On Thu, Dec 20, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
On Dec 18, 2012, at 6:44 AM, Anne van Kesteren ann...@annevk.nl wrote:
The specification is modeled after Gecko and Chrome and very much
intents to have keyboard access working. As per usual, everything that
is not
On Dec 18, 2012, at 6:44 AM, Anne van Kesteren ann...@annevk.nl wrote:
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 12:50 AM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
Based on all this, I continue to think that requesting keyboard access
should involve separate API, so that it can be feature-detected and given
On Thu, Dec 20, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
And given this difference in UA behavior, it seems useful to let web
developers feature-detect the difference in behavior somehow.
It would be useful to be able to detect it. But it's in no way cruical, we
can just do
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 12:50 AM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
Based on all this, I continue to think that requesting keyboard access
should involve separate API, so that it can be feature-detected and given
different security treatment by vendors as desired. This is what Flash does,
On 16/10/12 18:48, Maciej Stachowiak wrote:
Many games could work with only non-alphanumeric keys or in some cases
only the mouse. As could slideshows. You only need space/enter/arrows
for a full screen slide presentation.
FWIW I agree. Pretty much the only uses cases that I can envisage that
FYI Flickr slideshows and Google street view are now fullscreen users.
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 12:04 AM, Chris Pearce cpea...@mozilla.com wrote:
On 16/10/12 18:48, Maciej Stachowiak wrote:
Many games could work with only non-alphanumeric keys or in some cases
only the mouse. As could
On Oct 22, 2012, at 3:04 PM, Chris Pearce cpea...@mozilla.com wrote:
This looks remarkably like Mozilla's original proposal:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Gecko:FullScreenAPI
We chose not to implement this as it offers little protection against
phishing or spoofing attacks that don't rely on
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 12:50 AM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
Based on all this, I continue to think that requesting keyboard access
should involve separate API, so that it can be feature-detected and given
different security treatment by vendors as desired. This is what Flash
On Monday, October 22, 2012 at 6:04 PM, Chris Pearce wrote:
On 16/10/12 18:48, Maciej Stachowiak wrote:
Many games could work with only non-alphanumeric keys or in some cases only
the mouse. As could slideshows. You only need space/enter/arrows for a full
screen slide presentation.
: Vincent Scheib; Maciej Stachowiak; public-webapps@w3.org; Chris
Pearce;
Florian Bösch; Anne van Kesteren
Subject: Re: Defenses against phishing via the fullscreen api (was Re:
full screen
api)
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:48 PM, Carr, Wayne wayne.c...@intel.com
wrote:
Chrome supports Fullscreen
...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* Thursday, October 18, 2012 7:08 PM
*To:* Feross Aboukhadijeh
*Cc:* Carr, Wayne; Jonas Sicking; Vincent Scheib; Maciej Stachowiak;
public-webapps@w3.org; Chris Pearce; Anne van Kesteren
*Subject:* Re: Defenses against phishing via the fullscreen api (was Re:
full screen api
On Fri, Oct 19, 2012 at 4:50 AM, Carr, Wayne wayne.c...@intel.com wrote:
If touch events are restricted, how does the user pause the video?
If you do not disable click/touch on devices with an onscreen keyboard, how
do you defend against phishing?
On Fri, Oct 19, 2012 at 9:08 AM, Feross Aboukhadijeh fer...@feross.orgwrote:
Apple has also indicated of not liking confirm prompts of any kind
whatsoever
To reiterate: for 90% (probably more) of fullscreen use cases, there would
be no confirmation prompt at all. Only when the developer
phishing via the fullscreen api (was Re:
full screen
api)
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:48 PM, Carr, Wayne wayne.c...@intel.com
wrote:
Chrome supports Fullscreen with keyboard enabled. We use a
notification that persists until a user notices and dismisses it. We
may modify it in the future
Stachowiak; public-webapps@w3.org; Chris
Pearce;
Florian Bösch; Anne van Kesteren
Subject: Re: Defenses against phishing via the fullscreen api (was Re:
full screen
api)
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:48 PM, Carr, Wayne wayne.c...@intel.com
wrote:
Chrome supports Fullscreen with keyboard
Kesteren
Subject: Re: Defenses against phishing via the fullscreen api (was Re: full
screen api)
Note that that's a related but not identical stage of the process. There will
still have to be a way to differentiate how to request fullscreen with those
capabilities that you queried as being being
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:48 PM, Carr, Wayne wayne.c...@intel.com wrote:
Chrome supports Fullscreen with keyboard enabled. We use a notification
that persists until a user notices and
dismisses it. We may modify it in the future to make this more noticeable,
e.g. dimming page contents similar
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 5:42 AM, Florian Bösch pya...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 7:48 AM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
What are the cases where webpage-driven (as opposed to
browser-chrome-driven) fullscreen is really compelling, but they need full
keyboard access
On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 12:06 PM, Florian Bösch pya...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 4:51 PM, Rick Waldron waldron.r...@gmail.comwrote:
I'm not sure where this falls, but how would things like control-w or
cmd-w work? If the non-alphanumerics work, but the alphanumerics do not...
Scheib; Maciej Stachowiak; public-webapps@w3.org; Chris Pearce;
Florian Bösch; Anne van Kesteren
Subject: Re: Defenses against phishing via the fullscreen api (was Re: full
screen
api)
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:48 PM, Carr, Wayne wayne.c...@intel.com wrote:
Chrome supports Fullscreen with keyboard
Chrome supports Fullscreen with keyboard enabled. We use a notification
that persists until a user notices and dismisses it. We may modify it in
the future to make this more noticeable, e.g. dimming page contents similar
to FireFox.
I personally think it would be unfortunate to support multiple
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 10:56 PM, Vincent Scheib sch...@google.com wrote:
However, if other browsers only implement fullscreen without keyboard
support then clearly it would be best if developers could detect this when
composing their application interface, avoiding prompting users to enter
to the
notification.)
From: Vincent Scheib [mailto:sch...@google.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2012 1:57 PM
To: Maciej Stachowiak
Cc: Chris Pearce; Florian Bösch; Anne van Kesteren; Carr, Wayne;
public-webapps@w3.org
Subject: Re: Defenses against phishing via the fullscreen api (was Re: full
screen api
On Oct 14, 2012, at 3:54 PM, Chris Pearce cpea...@mozilla.com wrote:
On 14/10/12 00:49, Maciej Stachowiak wrote:
Despite both of these defenses having drawbacks, I think it is wise for
implementations to implement at least one of them. I think the spec should
explicitly permit
Ok, so here's my question. You have a webapp (that oh, happens to be a
game, or a slideshow app, or a video player with controls, etc.) which
needs keyboard/UI events access to work (come to think of it, can you
honestly think of any sort of usecase that does work entirely without user
That's why I liked having a separate API to request fullscreen with full
alphanumeric keyboard access. This allows apps to determine if fullscreen with
keyboard is available on a given browser, and allows browsers to set separate
security policies for that case. I think the spec should change
A function to query the capabilities obtainable after entering fullscreen
would also work from an application developers point of view:
navigator.fullscreenCapability.keyboard - true/false
navigator.fullscreenCapability.mouse - true/false
navigator.fullscreenCapability.ui - true/false
On Oct 15, 2012, at 5:01 PM, Chris Pearce cpea...@mozilla.com wrote:
On 16/10/12 11:39, Maciej Stachowiak wrote:
That's why I liked having a separate API to request fullscreen with full
alphanumeric keyboard access. This allows apps to determine if fullscreen
with keyboard is available
On 14/10/12 00:49, Maciej Stachowiak wrote:
On Oct 13, 2012, at 1:49 AM, Anne van Kesteren ann...@annevk.nl wrote:
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 8:25 PM, Florian Bösch pya...@gmail.com wrote:
There was a limited discussion on that a few days ago with the limited
consensus (?) being that requiring
On Sat, Oct 13, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
I think the most effective defense against phishing via fullscreen is to
prevent keyboard access. The original design for requestFullscreen had an
optional argument for requesting keyboard access, which led to a warning
On Oct 13, 2012, at 4:58 AM, Florian Bösch pya...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sat, Oct 13, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
I think the most effective defense against phishing via fullscreen is to
prevent keyboard access. The original design for requestFullscreen had an
You're making fullscreen useless for games.
On Sat, Oct 13, 2012 at 9:56 PM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
On Oct 13, 2012, at 4:58 AM, Florian Bösch pya...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sat, Oct 13, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Maciej Stachowiak m...@apple.com wrote:
I think the most effective
WebGL FPSes with fullscreen support
- http://media.tojicode.com/q3bsp/
- https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/demos/detail/bananabread
- http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6873971/data/cube2/index.html
On Sat, Oct 13, 2012 at 9:58 PM, Florian Bösch pya...@gmail.com wrote:
You're making fullscreen useless
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