http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/19-mahir-ali-moscow-revisited-by-mass-murder-740-hh-04

Moscow revisited by mass murder 
By Mahir Ali 
Wednesday, 07 Apr, 2010 
 
A part of a car used in the bomb attack is pictured (L) in Kizlyar March 31, 
2010. Suicide bombers killed at least 12 people in North Caucasus on Wednesday, 
two days after deadly attacks in Moscow. A car packed with explosives blew up 
as police gave chase, and a bomber in a police uniform set off a second blast 
in a crowd of police who rushed to the scene, authorities said. - Photo by 
Reuters. 

On a typically freezing day in early February, a bunch of folk from the Chechen 
town of Achkoi-Martan climbed into a rickety coach and set out on a 
garlic-picking expedition. 

Their destination was a wooded area between Chechnya and Ingushetia, and their 
presence in that zone had been authorised by the local administration.

The party was unarmed, but that fact offered little protection when some of 
them were spotted by Russian commandos near the Ingush village of Arshaty. It 
is not unusual, more or less anywhere in the world, for troops engaged in 
'counter-insurgency operations' to shoot first and ask questions later, if at 
all. The Russians opened fire without warning. Shortly afterwards, four of the 
garlic-pickers lay dead in the snow - three of them were teenagers. According 
to Memorial, a leading Russian human rights organisation, at least two of the 
youngsters were captured after being wounded, then summarily executed. The 
third teenager's bullet-ridden corpse bore evidence also of knife wounds to the 
spine and groin. 

The families of the dead are reported to have received compensation from the 
authorities in Chechnya as well as Ingushetia and the latter's president, 
Yunus-Bek Yevkurov publicly acknowledged the death of innocent civilians while 
claiming that the February operation also accounted for the lives of 18 rebels 
and was therefore a success. 

By the standards of Russia's restive Northern Caucasus region, the fate of the 
garlic-pickers wasn't extraordinary. Such incidents are no longer an everyday 
occurrence but when they do take place, they do not attract a great deal of 
attention even within Russia, let alone internationally. It is unlikely this 
particular outrage would have received more than perfunctory media coverage but 
for rebel chieftain Doku Umarov's claim that last week's Moscow metro massacres 
were a response to what happened in the woods on that fateful day in February. 

Umarov needn't be taken at his word: there may well be no direct causal link 
between the two atrocities. After all, didn't Umarov six months ago declare his 
intention of taking his campaign of violence to Russia's heartland, shortly 
before a bomb on the Nevsky Express between Moscow and St Petersburg killed 27 
commuters last November? And even if it were possible to establish such a 
connection, the brutal deaths of four innocents on the Chechen-Ingush border 
could hardly mitigate the loss of 10 times as many innocent lives in Moscow. 

At the same time, can anyone seriously doubt that mindless military operations 
that terrorise entire populations tend to fuel precisely the sort of activities 
and entrench the mindsets that ostensibly are intended to be stamped out? And 
that applies not just in the North Caucasus but also in northern Pakistan, in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, in the occupied Palestinian territories and in various 
other parts of the world. 

Of course, it works the other way around as well. After all, following the 
galling atrocities in Moscow, not many Russians will be inclined to question 
whatever form of revenge is deemed appropriate by President Dmitry Medvedev and 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. At least Medvedev, in calling for terrorism to 
be fought "without hesitation, to the end", paid lip service to the concept of 
respect for human rights; Putin, not uncharacteristically, called for those 
responsible to be "scraped from the sewers". Putin was the driving force behind 
the second Chechen war, which was launched in 1999. He wasn't the first Russian 
leader to mishandle Chechnya: that credit belongs to Boris Yeltsin, who reacted 
to the Chechen yearning for independence in the wake of the Soviet Union's 
disintegration by exercising the military option. At the time, Chechen 
nationalism was essentially secular, and it is quite possible that a 
substantial quantum of meaningful autonomy would have persuaded Chechnya's 
leaders - notably the former Soviet Air Force general Dzhokar Dudayev - to 
remain a part of the Russian Federation. 

Dudayev was eliminated in the mid-1990s by a missile based on stolen American 
technology, but his successors proved equally unacceptable to Moscow and the 
leadership of the separatist cause eventually fell into Islamist hands. Like 
Afghanistan, Kashmir and Bosnia before it, Chechnya consequently became 
something of a cause célèbre for jihadists from the Middle East, handing Moscow 
something of a propaganda coup. It was claimed that some of the worst 
atrocities, such as the Beslan massacre, involved Arab input. 

To whatever extent that may have been true, it's unlikely the Chechen situation 
would have come to such a pass had it been handled more intelligently from the 
outset. Before Putin opted for 'Chechenisation' of the conflict, undocumented 
deaths, disappearances, rape and torture were endemic. Russian forces routinely 
laid siege to villages and picked victims more or less at random: all men of a 
certain age were automatically suspects, and their relatives were fair game. 
It's a familiar pattern. And it would probably be impossible to calculate the 
extent to which such practices provided recruits for the cause of Islamist 
militancy. 

Chechnya has been relatively quiet under Putin's handpicked potentate, Ramzan 
Kadyrov, who is credited with rebuilding large parts of Grozny and persuading 
many rebels to abandon their cause. But recalcitrants bear the brunt of his 
infamous cruelty, and those who fall out with him are hunted down wherever they 
seek refuge, be it Moscow, Vienna or Dubai. Furthermore, the relatively few 
rebels that remain have been driven out into neighbouring Ingushetia and 
Dagestan - territories that were not covered in Medvedev's announcement last 
April about the cessation of Russian military operations in Chechnya. 

The suicide bombers who murdered 40 commuters at the Park Kultury and Lyubyanka 
underground stations in Moscow on March 29 were evidently young widows. It's 
been six years since 'Black Widows' from Chechnya targeted the Moscow metro and 
two Russian flights, with predictably devastating consequences. It is 
profoundly unfair and deeply tragic, but not entirely surprising, that 
Muscovites - as well as Dagestanis, a dozen of whom died in the two suicide 
bombings last week - should continue to pay the price for the rebels' disregard 
for human life as well as the Kremlin's inability to make a distinction between 
combating the symptoms and tackling the causes of a supremely unnecessary 
conflict.

mahir.d...@gmail.com 

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