Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
Hi Rainer, On Mon, Mar 2, 2009 at 2:56 PM, Hillebrand, Rainer rainer.hillebr...@t-mobile.net wrote: RH: I would recommend not to standardize a base security policy for all markets on the world. It would take too long. However, we might want to discuss for Widgets 2.0 whether we would try agreeing on a security framework defining what needs to be protected, how a security policy is defined (i.e. format, vocabulary) and how security policies could be provisioned or managed. Ok, this seems like a reasonable way forward. Not specifying the default security policy is inline with what is currently specified in the PC spec. I have added your suggestion for V2.0 to the wiki: http://www.w3.org/2008/webapps/wiki/Widgets2_UC%26R -- Marcos Caceres http://datadriven.com.au
RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
Dear Marcos, I have some doubts that a secure transport of a widget resource is so important in case of a signed widget resource. I would agree with you that we currently do not know how a signature is considered because we do not have a security framework and security policies that would define the use of signatures. However, if a user agent implements a security framework that enforces security policies considering signed widget resources then a secure transport will not be required. The signature shall guarantee the widget resource's integrity and authenticity. What would a secure transport add? Best Regards, Rainer * T-Mobile International Terminal Technology Rainer Hillebrand Head of Terminal Security Landgrabenweg 151, D-53227 Bonn Germany +49 171 5211056 (My T-Mobile) +49 228 936 13916 (Tel.) +49 228 936 18406 (Fax) E-Mail: rainer.hillebr...@t-mobile.net http://www.t-mobile.net This e-mail and any attachment are confidential and may be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, notify the sender immediately, destroy all copies from your system and do not disclose or use the information for any purpose. Diese E-Mail inklusive aller Anhänge ist vertraulich und könnte bevorrechtigtem Schutz unterliegen. Wenn Sie nicht der beabsichtigte Adressat sind, informieren Sie bitte den Absender unverzüglich, löschen Sie alle Kopien von Ihrem System und veröffentlichen Sie oder nutzen Sie die Information keinesfalls, gleich zu welchem Zweck. T-Mobile International AG Aufsichtsrat/ Supervisory Board: René Obermann (Vorsitzender/ Chairman) Vorstand/ Board of Management: Hamid Akhavan (Vorsitzender/ Chairman), Michael Günther, Lothar A. Harings, Katharina Hollender Handelsregister/Commercial Register Entry: Amtsgericht Bonn, HRB 12276 Steuer-Nr./Tax No.: 205 / 5777/ 0518 USt.-ID./VAT Reg.No.: DE189669124 Sitz der Gesellschaft/ Corporate Headquarters: Bonn -Original Message- From: public-webapps-requ...@w3.org [mailto:public-webapps-requ...@w3.org] On Behalf Of Marcos Caceres Sent: Dienstag, 24. Februar 2009 23:34 To: Frederick Hirsch Cc: ext Priestley, Mark, VF-Group; Barstow Art (Nokia-CIC/Boston); public-webapps Subject: Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec Hi Frederick, On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 11:19 PM, Frederick Hirsch frederick.hir...@nokia.com wrote: The Widget Signature spec is not an API definition so probably does not need to define how signature status information is returned. You are right, so agreed. I also agree that it would be incorrect to define in the Widget Signature spec whether or not a widget is valid, that is out of scope. Right again. The spec limits itself to signature validation. However I would not want to be prescriptive in the specification to the level of status return codes. Ok, makes sense. We may want to add a security considerations note along the lines of As distributor signatures are not included in an overall widget signature, it is possible for signatures to be added or removed and hence a secure channel for widget delivery might be preferable. Ok, that is also an important security consideration. Should definitely have that in the spec under security considerations or some such section. -- Marcos Caceres http://datadriven.com.au
Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
Rainer, On Mon, Mar 2, 2009 at 2:01 PM, Hillebrand, Rainer rainer.hillebr...@t-mobile.net wrote: Dear Marcos, I have some doubts that a secure transport of a widget resource is so important in case of a signed widget resource. I would agree with you that we currently do not know how a signature is considered because we do not have a security framework and security policies that would define the use of signatures. However, if a user agent implements a security framework that enforces security policies considering signed widget resources then a secure transport will not be required. The signature shall guarantee the widget resource's integrity and authenticity. What would a secure transport add? The way I see it, secure transport would add protection from a signature being deleted from the archive or replaced all together, with the inclusion of other files (i.e., protects from a man-in-the-middle attack). There may be other things too, but I have not thought of them yet. Kind regards, Marcos -- Marcos Caceres http://datadriven.com.au
Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
On Mon, Mar 2, 2009 at 2:56 PM, Hillebrand, Rainer rainer.hillebr...@t-mobile.net wrote: Dear Marcos, In order to detect a man-in-the-middle-attack, a widget resource is signed, either by an author's certificate that I trust or by an author certificate and a distributor certificate that I trust. that I trust means that I have the proven public keys for these certificates. If an attacker replaces or adds a file in the widget resource after it was signed then the signatures will be invalid. If the signatures are stripped off, a file is replaced or added and the widget resource is signed again with another certificate that I do not trust then the attack will fail when checking the signature. Yes, I am only really concerned with the case whereby the signature is removed (I'm aware that it is not possible to do any kind of replacement or tampering of the sig). The security policy that we (Web Apps) have been discussing would allow unsigned widgets to run with full privileges by default. I also push for this model because I don't think developers should have to pay for a cert to have their apps run on a device. I would agree with you that a secure transport will be useful if the widget resource is unsigned or signed with an unknown certificate. Then it will be the decision of a security framework and its security policies how such a widget resource will be treated. Agreed. A point of contention is whether we standardize a base security policy or not. We might just leave that totally up to implementers. -- Marcos Caceres http://datadriven.com.au
RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
Dear Marcos, I added my comments inline. Best Regards, Rainer * T-Mobile International Terminal Technology Rainer Hillebrand Head of Terminal Security Landgrabenweg 151, D-53227 Bonn Germany +49 171 5211056 (My T-Mobile) +49 228 936 13916 (Tel.) +49 228 936 18406 (Fax) E-Mail: rainer.hillebr...@t-mobile.net http://www.t-mobile.net This e-mail and any attachment are confidential and may be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, notify the sender immediately, destroy all copies from your system and do not disclose or use the information for any purpose. Diese E-Mail inklusive aller Anhänge ist vertraulich und könnte bevorrechtigtem Schutz unterliegen. Wenn Sie nicht der beabsichtigte Adressat sind, informieren Sie bitte den Absender unverzüglich, löschen Sie alle Kopien von Ihrem System und veröffentlichen Sie oder nutzen Sie die Information keinesfalls, gleich zu welchem Zweck. T-Mobile International AG Aufsichtsrat/ Supervisory Board: René Obermann (Vorsitzender/ Chairman) Vorstand/ Board of Management: Hamid Akhavan (Vorsitzender/ Chairman), Michael Günther, Lothar A. Harings, Katharina Hollender Handelsregister/Commercial Register Entry: Amtsgericht Bonn, HRB 12276 Steuer-Nr./Tax No.: 205 / 5777/ 0518 USt.-ID./VAT Reg.No.: DE189669124 Sitz der Gesellschaft/ Corporate Headquarters: Bonn -Original Message- From: marcosscace...@gmail.com [mailto:marcosscace...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Marcos Caceres Sent: Montag, 2. März 2009 15:03 To: Hillebrand, Rainer Cc: public-webapps Subject: Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec On Mon, Mar 2, 2009 at 2:56 PM, Hillebrand, Rainer rainer.hillebr...@t-mobile.net wrote: Dear Marcos, In order to detect a man-in-the-middle-attack, a widget resource is signed, either by an author's certificate that I trust or by an author certificate and a distributor certificate that I trust. that I trust means that I have the proven public keys for these certificates. If an attacker replaces or adds a file in the widget resource after it was signed then the signatures will be invalid. If the signatures are stripped off, a file is replaced or added and the widget resource is signed again with another certificate that I do not trust then the attack will fail when checking the signature. Yes, I am only really concerned with the case whereby the signature is removed (I'm aware that it is not possible to do any kind of replacement or tampering of the sig). The security policy that we (Web Apps) have been discussing would allow unsigned widgets to run with full privileges by default. RH: I will be concerned like you that a widget has access to all widget user agent resources regardless of whether: a) it was signed and signatures were left untouched, b) it was signed but the signatures were removed, c) it was unsigned and transported over a secure channel, d) it was unsigned and transported over an unprotected channel. As long as the PC does not specify any security mechanism that verifies the integrity and the authenticity of a widget resource and that has an influence on the access to widget user agent resources or the processing of the widget, then we have to live with this concern. Then we can only hope that WUA implementers provide their own security mechanism leading to fragmentation in this respect. I also push for this model because I don't think developers should have to pay for a cert to have their apps run on a device. RH: From my point of view, signing does not necessarily mean that a developer has to pay for it. On the other hand, I am aware of the note in the PC saying How a widget user agent uses a digital signature is determined by the security policy implemented by that widget user agent. As such, this specification does not mandate processing rules dependent on the verification of one or more digital signature documents or on the revocation status obtained for the certificates associated with a verified digital signature document. I would agree with you that a secure transport will be useful if the widget resource is unsigned or signed with an unknown certificate. Then it will be the decision of a security framework and its security policies how such a widget resource will be treated. Agreed. A point of contention is whether we standardize a base security policy or not. We might just leave that totally up to implementers. RH: I would recommend not to standardize a base security policy for all markets on the world. It would take too long. However, we might want to discuss for Widgets 2.0 whether we would try agreeing on a security framework defining what needs to be protected, how a security policy is defined (i.e. format, vocabulary) and how security policies could be provisioned or managed. -- Marcos Caceres http://datadriven.com.au
Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
, or was just named according to the convention for digital signature. To be abused by an attacker it would either be necessary to inject a reference to the file into the widget, which might be difficult, or to hijack an existing reference to a signature file by swapping the intended signature file for the attacker's signature file (with the same name). While this later attack depends on the author providing such a reference in their widget, there are two reasons why the author may currently choose to do this - to get some information about the signature to display to the user, or possibly more likely, to get around the need to sign everything in their widget resource (I thought of this as a way around signing everything so developers will too!). It's not a big hole and the attacks require some assistance from developers, but unless there's a reason not to it should be pretty easy to close. -Original Message- From: Marcos Caceres [mailto:marcosscace...@gmail.com] Sent: 04 February 2009 17:35 To: Priestley, Mark, VF-Group Cc: Arthur Barstow; public-webapps Subject: Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec Hi Mark, On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 6:29 PM, Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com wrote: Hi Marcos, Art, All, Please find below Vodafone's comments on the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration specification. I have divided them into what I consider to be substantive comments and editorial comments. Thanks, Mark -- -- -- Substantive comments -- -- -- Step 5 Process the Digital Signatures We disagree with the stage 2, specifically If the file entry is deemed by the [Widgets-DigSig] to be an invalid widget, then a widget user agent must treat this widget as an invalid widget., on two grounds: (1) Because one signature is invalid it doesn't mean that all of the signatures are invalid; (2) Just because one signature or all signatures are invalid does not mean that the widget should not be installed, only that it should _not_ be treated as a signed widget. The security policy of the device might be configured not to install an unsigned widget or a widget with an invalid signature but this should be dependent on the security policy implemented. Sorry, I think you might have misunderstood what I was trying to say here (probably I did not write it clearly enough). This assertion is here to deal with instances where the digital signature deemed by the Widgets Dig Sig spec to be somehow fully broken or completely non-conforming in such a way that all processing must stop. I don't yet know if Widgets Dig Sig will spit out such a result for any digsig it is processing, but it seemed like a good idea to put this in here at the time. In other words, this is something that is controlled by the Widgets Dig Sig spec. If it turns out that Widgets Dig Sig never results in an invalid widget situation, then I will take this out. I've created a red note in the spec that says Issue: [Widgets-DigSig] may never identify a widget package as invalid as a reminder that we need to sort this out. FWIW, I think step 5 is buggy and needs a rewrite (I've added another issue to the spec stating as such). I'll need to work with you to fix it as we progress the Dig Sig spec. --- Step 4 Locate Digital Signatures for the Widget I'm not sure whether the packaging and configuration specification is the correct place to do this but IMHO there needs to be a statement that a files with a file name corresponding to the naming convention for digital signatures are not accessible from the widget once the widget is installed / instantiated. Failure to impose this restriction will make it possible to include a signature and then reference it from the signed code, which presents a security hole. Good point. This seems like something that needs to be in the yet to be written a widget runtime security spec. I've added an issue note to the spec so we don't forget about this. Just out of interest, can you present the nature of the security hole? i.e., once an attacker has the signature, say, via an XSS attack, what could they do with it? --- 7.10 The access Element The access element defines a network attribute as A boolean attribute that indicates that the widget might need to access network resources as specified in [Widgets-Security]. Based on this description we would like to make the following observations and suggestion: The access element contains security permissions that will be used as hooks in the yet to be written [Widgets-Security] specification. The problem is that the permissions haven't yet been discussed in detail and so we may find
Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
Hi Frederick, On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 11:19 PM, Frederick Hirsch frederick.hir...@nokia.com wrote: The Widget Signature spec is not an API definition so probably does not need to define how signature status information is returned. You are right, so agreed. I also agree that it would be incorrect to define in the Widget Signature spec whether or not a widget is valid, that is out of scope. Right again. The spec limits itself to signature validation. However I would not want to be prescriptive in the specification to the level of status return codes. Ok, makes sense. We may want to add a security considerations note along the lines of As distributor signatures are not included in an overall widget signature, it is possible for signatures to be added or removed and hence a secure channel for widget delivery might be preferable. Ok, that is also an important security consideration. Should definitely have that in the spec under security considerations or some such section. -- Marcos Caceres http://datadriven.com.au
RE: [widgets] The access element (was: RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec)
Comments inline. Thanks, Mark -Original Message- From: marcosscace...@gmail.com [mailto:marcosscace...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Marcos Caceres Sent: 22 February 2009 16:02 To: Priestley, Mark, VF-Group Cc: Arthur Barstow; public-webapps Subject: Re: [widgets] The access element (was: RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec) Hi Mark, 2009/2/19 Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com: Hi All, In the email [1] containing my comments against the LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec, I wrote: 7.10 The access Element The access element defines a network attribute as A boolean attribute that indicates that the widget might need to access network resources as specified in [Widgets-Security]. Based on this description we would like to make the following observations and suggestion: The access element contains security permissions that will be used as hooks in the yet to be written [Widgets-Security] specification. The problem is that the permissions haven't yet been discussed in detail and so we may find that we want to represent additional context other than a black and white is network access required?. For example, it may be the case that it is important from a security point of view to know which bearer or protocol will be used, or to nest a set of domains/URLs with which the widget wants to communicate. I do not have a strong view on what might be relevant here, and I am not suggesting that it needs to be considered as part of the last call of the Packaging and Configuration spec, only that it is likely that the permission will need to be more complex when we look at it from a security perspective. Marcos replied: I think we better start this soon, then. My feeling is that we will need some kind of domain access declarations, and I would like to see them in the configuration document. My follow up: Marcos makes the suggestion that he would like to see the access element replaced/extended with domains. Vodafone have come to a similar conclusion. We feel that a widget author should be able to declare the hosts with which they want to communicate. The widget should then only be allowed to communicate with those hosts. This is beneficial for two reasons: 1.) It allows the widget author to practice the principle of least privilege, limiting the potential attack space Agreed. 2.) It allows other parties (users, widget distributors, consuming widget user agents) to inspect the widget to get some idea of who the widget will communicate with, thereby enabling more sensible security decisions to be made. Agreed. There is however one exception that we would like to enable, the ability for a widget author to indicate that their widget might be expected to communicate with any host. This is to allow for use cases such as widget RSS readers. We would therefore like to propose that the access element is extended along the following lines: access network any-host=true/false target host=somehost.com / target host=en.anotherurl.com / /network /access Firstly, this assumes communication over HTTP. I think we need to make this protocol agnostic. How do I indicate I want to use HTTPs? You would need a special purpose URI parse that can parse malformed URIs. I propose the simpler: access network=true domain href=URI / /access The semantics of the URI can be derived from whatever URI type is used (most likely case will be HTTP, in which case you parse the URI semantics using RFC2616). User agents can support whatever URIs they like, or exclude others (e.g., file://). Agreed - with some comments below Declaring network any-host=true/ would mean that regardless of whether the network element contained any child domain elements, the author was declaring that they wanted access to any host (note that by default this value would be false so only authors who wanted access to any host would be inclined to use it). I suggest a special case of domain: domain href=*/ Agreed - the only advantage I saw of using an attribute was that if an author incorrectly specified specific domains and the all domains value, the user agent wouldn't have to process the specific domains that were in error. But I agree this was ugly and support a special domain value as you suggest. There is IMO an open question as to whether it would better to specify: 1. full URLs in place of hostnames, eg: target url=http://somehost.com; / From my point of view, yes... as per the rationale above. I mostly agree but with some follow up questions below... 2. hostnames (to allow for use of http and https and other protocols without requiring multiple declarations), maybe by using an additional attribute, eg: target host=somehost.com protocol=http/ URIs already define all this, so we don't need
Re: [widgets] The access element (was: RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec)
Hi Mark, 2009/2/19 Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com: Hi All, In the email [1] containing my comments against the LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec, I wrote: 7.10 The access Element The access element defines a network attribute as A boolean attribute that indicates that the widget might need to access network resources as specified in [Widgets-Security]. Based on this description we would like to make the following observations and suggestion: The access element contains security permissions that will be used as hooks in the yet to be written [Widgets-Security] specification. The problem is that the permissions haven't yet been discussed in detail and so we may find that we want to represent additional context other than a black and white is network access required?. For example, it may be the case that it is important from a security point of view to know which bearer or protocol will be used, or to nest a set of domains/URLs with which the widget wants to communicate. I do not have a strong view on what might be relevant here, and I am not suggesting that it needs to be considered as part of the last call of the Packaging and Configuration spec, only that it is likely that the permission will need to be more complex when we look at it from a security perspective. Marcos replied: I think we better start this soon, then. My feeling is that we will need some kind of domain access declarations, and I would like to see them in the configuration document. My follow up: Marcos makes the suggestion that he would like to see the access element replaced/extended with domains. Vodafone have come to a similar conclusion. We feel that a widget author should be able to declare the hosts with which they want to communicate. The widget should then only be allowed to communicate with those hosts. This is beneficial for two reasons: 1.) It allows the widget author to practice the principle of least privilege, limiting the potential attack space Agreed. 2.) It allows other parties (users, widget distributors, consuming widget user agents) to inspect the widget to get some idea of who the widget will communicate with, thereby enabling more sensible security decisions to be made. Agreed. There is however one exception that we would like to enable, the ability for a widget author to indicate that their widget might be expected to communicate with any host. This is to allow for use cases such as widget RSS readers. We would therefore like to propose that the access element is extended along the following lines: access network any-host=true/false target host=somehost.com / target host=en.anotherurl.com / /network /access Firstly, this assumes communication over HTTP. I think we need to make this protocol agnostic. How do I indicate I want to use HTTPs? You would need a special purpose URI parse that can parse malformed URIs. I propose the simpler: access network=true domain href=URI / /access The semantics of the URI can be derived from whatever URI type is used (most likely case will be HTTP, in which case you parse the URI semantics using RFC2616). User agents can support whatever URIs they like, or exclude others (e.g., file://). Declaring network any-host=true/ would mean that regardless of whether the network element contained any child domain elements, the author was declaring that they wanted access to any host (note that by default this value would be false so only authors who wanted access to any host would be inclined to use it). I suggest a special case of domain: domain href=*/ There is IMO an open question as to whether it would better to specify: 1. full URLs in place of hostnames, eg: target url=http://somehost.com; / From my point of view, yes... as per the rationale above. 2. hostnames (to allow for use of http and https and other protocols without requiring multiple declarations), maybe by using an additional attribute, eg: target host=somehost.com protocol=http/ URIs already define all this, so we don't need to break up the URIs into their parts. The semantics of HTTP URIs are well understood and already easily parsed by implementations. 3. hostnames + paths (to allow authors to restrict access to specific resources) target host=somehost.com protocol=http path=/images/ Would be supported by using URIs: domain href=http://somehost.com/images// OR domain href=http://example.com/resource; / The resource could then be exploited (in a good way) at runtime through query strings: script src=http://example.com/resource?callback=helloThere; FWIW, I think we need to look at what CORS is doing with respect to this and mirror as much as we can: http://dev.w3.org/2006/waf/access-control/ Related to the above options is whether or not the omission of protocols and paths could/should be specified to mean any value. This would allow a certain
Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
2009/2/16 Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com: No problem. From http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2009JanMar/0346.html: [mp] The hole is that signature files are excluded from the generation of the signature values in any other signature files. This means that if, for example, an attacker added to the widget resource a signature file containing some malicious content, the malicious content of that file wouldn't be covered by any of the other signatures but the widget user agent thinks the entire widget resource is signed. This could happen regardless of whether or not the signature file was actually valid, or was just named according to the convention for digital signature. Ok, good point. To be abused by an attacker it would either be necessary to inject a reference to the file into the widget, which might be difficult, or to hijack an existing reference to a signature file by swapping the intended signature file for the attacker's signature file (with the same name). While this later attack depends on the author providing such a reference in their widget, there are two reasons why the author may currently choose to do this - to get some information about the signature to display to the user, or possibly more likely, to get around the need to sign everything in their widget resource (I thought of this as a way around signing everything so developers will too!). Ok. It's not a big hole and the attacks require some assistance from developers, but unless there's a reason not to it should be pretty easy to close. I realise that this still requires the ability to read in the file, which would probably have to be via a local Ajax call, not a reference as I suggested above. You could say that it's a pretty theoretical vulnerability but if it's easy to fix and there's no negatives then I think we should address it. Ok, as you saw, I created an issue so we don't forget to address this: http://www.w3.org/2008/webapps/track/issues/83 I also added your description of the hole. Kind regards, Marcos -- Marcos Caceres http://datadriven.com.au
[widgets] The access element (was: RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec)
from a Vodafone perspective and as someone who participates in both W3C WebApps and BONDI, ideally we would like to see the solution specified in W3C and then simply referenced in BONDI. With BONDIs current specifications being at Candidate Release status until the 9th March there is still a good opportunity to achieve this kind of alignment. I realise that it's late in the day to be specifying new elements but I think there are real advantages to extending the access element in the way proposed and it addresses a real use case. As always, comments, questions and suggestions are welcomed! Thanks, Mark [1] http://www.mail-archive.com/public-webapps@w3.org/msg02058.html [2] http://bondi.omtp.org/Documents/CR10/BONDI_Architecture_Security_Task_CR 10.pdf -Original Message- From: Marcos Caceres [mailto:marcosscace...@gmail.com] Sent: 04 February 2009 17:35 To: Priestley, Mark, VF-Group Cc: Arthur Barstow; public-webapps Subject: Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec Hi Mark, On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 6:29 PM, Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com wrote: Hi Marcos, Art, All, Please find below Vodafone's comments on the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration specification. I have divided them into what I consider to be substantive comments and editorial comments. Thanks, Mark -- -- -- Substantive comments -- -- -- Step 5 Process the Digital Signatures We disagree with the stage 2, specifically If the file entry is deemed by the [Widgets-DigSig] to be an invalid widget, then a widget user agent must treat this widget as an invalid widget., on two grounds: (1) Because one signature is invalid it doesn't mean that all of the signatures are invalid; (2) Just because one signature or all signatures are invalid does not mean that the widget should not be installed, only that it should _not_ be treated as a signed widget. The security policy of the device might be configured not to install an unsigned widget or a widget with an invalid signature but this should be dependent on the security policy implemented. Sorry, I think you might have misunderstood what I was trying to say here (probably I did not write it clearly enough). This assertion is here to deal with instances where the digital signature deemed by the Widgets Dig Sig spec to be somehow fully broken or completely non-conforming in such a way that all processing must stop. I don't yet know if Widgets Dig Sig will spit out such a result for any digsig it is processing, but it seemed like a good idea to put this in here at the time. In other words, this is something that is controlled by the Widgets Dig Sig spec. If it turns out that Widgets Dig Sig never results in an invalid widget situation, then I will take this out. I've created a red note in the spec that says Issue: [Widgets-DigSig] may never identify a widget package as invalid as a reminder that we need to sort this out. FWIW, I think step 5 is buggy and needs a rewrite (I've added another issue to the spec stating as such). I'll need to work with you to fix it as we progress the Dig Sig spec. --- Step 4 Locate Digital Signatures for the Widget I'm not sure whether the packaging and configuration specification is the correct place to do this but IMHO there needs to be a statement that a files with a file name corresponding to the naming convention for digital signatures are not accessible from the widget once the widget is installed / instantiated. Failure to impose this restriction will make it possible to include a signature and then reference it from the signed code, which presents a security hole. Good point. This seems like something that needs to be in the yet to be written a widget runtime security spec. I've added an issue note to the spec so we don't forget about this. Just out of interest, can you present the nature of the security hole? i.e., once an attacker has the signature, say, via an XSS attack, what could they do with it? --- 7.10 The access Element The access element defines a network attribute as A boolean attribute that indicates that the widget might need to access network resources as specified in [Widgets-Security]. Based on this description we would like to make the following observations and suggestion: The access element contains security permissions that will be used as hooks in the yet to be written [Widgets-Security] specification. The problem is that the permissions haven't yet been discussed in detail and so we may find that we want to represent additional context other than a black and white
RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
No problem. From http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2009JanMar/0346.html: [mp] The hole is that signature files are excluded from the generation of the signature values in any other signature files. This means that if, for example, an attacker added to the widget resource a signature file containing some malicious content, the malicious content of that file wouldn't be covered by any of the other signatures but the widget user agent thinks the entire widget resource is signed. This could happen regardless of whether or not the signature file was actually valid, or was just named according to the convention for digital signature. To be abused by an attacker it would either be necessary to inject a reference to the file into the widget, which might be difficult, or to hijack an existing reference to a signature file by swapping the intended signature file for the attacker's signature file (with the same name). While this later attack depends on the author providing such a reference in their widget, there are two reasons why the author may currently choose to do this - to get some information about the signature to display to the user, or possibly more likely, to get around the need to sign everything in their widget resource (I thought of this as a way around signing everything so developers will too!). It's not a big hole and the attacks require some assistance from developers, but unless there's a reason not to it should be pretty easy to close. I realise that this still requires the ability to read in the file, which would probably have to be via a local Ajax call, not a reference as I suggested above. You could say that it's a pretty theoretical vulnerability but if it's easy to fix and there's no negatives then I think we should address it. Thanks, Mark -Original Message- From: Marcos Caceres [mailto:marcosscace...@gmail.com] Sent: 13 February 2009 13:27 To: Priestley, Mark, VF-Group Cc: Frederick Hirsch; Barstow Art (Nokia-CIC/Boston); public-webapps Subject: Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec Hi Mark, 2009/2/12 Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com: [mp] To be clear I was suggesting that access to signatures was restricted from the widget after installation. I was not suggesting that they were not more generally available. As you say access to signatures after installation (outside of the widget) is useful and should be supported. Could you please explain what the security implications of allowing a widget to have access to the signatures at runtime? (apologies if you have done this in another email, I might have missed it). Kind regards, Marcos -- Marcos Caceres http://datadriven.com.au
Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
Hi Mark, 2009/2/12 Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com: [mp] To be clear I was suggesting that access to signatures was restricted from the widget after installation. I was not suggesting that they were not more generally available. As you say access to signatures after installation (outside of the widget) is useful and should be supported. Could you please explain what the security implications of allowing a widget to have access to the signatures at runtime? (apologies if you have done this in another email, I might have missed it). Kind regards, Marcos -- Marcos Caceres http://datadriven.com.au
Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
will make it possible to include a signature and then reference it from the signed code, which presents a security hole. Good point. This seems like something that needs to be in the yet to be written a widget runtime security spec. I've added an issue note to the spec so we don't forget about this. Just out of interest, can you present the nature of the security hole? i.e., once an attacker has the signature, say, via an XSS attack, what could they do with it? [mp] The hole is that signature files are excluded from the generation of the signature values in any other signature files. This means that if, for example, an attacker added to the widget resource a signature file containing some malicious content, the malicious content of that file wouldn't be covered by any of the other signatures but the widget user agent thinks the entire widget resource is signed. This could happen regardless of whether or not the signature file was actually valid, or was just named according to the convention for digital signature. To be abused by an attacker it would either be necessary to inject a reference to the file into the widget, which might be difficult, or to hijack an existing reference to a signature file by swapping the intended signature file for the attacker's signature file (with the same name). While this later attack depends on the author providing such a reference in their widget, there are two reasons why the author may currently choose to do this - to get some information about the signature to display to the user, or possibly more likely, to get around the need to sign everything in their widget resource (I thought of this as a way around signing everything so developers will too!). It's not a big hole and the attacks require some assistance from developers, but unless there's a reason not to it should be pretty easy to close. -Original Message- From: Marcos Caceres [mailto:marcosscace...@gmail.com] Sent: 04 February 2009 17:35 To: Priestley, Mark, VF-Group Cc: Arthur Barstow; public-webapps Subject: Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec Hi Mark, On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 6:29 PM, Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com wrote: Hi Marcos, Art, All, Please find below Vodafone's comments on the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration specification. I have divided them into what I consider to be substantive comments and editorial comments. Thanks, Mark -- -- -- Substantive comments -- -- -- Step 5 Process the Digital Signatures We disagree with the stage 2, specifically If the file entry is deemed by the [Widgets-DigSig] to be an invalid widget, then a widget user agent must treat this widget as an invalid widget., on two grounds: (1) Because one signature is invalid it doesn't mean that all of the signatures are invalid; (2) Just because one signature or all signatures are invalid does not mean that the widget should not be installed, only that it should _not_ be treated as a signed widget. The security policy of the device might be configured not to install an unsigned widget or a widget with an invalid signature but this should be dependent on the security policy implemented. Sorry, I think you might have misunderstood what I was trying to say here (probably I did not write it clearly enough). This assertion is here to deal with instances where the digital signature deemed by the Widgets Dig Sig spec to be somehow fully broken or completely non-conforming in such a way that all processing must stop. I don't yet know if Widgets Dig Sig will spit out such a result for any digsig it is processing, but it seemed like a good idea to put this in here at the time. In other words, this is something that is controlled by the Widgets Dig Sig spec. If it turns out that Widgets Dig Sig never results in an invalid widget situation, then I will take this out. I've created a red note in the spec that says Issue: [Widgets-DigSig] may never identify a widget package as invalid as a reminder that we need to sort this out. FWIW, I think step 5 is buggy and needs a rewrite (I've added another issue to the spec stating as such). I'll need to work with you to fix it as we progress the Dig Sig spec. --- Step 4 Locate Digital Signatures for the Widget I'm not sure whether the packaging and configuration specification is the correct place to do this but IMHO there needs to be a statement that a files with a file name corresponding to the naming convention for digital signatures are not accessible from the widget once the widget is installed / instantiated. Failure to impose this restriction will make it possible to include a signature and then reference it from
RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
developers, but unless there's a reason not to it should be pretty easy to close. -Original Message- From: Marcos Caceres [mailto:marcosscace...@gmail.com] Sent: 04 February 2009 17:35 To: Priestley, Mark, VF-Group Cc: Arthur Barstow; public-webapps Subject: Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec Hi Mark, On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 6:29 PM, Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com wrote: Hi Marcos, Art, All, Please find below Vodafone's comments on the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration specification. I have divided them into what I consider to be substantive comments and editorial comments. Thanks, Mark -- -- -- Substantive comments -- -- -- Step 5 Process the Digital Signatures We disagree with the stage 2, specifically If the file entry is deemed by the [Widgets-DigSig] to be an invalid widget, then a widget user agent must treat this widget as an invalid widget., on two grounds: (1) Because one signature is invalid it doesn't mean that all of the signatures are invalid; (2) Just because one signature or all signatures are invalid does not mean that the widget should not be installed, only that it should _not_ be treated as a signed widget. The security policy of the device might be configured not to install an unsigned widget or a widget with an invalid signature but this should be dependent on the security policy implemented. Sorry, I think you might have misunderstood what I was trying to say here (probably I did not write it clearly enough). This assertion is here to deal with instances where the digital signature deemed by the Widgets Dig Sig spec to be somehow fully broken or completely non-conforming in such a way that all processing must stop. I don't yet know if Widgets Dig Sig will spit out such a result for any digsig it is processing, but it seemed like a good idea to put this in here at the time. In other words, this is something that is controlled by the Widgets Dig Sig spec. If it turns out that Widgets Dig Sig never results in an invalid widget situation, then I will take this out. I've created a red note in the spec that says Issue: [Widgets-DigSig] may never identify a widget package as invalid as a reminder that we need to sort this out. FWIW, I think step 5 is buggy and needs a rewrite (I've added another issue to the spec stating as such). I'll need to work with you to fix it as we progress the Dig Sig spec. --- Step 4 Locate Digital Signatures for the Widget I'm not sure whether the packaging and configuration specification is the correct place to do this but IMHO there needs to be a statement that a files with a file name corresponding to the naming convention for digital signatures are not accessible from the widget once the widget is installed / instantiated. Failure to impose this restriction will make it possible to include a signature and then reference it from the signed code, which presents a security hole. Good point. This seems like something that needs to be in the yet to be written a widget runtime security spec. I've added an issue note to the spec so we don't forget about this. Just out of interest, can you present the nature of the security hole? i.e., once an attacker has the signature, say, via an XSS attack, what could they do with it? --- 7.10 The access Element The access element defines a network attribute as A boolean attribute that indicates that the widget might need to access network resources as specified in [Widgets-Security]. Based on this description we would like to make the following observations and suggestion: The access element contains security permissions that will be used as hooks in the yet to be written [Widgets-Security] specification. The problem is that the permissions haven't yet been discussed in detail and so we may find that we want to represent additional context other than a black and white is network access required?. For example, it may be the case that it is important from a security point of view to know which bearer or protocol will be used, or to nest a set of domains/URLs with which the widget wants to communicate. I do not have a strong view on what might be relevant here, and I am not suggesting that it needs to be considered as part of the last call of the Packaging and Configuration spec, only that it is likely that the permission will need to be more complex when we look at it from a security perspective. I think we better start this soon, then. My feeling is that we will need some kind of domain access declarations, and I would like to see
RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
agent may use bigger heights and widths if it wants to? Equally should there be default sizes in case the attribute is not used? Hmm... good point. I've added that as an issue in the relevant section. [mp] OK - no strong opinion on this I was just really asking a question In terms of raster graphics the text currently says If the file pointed to by the src is a supported raster graphic, this value may be ignored by the widget user agent. but shouldn't the may in this case be a should? Correct, but that should should be a must. Fixed. [mp] Even better, thanks. --- 7.13 The feature Element In the sentence The feature is used by an author to denote that, at runtime, a widget may require access to a feature. the use of may require is very slightly confusing given that the next attribute is required. Suggest changing require to try to or attempt to. Changed require to attempt to. [mp] Thanks Likewise in the definition of the name attribute in the sentence A URI attribute that identifies a feature required by the widget at runtime (such as an API). change required by to that may be used. Done. [mp] Thanks --- 8 Steps for Processing a Widget Resource The sentence The steps for processing a widget resource involves ten steps that a widget user agent must follow, in sequential order, responding accordingly if any of the steps result in an error. could be slightly misleading as some of the steps are skipped depending on the processing in a preceding step. I'm not sure if this is always in a response to an error? Ok, I changed it to: The steps for processing a widget resource involves ten steps that a user agent must follow, in sequential order, responding accordingly if any of the steps result in an error or if the specification asks for the user agent to skip a step. Is that any better? [mp] Yep - sorry if I was being over pedantic :( A minor comment on section 8 as a whole - some of the steps have an explicit link to go to the next step while others (like 9) don't. It would be nice if this was consistent. Ok, I checked every step and made sure things are consistent. Once all the comments are done, I'll do another editorial round to make sure everything is more consistent. In addition, some of the algorithms, for example step 7, could be made clearer by explicitly stating when to go to the next step (i.e. in case of success in 7.1 and 7.2). Ok, I did what you said for step 7 and Step 8. Can you let me know which other ones need a rewrite? Finally, in Step 6 there is a sentence Else, remove the last subtag of the range and repeat this step 2.d. (e.g., if the range Just to be super clear perhaps this step 2.d. could be change to and go to 2.d of this algorithm Made the change you suggested. [mp] All of the above changes for Section 8 look good to me- thanks. -Original Message- From: Marcos Caceres [mailto:marcosscace...@gmail.com] Sent: 04 February 2009 17:35 To: Priestley, Mark, VF-Group Cc: Arthur Barstow; public-webapps Subject: Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec Hi Mark, On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 6:29 PM, Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com wrote: Hi Marcos, Art, All, Please find below Vodafone's comments on the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration specification. I have divided them into what I consider to be substantive comments and editorial comments. Thanks, Mark -- -- -- Substantive comments -- -- -- Step 5 Process the Digital Signatures We disagree with the stage 2, specifically If the file entry is deemed by the [Widgets-DigSig] to be an invalid widget, then a widget user agent must treat this widget as an invalid widget., on two grounds: (1) Because one signature is invalid it doesn't mean that all of the signatures are invalid; (2) Just because one signature or all signatures are invalid does not mean that the widget should not be installed, only that it should _not_ be treated as a signed widget. The security policy of the device might be configured not to install an unsigned widget or a widget with an invalid signature but this should be dependent on the security policy implemented. Sorry, I think you might have misunderstood what I was trying to say here (probably I did not write it clearly enough). This assertion is here to deal with instances where the digital signature deemed by the Widgets Dig Sig spec to be somehow fully broken or completely non-conforming in such a way that all processing must stop. I don't yet know if Widgets Dig Sig will spit out such a result for any digsig it is processing
Re: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
Hi Mark, On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 6:29 PM, Priestley, Mark, VF-Group mark.priest...@vodafone.com wrote: Hi Marcos, Art, All, Please find below Vodafone's comments on the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration specification. I have divided them into what I consider to be substantive comments and editorial comments. Thanks, Mark -- Substantive comments -- Step 5 Process the Digital Signatures We disagree with the stage 2, specifically If the file entry is deemed by the [Widgets-DigSig] to be an invalid widget, then a widget user agent must treat this widget as an invalid widget., on two grounds: (1) Because one signature is invalid it doesn't mean that all of the signatures are invalid; (2) Just because one signature or all signatures are invalid does not mean that the widget should not be installed, only that it should _not_ be treated as a signed widget. The security policy of the device might be configured not to install an unsigned widget or a widget with an invalid signature but this should be dependent on the security policy implemented. Sorry, I think you might have misunderstood what I was trying to say here (probably I did not write it clearly enough). This assertion is here to deal with instances where the digital signature deemed by the Widgets Dig Sig spec to be somehow fully broken or completely non-conforming in such a way that all processing must stop. I don't yet know if Widgets Dig Sig will spit out such a result for any digsig it is processing, but it seemed like a good idea to put this in here at the time. In other words, this is something that is controlled by the Widgets Dig Sig spec. If it turns out that Widgets Dig Sig never results in an invalid widget situation, then I will take this out. I've created a red note in the spec that says Issue: [Widgets-DigSig] may never identify a widget package as invalid as a reminder that we need to sort this out. FWIW, I think step 5 is buggy and needs a rewrite (I've added another issue to the spec stating as such). I'll need to work with you to fix it as we progress the Dig Sig spec. --- Step 4 Locate Digital Signatures for the Widget I'm not sure whether the packaging and configuration specification is the correct place to do this but IMHO there needs to be a statement that a files with a file name corresponding to the naming convention for digital signatures are not accessible from the widget once the widget is installed / instantiated. Failure to impose this restriction will make it possible to include a signature and then reference it from the signed code, which presents a security hole. Good point. This seems like something that needs to be in the yet to be written a widget runtime security spec. I've added an issue note to the spec so we don't forget about this. Just out of interest, can you present the nature of the security hole? i.e., once an attacker has the signature, say, via an XSS attack, what could they do with it? --- 7.10 The access Element The access element defines a network attribute as A boolean attribute that indicates that the widget might need to access network resources as specified in [Widgets-Security]. Based on this description we would like to make the following observations and suggestion: The access element contains security permissions that will be used as hooks in the yet to be written [Widgets-Security] specification. The problem is that the permissions haven't yet been discussed in detail and so we may find that we want to represent additional context other than a black and white is network access required?. For example, it may be the case that it is important from a security point of view to know which bearer or protocol will be used, or to nest a set of domains/URLs with which the widget wants to communicate. I do not have a strong view on what might be relevant here, and I am not suggesting that it needs to be considered as part of the last call of the Packaging and Configuration spec, only that it is likely that the permission will need to be more complex when we look at it from a security perspective. I think we better start this soon, then. My feeling is that we will need some kind of domain access declarations, and I would like to see them in the configuration document. __This has the potential to block progress of this specification.__ There is also the case in which the network permission may be used to determine whether or not the user wants to install a widget, This sounds reasonable. or by the widget user agent may want to indicate whether or not the widget can run when there is no available network connection. Some widgets may only operate when
RE: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
to: A widget user agent will attempt to locate a file entry whose file-name case insensitively matches one of the default start files based on the order they appear in the table below (from top to bottom). --- 7.1 Namespace It seems a bit tough that an invalid configuration document results in a invalid widget as the configuration document is optional. Also, if the configuration document in the localised folder is invalid, it could be the case that there is a valid configuration document at the root of the widget. I don't have a strong opinion on this and have no objection to leaving the text as it is, I just wondered if there was a reason why this approach had been taken? --- 7.2 Proprietary Extensions Should the may be a should? Otherwise, it could be interpreted as suggesting that vendors may equally use other approaches? --- 7.9 The icon Element (disclaimer - I may well be talking rubbish here as the following comments are based on a _very_ basic understanding of graphics formats) The text says that if the icon is vector format then the height and width attributes will be used, however, isn't one the point of using vector graphics that they could be re-sized to fit the available space. Therefore shouldn't there be a statement saying that the widget user agent MAY ignore these values? Equally should there be default sizes in case the attribute is not used? In terms of raster graphics the text currently says If the file pointed to by the src is a supported raster graphic, this value may be ignored by the widget user agent. but shouldn't the may in this case be a should? --- 7.13 The feature Element In the sentence The feature is used by an author to denote that, at runtime, a widget may require access to a feature. the use of may require is very slightly confusing given that the next attribute is required. Suggest changing require to try to or attempt to. Likewise in the definition of the name attribute in the sentence A URI attribute that identifies a feature required by the widget at runtime (such as an API). change required by to that may be used. --- 8 Steps for Processing a Widget Resource The sentence The steps for processing a widget resource involves ten steps that a widget user agent must follow, in sequential order, responding accordingly if any of the steps result in an error. could be slightly misleading as some of the steps are skipped depending on the processing in a preceding step. I'm not sure if this is always in a response to an error? A minor comment on section 8 as a whole - some of the steps have an explicit link to go to the next step while others (like 9) don't. I t would be nice if this was consistent. In addition, some of the algorithms, for example step 7, could be made clearer by explicitly stating when to go to the next step (i.e. in case of success in 7.1 and 7.2). Finally, in Step 6 there is a sentence Else, remove the last subtag of the range and repeat this step 2.d. (e.g., if the range Just to be super clear perhaps this step 2.d. could be change to and go to 2.d of this algorithm -Original Message- From: public-webapps-requ...@w3.org [mailto:public-webapps-requ...@w3.org] On Behalf Of Arthur Barstow Sent: 28 January 2009 20:54 To: public-webapps Subject: Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec A reminder for people interested in Widgets specs ... January 31 is the deadline for comments for the 22 December 2008 Last Call Working Draft of the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration spec: http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/WD-widgets-20081222/ -Regards, Art Barstow Begin forwarded message: Resent-From: public-webapps@w3.org From: ext Arthur Barstow art.bars...@nokia.com Date: January 9, 2009 1:38:51 PM EST To: public-webapps public-webapps@w3.org Subject: Request for Comments: Last Call WD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec; deadline 31 Jan 2009 Archived-At: http://www.w3.org/mid/E2D2E546-BB41-4380-BD22- ac6d5245a...@nokia.com Bcc: public-i18n-c...@w3.org, public-b...@w3.org, wai-xt...@w3.org, public-m...@w3.org Reply-to: public-webapps@w3.org (archived at [1]) The Web Applications WG [2] explicitly seeks comments from the I18N, Mobile Web BP, Mobile Web Test Suites and WAI PF Working Groups regarding the 22 December 2008 Last Call Working Draft of the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration spec: http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/WD-widgets-20081222/ Comments from all others, including the Web Apps community are also encouraged. The comment period ends on 31 January 2009. -Regards, Art Barstow P.S. Note: Bcc was used to help reduce cross-posting. Please send all replies to public-webapps@w3.org [1] http://lists.w3.org
Reminder: January 31 comment deadline for LCWD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec
A reminder for people interested in Widgets specs ... January 31 is the deadline for comments for the 22 December 2008 Last Call Working Draft of the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration spec: http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/WD-widgets-20081222/ -Regards, Art Barstow Begin forwarded message: Resent-From: public-webapps@w3.org From: ext Arthur Barstow art.bars...@nokia.com Date: January 9, 2009 1:38:51 PM EST To: public-webapps public-webapps@w3.org Subject: Request for Comments: Last Call WD of Widgets 1.0: Packaging Configuration spec; deadline 31 Jan 2009 Archived-At: http://www.w3.org/mid/E2D2E546-BB41-4380-BD22- ac6d5245a...@nokia.com Bcc: public-i18n-c...@w3.org, public-b...@w3.org, wai-xt...@w3.org, public-m...@w3.org Reply-to: public-webapps@w3.org (archived at [1]) The Web Applications WG [2] explicitly seeks comments from the I18N, Mobile Web BP, Mobile Web Test Suites and WAI PF Working Groups regarding the 22 December 2008 Last Call Working Draft of the Widgets 1.0: Packaging and Configuration spec: http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/WD-widgets-20081222/ Comments from all others, including the Web Apps community are also encouraged. The comment period ends on 31 January 2009. -Regards, Art Barstow P.S. Note: Bcc was used to help reduce cross-posting. Please send all replies to public-webapps@w3.org [1] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/ [2] http://www.w3.org/2008/webapps/wiki/Main_Page
