AW: AW: AW: [HACKERS] ALTER TABLE DROP COLUMN

2000-10-13 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
Hiroshi's patch would make for a good starting point by bringing in the ability to do the DROP COLUMN feature, as I understand, without the rollback capability, No Hiroshi's patch is rollback enabled, simply because all it does is change some system tables. It only does not free space that

AW: [HACKERS] ALTER TABLE DROP COLUMN

2000-10-12 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
being deleted, then if the system crashes part way through, it should be possible to continue after the system is brought up, no? If it crashes in the middle, some rows have the column removed, and some do not. We would need to know where this separation is, but we cannot do a

AW: AW: [HACKERS] Reimplementing permission checks for rules

2000-10-12 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
Sorry for the late reply, but I was on vacation (my 2. daughter was born). After looking at the rule rewriter some more, I realized that the only way to push all permissions checks to execution time is not only to keep skipAcl, but to generalize it. The problem is with checks on the view

AW: [HACKERS] Reimplementing permission checks for rules

2000-09-29 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
What I'm thinking about doing is eliminating the "skipAcl" RTE field and instead adding an Oid field named something like "checkAclAs". The semantics of this field would be "if zero, check access permissions for this table using the current effective userID; but if not zero, check access

AW: [HACKERS] Please no // comments in C source (ecpg)

2000-09-25 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
Please don't use C++ style comments in C source files. It does not work for all ports. AFAIK, only GCC supports // as comments. // comments are legal as of Standard C 1999, so expect more compilers to accept them silently. (That still doesn't mean we get to use them, of

AW: AW: [HACKERS] setuid functions, a solution to the RI privilege problem

2000-09-18 Thread Zeugswetter Andreas SB
But the pg_shadow authentication is based on credentials provided by the client whereas what you propose here would run on the server, so this doesn't make sense. Since you can write extensions to PostgreSQL that reach far into the OS, it does make sense to execute those extensions under

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