Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2017-03-28 Thread Michael Paquier
On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Michael Paquier > wrote: >> On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 1:33 PM, Michael Paquier >> wrote: >>> Patch moved to CF 2017-01. >> >>

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2017-01-31 Thread Michael Paquier
On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 1:33 PM, Michael Paquier > wrote: >> Patch moved to CF 2017-01. > > And nothing has happened since, the patch rotting a bit because of a > conflict in pg_dump's

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2017-01-31 Thread Michael Paquier
On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 1:33 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Michael Paquier > wrote: >> On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Ideriha, Takeshi >> wrote: >>> I applied your fixed patch

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-28 Thread Michael Paquier
On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Ideriha, Takeshi > wrote: >> I applied your fixed patch and new one, and confirmed the applied source >> passed the tests successfully. And I

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-24 Thread Michael Paquier
On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Ideriha, Takeshi wrote: > I applied your fixed patch and new one, and confirmed the applied source > passed the tests successfully. And I also checked manually the error messages > were emitted successfully when cr/lf are included

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-24 Thread Ideriha, Takeshi
> > [Summary] > > 1. apply patch and make world > > -> failed because was mistakenly coded . > > > > 2.correct this mistake and make check-world > > -> got 1 failed test: "'pg_dumpall with \n\r in database name'" > > because test script cannot createdb "foo\n\rbar" > > The attached

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-22 Thread Michael Paquier
On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 5:55 PM, Ideriha, Takeshi wrote: > Here's a summary for what I tested in RHEL7.0, details follow. Thanks for the review. > [Summary] > 1. apply patch and make world > -> failed because was mistakenly coded . > > 2.correct this mistake

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-22 Thread Ideriha, Takeshi
Hi, Here's a summary for what I tested in RHEL7.0, details follow. [Summary] 1. apply patch and make world -> failed because was mistakenly coded . 2.correct this mistake and make check-world -> got 1 failed test: "'pg_dumpall with \n\r in database name'" because test script cannot

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-10-11 Thread Michael Paquier
On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 11:00 AM, Noah Misch wrote: > I count one person disfavoring the patch concept of rejecting these characters > early, and I count two people, plus yourself as author, favoring it. > Therefore, the patch can move forward with the proposed design. The

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-10-10 Thread Noah Misch
On Sun, Oct 02, 2016 at 10:47:04PM +0900, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Michael Paquier > wrote: > > On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 10:01 AM, Noah Misch wrote: > >> I discourage documenting LF/CR restrictions. For the epsilon

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-10-02 Thread Michael Paquier
On Sun, Oct 2, 2016 at 10:47 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > And seeing nothing happening here, I still don't know what to do with > this patch. Thoughts? If we are going to do nothing I would suggest to > just remove the comment in string_utils.c saying that such LF and

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-10-02 Thread Michael Paquier
On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 10:01 AM, Noah Misch wrote: >> I discourage documenting LF/CR restrictions. For the epsilon of readers who >> would benefit from this knowledge, the error message

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-11 Thread Michael Paquier
On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 10:01 AM, Noah Misch wrote: > I discourage documenting LF/CR restrictions. For the epsilon of readers who > would benefit from this knowledge, the error message suffices. For everyone > else, it would just dilute the text. (One could argue against

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-11 Thread Noah Misch
On Thu, Sep 08, 2016 at 12:12:49PM -0400, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > On 9/6/16 1:42 PM, Robert Haas wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 9:43 PM, Peter Eisentraut > > wrote: > > > Everything that is using appendShellString() is now going to reject LF > > > and CR

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-08 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 9/6/16 1:42 PM, Robert Haas wrote: > If we were talking about pathnames containing spaces, I would agree, > but I've never heard of a legitimate pathname containing CR or LF. I > can't see us losing much by refusing to allow such pathnames, except > for security holes. The flip side of that

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-07 Thread Michael Paquier
On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 2:32 AM, Tom Lane wrote: > I think probably a better answer is to reject bad paths earlier, eg have > initdb error out before doing anything if the proposed -D path contains > CR/LF. Yes, that's a bug that we had better address. It is not nice to not

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-06 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 9:43 PM, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: >> Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against >> those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as >> commands into

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-06 Thread Tom Lane
Peter Eisentraut writes: > On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: >> Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against >> those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as >> commands into psql and shell. So attached is a

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-06 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against > those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as > commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patch to implement this > restriction in the backend, and I am

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-02 Thread Michael Paquier
On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 2:44 AM, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: >> Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against >> those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as >> commands into

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-01 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against > those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as > commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patch to implement this > restriction in the backend, How about

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Tom Lane
Peter Geoghegan writes: > On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 6:28 PM, Michael Paquier > wrote: >> There is no need to put restrictions on those I think, and they are >> actually supported. > Bi-directional text support (i.e., the use of right-to-left control >

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Peter Geoghegan
On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 6:28 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > There is no need to put restrictions on those I think, and they are > actually supported. Bi-directional text support (i.e., the use of right-to-left control characters) is known to have security implications,

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Michael Paquier
On Tue, Aug 23, 2016 at 10:19 AM, Peter Geoghegan wrote: > I haven't looked at the patch, but offhand I wonder if it's worth > considering control characters added by unicode, if you haven't already. There is no need to put restrictions on those I think, and they are actually

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Peter Geoghegan
I haven't looked at the patch, but offhand I wonder if it's worth considering control characters added by unicode, if you haven't already. -- Peter Geoghegan

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Michael Paquier
On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 10:12 AM, Michael Paquier wrote: > Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against > those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as > commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patch to implement this

[HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-11 Thread Michael Paquier
Hi all, As CVE-2016-5424 has put recently in light, using LF and CR in database and role names can lead to unexpected problems in the way they are handled in logical backups or generated command lines. There is as well a comment in the code mentioning a potential restriction for that, precisely