Re: [HACKERS] Identify user requested queries

2015-11-23 Thread Praveen M
Hi Craig,

Thanks for the input. I guess i need to read more code and see if it is
achievable. I started looking into the code very recently. Your inputs is
very valuable to me. Thanks.

Yes I am trying to do something similar to multi-tenancy. I will look at
the row level security.

Thanks
Praveen

On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 2:16 AM, Craig Ringer  wrote:

> On 23 November 2015 at 13:27, Praveen M  wrote:
>
>> Hi All,
>>
>> When the user attempts to make a connection with the database , the code
>> will look into various pg_catalog tables internally. However the user also
>> can query the pg_catalog tables. Is there a way to identify the user
>> requested (or typed query) vs the system requested (internal) queries?
>>
>
> As far as I know there is no simple and reliable method but I'm no
> expert.
>
> Most system accesses to common catalogs use the syscache, which doesn't go
> through the SQL parse/bind/execute process. Or they construct simple scans
> directly, again bypassing the full parser. The system will run internal
> queries with the SPI though, and that's full-fledged SQL. Triggers, rules,
> views, etc, use the SPI, as does plpgsql, fulltext search, XML support, and
> a few other parts of the system. So you cannot assume that anything using
> SQL is user-originated.
>
> Take a look at PostgresMain in src/backend/tcop/postgres.c for the
> top-level user query entry point. You'll see there that you cannot rely on
> testing isTopLevel because multiple statements sent as a single query
> string are treated as if they were a nested transaction block.
> (see exec_simple_query(), postgres.c around line 962). That'd also cause
> problems with use of PL/PgSQL.
>
> You can't assume that all SPI queries are safe, because the user can run
> queries via the SPI using plpgsql etc.
>
> I don't see any way to do this without introducing the concept of a
> "system query"... and in PostgreSQL that's not simple, because the system
> query could cause the invocation of user-defined operators, functions,
> triggers, etc, that then run user-defined code. You'd have to clear the
> "system query" flag whenever you entered user-defined code, then restore it
> on exit. That seems exceedingly hard to get right reliably.
>
> Reading between the lines, it sounds like you are looking for a way to
> limit end-user access to system catalogs as part of a lockdown effort,
> perhaps related to multi-tenancy. Correct? If so, you may wish to look at
> the current work on supporting row security on system catalogs, as that is
> probably closer to what you will need.
>
>
>> Also what procedure or function in the code that indicates the user can
>> write queries , something like I wanted to know the code where the
>> connection is created and available for user to use.
>>
>
> Start reading at src/backend/tcop/postgres.c .
>
> --
>  Craig Ringer   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
>  PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services
>


Re: [HACKERS] Identify user requested queries

2015-11-23 Thread Craig Ringer
On 23 November 2015 at 13:27, Praveen M  wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> When the user attempts to make a connection with the database , the code
> will look into various pg_catalog tables internally. However the user also
> can query the pg_catalog tables. Is there a way to identify the user
> requested (or typed query) vs the system requested (internal) queries?
>

As far as I know there is no simple and reliable method but I'm no
expert.

Most system accesses to common catalogs use the syscache, which doesn't go
through the SQL parse/bind/execute process. Or they construct simple scans
directly, again bypassing the full parser. The system will run internal
queries with the SPI though, and that's full-fledged SQL. Triggers, rules,
views, etc, use the SPI, as does plpgsql, fulltext search, XML support, and
a few other parts of the system. So you cannot assume that anything using
SQL is user-originated.

Take a look at PostgresMain in src/backend/tcop/postgres.c for the
top-level user query entry point. You'll see there that you cannot rely on
testing isTopLevel because multiple statements sent as a single query
string are treated as if they were a nested transaction block.
(see exec_simple_query(), postgres.c around line 962). That'd also cause
problems with use of PL/PgSQL.

You can't assume that all SPI queries are safe, because the user can run
queries via the SPI using plpgsql etc.

I don't see any way to do this without introducing the concept of a "system
query"... and in PostgreSQL that's not simple, because the system query
could cause the invocation of user-defined operators, functions, triggers,
etc, that then run user-defined code. You'd have to clear the "system
query" flag whenever you entered user-defined code, then restore it on
exit. That seems exceedingly hard to get right reliably.

Reading between the lines, it sounds like you are looking for a way to
limit end-user access to system catalogs as part of a lockdown effort,
perhaps related to multi-tenancy. Correct? If so, you may wish to look at
the current work on supporting row security on system catalogs, as that is
probably closer to what you will need.


> Also what procedure or function in the code that indicates the user can
> write queries , something like I wanted to know the code where the
> connection is created and available for user to use.
>

Start reading at src/backend/tcop/postgres.c .

-- 
 Craig Ringer   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services