:37:46 -0300 2011: > It's maybe worth noting here that what's being asked for is roughly > what you get from UNIX's distinction between euid and ruid. Many > programs that run setuid root perform a few operations that require > root privileges u

Re: [HACKERS] lowering privs in SECURITY DEFINER function

2011-04-10 Thread Robert Haas
On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 6:39 PM, Jeff Davis wrote: > On Wed, 2011-04-06 at 18:33 -0300, Alvaro Herrera wrote: >> (Consider, for example, that you may want to enable a user to run some >> operation to which he is authorized, but you want to carry out some >> privileged operation before/after doing s

Re: [HACKERS] lowering privs in SECURITY DEFINER function

2011-04-08 Thread A.M.
On Apr 8, 2011, at 7:20 PM, Alvaro Herrera wrote: > Excerpts from A.M.'s message of mié abr 06 19:08:35 -0300 2011: > >> That's really strange considering that the new role may not normally >> have permission to switch to the original role. How would you handle >> the case where the security def

Re: [HACKERS] lowering privs in SECURITY DEFINER function

2011-04-08 Thread Alvaro Herrera
Excerpts from A.M.'s message of mié abr 06 19:08:35 -0300 2011: > That's really strange considering that the new role may not normally > have permission to switch to the original role. How would you handle > the case where the security definer role is not the super user? As I said to Jeff, it's u

Re: [HACKERS] lowering privs in SECURITY DEFINER function

2011-04-08 Thread Alvaro Herrera
Excerpts from Jeff Davis's message of mié abr 06 19:39:27 -0300 2011: > On Wed, 2011-04-06 at 18:33 -0300, Alvaro Herrera wrote: > > (Consider, for example, that you may want to enable a user to run some > > operation to which he is authorized, but you want to carry out some > > privileged operatio

Re: [HACKERS] lowering privs in SECURITY DEFINER function

2011-04-06 Thread Jeff Davis
On Wed, 2011-04-06 at 18:33 -0300, Alvaro Herrera wrote: > (Consider, for example, that you may want to enable a user to run some > operation to which he is authorized, but you want to carry out some > privileged operation before/after doing so: for example, disable > triggers, run an update, re-en

Re: [HACKERS] lowering privs in SECURITY DEFINER function

2011-04-06 Thread A.M.
On Apr 6, 2011, at 5:33 PM, Alvaro Herrera wrote: > Hi, > > A customer of ours has for a long time the desire to be able to return > to the previous privilege level (i.e. the caller privs) inside a > SECURITY DEFINER function. I find that this notion is not at all > covered in the SQL standard,

[HACKERS] lowering privs in SECURITY DEFINER function

2011-04-06 Thread Alvaro Herrera
Hi, A customer of ours has for a long time the desire to be able to return to the previous privilege level (i.e. the caller privs) inside a SECURITY DEFINER function. I find that this notion is not at all covered in the SQL standard, yet the use case is certainly valid from a security-concious po