Re: [cabfpub] CAA working group description

2017-10-10 Thread Jacob Hoffman-Andrews via Public
On Mon, Oct 9, 2017 at 4:04 PM, Geoff Keating wrote: > I don’t think any of these apply at the IETF level; I’m sure the IETF is > not going to specify a ‘what if you only wanted a little bit of DNSSEC’ > configuration > Why not? If DNSSEC is not deployable in practice by CAs,

[cabfpub] Clarification on DNAME erratum

2017-10-10 Thread Jacob Hoffman-Andrews via Public
Andrew Ayer reported an erratum on RFC 6844, separately from the erratum 5065 tree-climbing issue: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5097 The current RFC 6844 says: > Let CAA(X) be the record set returned in response to performing a CAA > record query on the label X, P(X) be the DNS label

Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 213 - Revocation Timeline Extension

2017-10-10 Thread Ryan Sleevi via Public
On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Gervase Markham wrote: > On 20/09/17 01:26, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > I appreciate your suggestion of a solution, but I'm not quite sure I > > understand your concerns. Apologies for that, but it would be great if > > you could elaborate why you

Re: [cabfpub] BRs, EVGLs, and "latest version"

2017-10-10 Thread Frank Corday via Public
The passing of Ballot 205 also injects further uncertainty for a CA if a qualified audit is received. From: Public [mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via Public Sent: Monday, October 09, 2017 10:20 AM To: Ben Wilson Cc: CA/Browser Forum

Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 184 - SRVnames

2017-10-10 Thread Gervase Markham via Public
On 04/10/17 06:38, Jeremy Rowley via Public wrote: > Probably time to finish this ballot off.  This is the last version I > have, slightly modified to remove the 822 and other language.  Thoughts?   Do DNSName name constraints in a TCSC apply to the DNS name part of the SVRName? I've read section

[cabfpub] Spamproofed email addresses

2017-10-10 Thread Gervase Markham via Public
Just a note to say that email addresses published as the Problem Reporting Mechanism in the CCADB are now (fairly trivially) spamproofed in the public reports, as requested at the CAB Forum meeting in Taipei. See: https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/CAInformationReport for examples.