Re: [Bug 12965] New: Problem: I want to perform DNS queries from a HTML5 app, but the networking functions available are too restrictive to build a stub resolver. Why: DNS is not just for machines -

2011-06-15 Thread timeless
http://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=12965 >           Summary: Problem: I want to perform DNS queries from a HTML5 >                    app, but the networking functions available are too >                    restrictive to build a stub resolver. Why: DNS is not >                    just

[Bug 12965] New: Problem: I want to perform DNS queries from a HTML5 app, but the networking functions available are too restrictive to build a stub resolver. Why: DNS is not just for machines - zon

2011-06-15 Thread bugzilla
http://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=12965 Summary: Problem: I want to perform DNS queries from a HTML5 app, but the networking functions available are too restrictive to build a stub resolver. Why: DNS is not just for

RE: [indexeddb] Should deleteDatabase return IDBVersionChangeRequest?

2011-06-15 Thread Israel Hilerio
On Wednesday, June 15, 2011 3:27 PM, Jonas Sicking wrote: > On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 2:15 PM, Israel Hilerio > wrote: > > IDBFactory.deleteDatabase can be called without ever invoking the > > IDBDatabase.setVersion and requires a VERSION_CHANGE transaction for > > it to happen.  Unfortunately, ther

Re: [indexeddb] Should deleteDatabase return IDBVersionChangeRequest?

2011-06-15 Thread Jonas Sicking
On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 2:15 PM, Israel Hilerio wrote: > IDBFactory.deleteDatabase can be called without ever invoking the > IDBDatabase.setVersion and requires a VERSION_CHANGE transaction for it to > happen.  Unfortunately, there is no way for the caller of deleteDatabase to > receive a blocked

[indexeddb] Should deleteDatabase return IDBVersionChangeRequest?

2011-06-15 Thread Israel Hilerio
IDBFactory.deleteDatabase can be called without ever invoking the IDBDatabase.setVersion and requires a VERSION_CHANGE transaction for it to happen. Unfortunately, there is no way for the caller of deleteDatabase to receive a blocked event because IDBRequest doesn't define an onblocked event h

Re: [XHR][XHR2] Same-origin policy protection

2011-06-15 Thread Boris Zbarsky
On 6/15/11 4:08 PM, David Bruant wrote: 2) XHR in the web browser gives (at the moment, at least) sites that are outside a firewall that your browser is behind the ability to make requests to hosts that are behind the firewall. You wrote "at the moment, at least". Is there some planned chan

Re: [XHR][XHR2] Same-origin policy protection

2011-06-15 Thread David Bruant
Le 15/06/2011 19:39, Adam Barth a écrit : > The server still needs to opt-in to allowing the web site to read the > response or you get into trouble with firewalls. This functionality > is already available in every modern browser. > > Adam > > > On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 10:15 AM, Charles Pritchard

RfC: DAP's Contacts API Last Call Working Draft; deadline July 14

2011-06-15 Thread Arthur Barstow
On June 16, the Device API group will publish a Last Call Working Draft of its Calendar API spec: http://www.w3.org/TR/2010/WD-contacts-api-20110616/ Individuals are encouraged to provide individual feedback directly to DAP via their public list: public-device-a...@w3.org If anyone

Re: [XHR][XHR2] Same-origin policy protection

2011-06-15 Thread Adam Barth
The server still needs to opt-in to allowing the web site to read the response or you get into trouble with firewalls. This functionality is already available in every modern browser. Adam On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 10:15 AM, Charles Pritchard wrote: > There have been a few requests for an XHR wh

Re: [XHR][XHR2] Same-origin policy protection

2011-06-15 Thread Charles Pritchard
There have been a few requests for an XHR which does not expose session data to the target. I believe IE9 has an interface for this; I know it's been requested on chromium bug list. On Jun 15, 2011, at 9:18 AM, Boris Zbarsky wrote: > On 6/15/11 6:43 AM, David Bruant wrote: >> Could someone e

Re: [XHR][XHR2] Same-origin policy protection

2011-06-15 Thread Boris Zbarsky
On 6/15/11 6:43 AM, David Bruant wrote: Could someone explain how running in a web browser justify such a difference? For instance, could someone explain a threat particular to cross-origin XHR in web browser? Off the top of my head: 1) XHR in the web browser sends the user's cookies, HTTP au

Re: [whatwg] File API Streaming Blobs

2011-06-15 Thread Adam Malcontenti-Wilson
Ian, I wish I knew that earlier when I originally posted the idea, there was lots of discussion and good ideas but then it suddenly dropped of the face of the earth. Essentially I am fowarding this suggestion to public-webapps@w3.org on the basis as apparently most discussion of File API specs happ

[XHR][XHR2] Same-origin policy protection

2011-06-15 Thread David Bruant
Hi, I've been thinking a lot about same-origin policy recently. I understand the protection it provides when it comes to cross-frame communication, but I'm having a hard time understanding what it protects from when it comes to cross-origin XHR. Over the years, web sites have moved to web apps