Re: Limiting the scope of user permissions

2015-04-27 Thread Frederik Braun
You can tackle bits of this problem by assigning different subdomains either per-permission set or per-client. AFAIU, the settings should be stored independently. With more and more permissions coming to the web, the numbers of combinations might grow exponentially though. On 27.04.2015 12:50,

Re: =[xhr]

2015-01-30 Thread Frederik Braun
Hi, Thank you for your feedback. Please see the archives for previous iterations of this discussion, e.g. (and click next in thread). On 29.01.2015 21:04, LOUIFI, Bruno wrote: Hi, I am really disappointed when I saw in

Re: Service worker popup (rich notification)

2014-10-06 Thread Frederik Braun
On 02.10.2014 21:34, Jonas Sicking wrote: On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Anne van Kesteren wrote: On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 8:27 PM, John Mellor wrote: This seems to either require a somewhat stronger trust signal from the user, or a very easy mechanism for

Re: HTML imports: new XSS hole?

2014-06-10 Thread Frederik Braun
On 04.06.2014 11:00, Anne van Kesteren wrote: On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 7:20 PM, Oda, Terri wrote: Perhaps it would make sense to also require explicit allowing of imports via CSP? Scripts are allowed when no CSP is provided for historical compatibility so you'd need to make

Re: Blob URL Origin

2014-05-13 Thread Frederik Braun
On 12.05.2014 18:41, Jonas Sicking wrote: (new URL(url)).origin should work, no? It does not work for blob URIs in Firefox.

Re: Blob URL Origin

2014-05-12 Thread Frederik Braun
On 09.05.2014 23:29, Arun Ranganathan wrote: .. So this is problematic: we don’t have a common syntax on the web, and even implementations which share code don’t do it exactly the same. Of course, blob: URLs aren’t supposed to be human readable, or really viewed by the developer. But not

Re: [HTML imports]: Imports and Content Security Policy

2014-02-04 Thread Frederik Braun
On 03.02.2014 21:58, Hajime Morrita wrote: Parser-made script means the script tags and its contents that are written in HTML bytestream, not given by DOM mutation calls from scripts. As HTML Imports doesn't allow document.write(), it seems safe to assume that these scripts are statically

Re: [HTML imports]: Imports and Content Security Policy

2014-02-03 Thread Frederik Braun
On 31.01.2014 06:43, Hajime Morrita wrote: Generally I prefer master-CSP model than the own CSP model due to its simplicity but I agree that unsafe-script kills the conciseness of Imports. To make inline scripts work with imports, we might want another CSP directive like safe-script, which

Re: [HTML imports]: Imports and Content Security Policy

2014-01-31 Thread Frederik Braun
On 30.01.2014 19:53, Scott Miles wrote: I'm hoping there are some constraints we can impose on imports to allow them to contain inline scripts to exist under CSP. That's interesting. Wouldn't this violate the CSP spec? Imported scripts still have access to the same origin as the master document,

Re: [HTML imports]: Imports and Content Security Policy

2014-01-10 Thread Frederik Braun
On 10.01.2014 03:52, Hajime Morrita wrote: Hi Frederik, Thanks for bringing it up! As you pointed out, CSP of imported documents essentially extends the set of allowed domains. I thought I was useful for component authors to specify their own domains, like one of their own CDN. Well the

Re: [HTML imports]: Imports and Content Security Policy

2014-01-10 Thread Frederik Braun
On 10.01.2014 14:51, Nick Krempel wrote: To clarify: your example is supposed to be an attack on, not (we can assume the attacker has control over Nick ​ Yes, imagine an XSS vulnerability on

[HTML imports]: Imports and Content Security Policy

2014-01-09 Thread Frederik Braun
Hi, I have subscribed to this list because my colleague Gabor (CC) and I found a few issues with Content Security Policies applied to HTML imports. The current draft (, Jan 9) suggests that import loading is restricted through a