[HACKERS] FDW question - how to identify columns to populate in response?

2015-08-14 Thread Bear Giles
Hi, I'm working on a FDW for the unix/linux user database - think /etc/passwd and /etc/group although I'm actually using system calls that could be quietly redirected to LDAP or other backends. It's easy to create the FDW and a table associated with it, something like CREATE TABLE passwd ( name

[HACKERS] what would tar file FDW look like?

2015-08-17 Thread Bear Giles
I'm starting to work on a tar FDW as a proxy for a much more specific FDW. (It's the 'faster to build two and toss the first away' approach - tar lets me get the FDW stuff nailed down before attacking the more complex container.) It could also be useful in its own right, or as the basis for a zip f

Re: [HACKERS] what would tar file FDW look like?

2015-08-17 Thread Bear Giles
the digital certificate and the (optionally encrypted) private key. It has searchable metadata, e.g., finding all records with a specific subject.) Bear On Mon, Aug 17, 2015 at 8:29 AM, Greg Stark wrote: > On Mon, Aug 17, 2015 at 3:14 PM, Bear Giles wrote: > > I'm starting to w

Re: [HACKERS] Proposal: Trigonometric functions in degrees

2015-10-26 Thread Bear Giles
> > ​ > Stupid question - is sin(3m) a call-through to the math coprocessor?​ It probably only matters when doing a series of calculations (where the extra guard bits can matter) and not when doing a simple one-time lookup but it might be something to consider in regards to setting a precedent. B

Re: [HACKERS] Kerberos principal to dbuser mapping

2002-05-16 Thread Bear Giles
> > > Is there any existing way of making queries from > > > postmaster (other than setting up a client > > > connection from it)? > > > > There is no existing way, and none will be added in > > the future either. > > There are good system-reliability reasons for > > keeping the postmaster > > aw

[HACKERS] SSL client cert patch submitted

2002-05-17 Thread Bear Giles
I just submitted a patch to support SSL client certificates. With this patch the Port structure is extended to include a new field, 'peer', that contains the client certificate if offered. This patch also cleans up the SSL code. Most of this should be invisible to users, with the exception of a

[HACKERS] SASL, compression?

2002-05-18 Thread Bear Giles
I've been looking at the authentication and networking code and would like to float a trial balloon. 1) add SASL. This is a new standards-track protocol that is often described as "PAM" for network authentication. PostgreSQL could remove *all* protocol-specific authentication code and use

[HACKERS] pq_eof() broken with SSL

2002-05-18 Thread Bear Giles
I came across another bug in the SSL code. backend/libpq/pqcomm.c:pq_eof() calls recv() to read a single byte of data to check for EOF. The character is then stuffed into the read buffer. This will not work with SSL. Besides the data being encrypted, you could end up reading a byte from an SSL

Re: [HACKERS] SASL, compression?

2002-05-18 Thread Bear Giles
> I'm not that clueful about SASL -- would this mean that we could get > rid of the PostgreSQL code that does SSL connections, plus MD5, crypt, > ident, etc. based authentication, and instead just use the SASL stuff? We would still need the ability to map user identities -> pgusers for those meth

Re: [HACKERS] SASL, compression?

2002-05-18 Thread Bear Giles
> Bear Giles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > 1) add SASL. This is a new standards-track protocol that is often > >described as "PAM" for network authentication. > > To me, "new standards-track protocol" translates as "pie in the sky&

Re: [HACKERS] pq_eof() broken with SSL

2002-05-19 Thread Bear Giles
> > a better fix is to explicitly create a new abstraction layer. > > Well, this is supposed to be an abstraction already. ;-) The new abstraction layer would localize SSL vs. plain sockets, and possibly SASL as well. The SSL issues I've identified to date are: critical - no check for SSL_g

[HACKERS] revised SSL patches submitted

2002-05-19 Thread Bear Giles
Another set of SSL patches have been sent to the patches list. (No idea when they'll get through the system.) This is a new baseline set of patches that fix many of the problems identified earlier and also add a number of security patches. N.B., some of these changes are visible to the user, but

Re: [HACKERS] SASL, compression?

2002-05-19 Thread Bear Giles
> What are the benefits of SASL+Postgresql compared to Postgresql over plain SSL? SASL is orthogonal to SSL. SASL is an application-layer library and can be run over either regular sockets or SSL. However there are SASL hooks to tell it that it's running over a secure channel. The anticipated

Re: [HACKERS] SASL, compression?

2002-05-20 Thread Bear Giles
> I can see the benefit of SASL as a standard in public exposed network > services like email servers (SMTP, POP, IMAP), where you can support > different email clients which themselves may or may not support SASL and > may use different SASL libraries. > > But for Postgresql - communications

[HACKERS] First cut at mkcert

2002-05-20 Thread Bear Giles
Attached is the first cut at mkcert.sh, a tool to create PostgreSQL server certificates. It also sets up a directory suitable for the OpenSSL CA tool, something that can be used to sign client certs. The root cert should be added to the backend SSL cert verification tools, and copied to user's .

[HACKERS] First cut at SSL documentation

2002-05-20 Thread Bear Giles
Attached is the first cut at some SSL documetation for the PostgreSQL manual. It's in plain text, not DocBook, to make editing easy for the first few revisions. The documentation leads the code by a day or so. Also, I'm still having problems with the patches list - none of my recent submissions

[HACKERS] 2nd cut at SSL documentation

2002-05-21 Thread Bear Giles
A second cut at SSL documentation SSL Support in PostgreSQL = Who needs it? = The sites that require SSL fall into one (or more) of several broad categories. *) They have insecure networks. Examples of insecure networks are anyone in a "corporate

[HACKERS] Security policy

2002-05-22 Thread Bear Giles
I sent this earlier, but accidently sent it from the wrong account and it's been sitting in the pending spool all day. Since writing it, I've sketched in server-side GSS-API and SASL support for my prior patches. The objective isn't to immediately support either, but to ensure that future suppor

[HACKERS] Security policy

2002-05-23 Thread Bear Giles
It occurs to me that part of the problem with wasted and incomplete efforts can be fixed with a clear security policy. The part that I'm interested in is provided below, in a very truncated form. Secure Communications Channels -- Secure communications channels can b

[HACKERS] Really stupid question(?)

2002-05-23 Thread Bear Giles
I've been giving a lot of thought to some of the questions raised by my SSL patch, and have both a conclusion and a really stupid question. First, the conclusion is that what I'm working on is "secure sessions." As I mentioned before, that's not just encryption (e.g., SSH tunnels), but the combin

Re: [HACKERS] First cut at SSL documentation

2002-06-13 Thread Bear Giles
> Sorry, there is a newer version. I will use that one. You may want to hold off on that - I've been busy lately and haven't had a chance to revisit the documentation or change some of the literal constants to numeric constants, but it's been on my "to do" list. The latter didn't affect the oth

Re: SSL/TLS support (Was: Re: [HACKERS] 7.3.1 stamped)

2002-12-28 Thread Bear Giles
Bruce Momjian wrote: Marc G. Fournier wrote: My suggestion would be to eventually phase out ssl2 in favor of ssl3 or tls. And, as we are phasing it out, make it an opt-in thing, where the dba has to turn on ssl2 KNOWING he is turning on a flawed protocol. That was sort of my point --- if we a

[HACKERS] next set of SSL - ideas?

2002-12-28 Thread Bear Giles
I should have some time free... and I wanted to get back to what seemed to be the most critical problem in the last cycle with the SSL code. Specifically, it's time to think about setting up a "policy" file. This puts a bit more work on the DBA, but it gives them complete flexibility in how th

[HACKERS] SSL sessions

2002-12-28 Thread Bear Giles
On other quick note - when we were discussing SSL sessions earlier I remember the concensus was that database clients usually keep a connection established for relatively long times. But now I'm not so sure - what about web servers communicating to a database backend? They should use connectio

Re: [HACKERS] XML

2002-03-20 Thread Bear Giles
> You have to write xmlGetUser() to take in the userid and return the > xml required for it. I see no advantage to generating the xml in the > db rather than in the servlet. As a counterexample, my PKIX extensions defined an "XML" datatype that could be used to generate XML instead of the standa

[HACKERS] inserting user defined types through a rule?

2002-04-01 Thread Bear Giles
I recently discovered a problem inserting a user-defined type when going through a rule. I'm not sure if it's a -hackers or -users question, but since it involves the interaction of a user-defined type and rules I thought it envitable that I would end up here anyway. The object in question is m

Re: [HACKERS] inserting user defined types through a rule?

2002-04-01 Thread Bear Giles
I'm using 7.1.3 currently, but am building and installing 7.2.1 tonight to see if this fixes the problem. I don't know the standard types and functions well enough to be able to whip out a test case, but I think I do have an idea on what the problem is. If I'm right, the problem is triggered by

Re: [HACKERS] help with bison

2002-04-10 Thread Bear Giles
> In fact, my grammar currently has an obscene > 20 shift/reduce and 4 reduce/reduce conflicts! A shift/reduce conflict, IIRC, usually indicates a situation where the grammar is unambiguous but may be inefficient. Eliminating them is nice, but not critical. A R/R conflict, in contrast, is a poi

Re: [HACKERS] help with bison

2002-04-10 Thread Bear Giles
> > As an aside, is there any reason to treat TEMP and TEMPORARY as two > > separate identifiers? > > Yes: if the lexer folds them together then unreserved_keyword can't > regenerate the equivalent name properly. But if they're synonyms, is that necessary? I'm not indifferent to the benefits of