Re: [cabfpub] [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension

2018-08-22 Thread Wayne Thayer via Public
On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 1:43 PM Doug Beattie wrote: > Tim, > > > > I agree that Vulnerability is different from key compromise and the > actions we take should reflect that and I think we should try to keep 12 > and 13 type events in the 5-day list. > > > > Is our strategy to have

Re: [cabfpub] [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension

2018-08-22 Thread Ryan Sleevi via Public
On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 9:17 AM Doug Beattie via Servercert-wg < servercert...@cabforum.org> wrote: > We’re having a hard time determining the differences between the following: > > > > The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if: > > 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's

Re: [cabfpub] [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension

2018-08-20 Thread Doug Beattie via Public
Tim, I agree that Vulnerability is different from key compromise and the actions we take should reflect that and I think we should try to keep 12 and 13 type events in the 5-day list. Is our strategy to have vulnerabilities fall into the 5 day list and exploited vulnerabilities fall

Re: [cabfpub] [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC6 - Revocation Timeline Extension

2018-08-20 Thread Tim Hollebeek via Public
Vulnerability is different from key compromise. Replacing all the heartbleed certificates within 24 hours would have been a huge fire drill. It’s important to get them replaced as quickly as possible, but mandatory revocations within 24 hours is going to make things worse, not better.