Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-14 Thread Anant Narayanan

On 5/13/12 2:17 PM, SULLIVAN, BRYAN L wrote:

For (1) we can expect a text change, right?


Yes, I will make them as soon as I able to.


For (2), If the app manifest if obtained over non-secure HTTP, it is subject to 
modification. If the app is delivered over non-secure HTTP, even more can be 
modified. So is the plan to provide some kind of user warning when the manifest 
and/or app (including assets from the same origin) are delivered via non-secure 
HTTP (in the absence of a manifest signature)? And even if a manifest signature 
is provided how does it ensure protection of the assets (e.g. JS, CSS, and 
HTML) if they are delivered over non-secure HTTP? Does HTTPS need to be 
enforced, and cert domain validation as well?


We've previously discussed enforcing serving manifests over HTTPS, but 
it may not be appropriate to put this into the spec itself. Different 
user agents may choose to do different things, ranging from disallowing 
installs over HTTP or warning the user before proceeding.


Regards,
-Anant



Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-14 Thread Marcos Caceres



On Monday, 14 May 2012 at 17:44, Anant Narayanan wrote:

 
 We've previously discussed enforcing serving manifests over HTTPS, but
 it may not be appropriate to put this into the spec itself. Different
 user agents may choose to do different things, ranging from disallowing
 installs over HTTP or warning the user before proceeding.

I agree - trying to enface this in the spec would be unhelpful. Would make, for 
instance, testing really annoying because devs would need to shell out a bunch 
of money for a static IP and an SSL cert.  

-- 
Marcos Caceres
http://datadriven.com.au






Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-14 Thread Anant Narayanan

Hi Scott,

Thanks for your comments, more inline.

On 5/13/12 12:06 PM, Scott Wilson wrote:

On 12 May 2012, at 19:02, Anant Narayanan wrote:

Q. Why not simply reuse the widgets spec [2]?

A. Aside from naming (we're talking about apps, the word widget seems to 
imply an artificial limitation),


To be fair, you can call your implementation anything you want even if it implements the 
Widget specs. Maybe we could rename the Widget specs Widgets, Apps, Gadgets or 
Whatever specs.

If you really, really hate the word that much you could decide to call the TWI widget object app 
instead in your own documentation, and just silently convert window.widget to 
window.app whenever you come across it. To reciprocate, I could add a line somewhere in Apache 
Wookie and Apache Cordova that does the exact opposite. Interoperability FTW!


I'm trying to understand how building on the widget spec would work in 
practice. I'm not opposed to it on principle, but we (Mozilla) have 
chosen not to implement the widget spec in the past, but we have already 
implemented the JSON manifest and API spec. If we rework this proposal 
as an extension to the widget spec, does it mean we will have to 
implement the entirety of the widget spec too?


Essentially, I'd like to make both spec independently implementable, 
even if we chose to extend some objects defined in the widget spec.



and replacing XML with JSON;


No objections to representing the manifest in JSON either. Would a 
serialization of The Widget Interface as a JSON manifest file obviate the need 
for defining basically the same metadata in a different spec? We can then just 
focus on the things that definitely aren't part of existing specs, such as the 
security model, installation events, and default orientation, all of which look 
like interesting extensions.


Rich Tibbett from Opera did precisely that, you can see a mapping here: 
http://people.opera.com/richt/release/specs/manifests/widgets_to_app_manifest.html


It looks good to me in general, but I'm a little wary of committing to 
all fields that are valid keys in the XML schema. Is there a way we can 
take a subset instead?



the other fundamental difference is that the widget spec describes packaged 
apps, whereas our manifest describes hosted apps.


Widgets is also used for hosted as well as packaged apps e.g. Apache Wookie + 
Apache Rave...


Ah, that's really good to know; I hadn't come across a widget that was 
hosted before, but looks like it is possible.



We think hosted apps have several interesting and unique web-like properties 
that are worth retaining. Hosted apps can be made to work offline just as well 
as packaged apps with AppCache (which is in need of some improvement, but can 
be made to work!).


Which are the bits of this proposal that are important for this and which 
aren't found in Widgets? Can we add those to the existing specs to fill any 
gaps?


The manifests in the proposal don't have an id field, because an app 
is simply identified by the domain from which the manifest for it was 
fetched. This is the key difference, but I'll have to look deeper at the 
Widget spec to see if there are any more.



Packaged apps do have their own advantages though, which we acknowledge, and 
are open to extending the spec to support both types of apps.


Hmm, that does kind of negate the previous point... but moving on..!


We don't support packaged apps yet, either in the specification or the 
implementation. If possible we'd like to go hosted + appcache as far as 
we can. I mentioned this because I don't want packaged apps to be a 
reason for this spec to be rejected.



I'm very positive about this proposal and would love to see it merged into 
Widgets:PC  TWI, with perhaps a separate spec on web app/widget installation 
including the work Mozilla has done on installation APIs and events.


I'm glad you like the proposal! However, I would really like to see the 
API and manifest in the same document, because, as I mentioned earlier, 
at-least in the context of browsers they are dependent on each other. 
What does it mean for a browser to only implement the manifest spec 
but not the installation API (or vice-versa)?


On the other hand, there might be other User-Agents that won't have the 
installation API though, because they don't have a DOM or support 
JavaScript; in which case we could seperate them but write additional 
text that recommends implementing both for environments that have a DOM. 
I'm not sure if that's in scope for the working group.



I'd be interested in implementing those in Apache Wookie, Apache Rave and 
related projects and initiatives that build on them, as web app installation 
and app store APIs are something thats come up in quite a few implementations 
and it would be great to have a spec for that.

Just don't tie it to another competing manifest format, please!


The current widget spec doesn't allow for a JSON representation. We will 
have to come up with a 

Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-14 Thread Anant Narayanan

On 5/14/12 10:47 AM, Mounir Lamouri wrote:

I don't think we can justify the choice of one app per origin just
because it's how browsers work nowadays regarding security and
permissions. This is an implementation detail and we shouldn't write
specs based on implementation details. And that might be true only for
some browsers and not for others.


Agree wholeheartedly!


In addition, how permissions are currently handled already have serious
limitations which would make the app security model hard to implement if
we stick to a simple origin definition. For example, if I go to
foo.example.com from APP1 (because APP1 is from that origin or because
I'm browsing that website from that app) and then I go to
foo.example.com from APP2, should permissions given when I was using
APP1 given to APP2? I don't think we should. Concretely that means that
a website accessed from it's dedicated app and the same website browsed
from a browser app would have the same permissions or that a website
browsed from browser foo and the same website browsed from browser bar
would also have the same permissions.


I don't understand this scenario fully, permissions given to an app are 
tied to its origin and cannot be extended to any other domain, 
irrespective of whether that domain was accessed via the app (an iframe 
or something else). We do not allow an app to navigate outside its 
origin at the top-level window.



IMO, the manifest URL should be the unique identifier for an application
so we should not restricts applications per origin and the security
model should consider that permissions where given to a specific origin
inside a specific application.


I'm not sure how this would work. Not only do we have to isolate API 
permissions between two apps from the same domain, but also other things 
like cookie jars, localStorage, indexedDB, XHR, and so on.


How will you enforce App1 from being unable to XHR to App2 even though 
they're both from the same domain? In particular, how do you know what 
pages from a given domain belong to which app? One possibility is to 
allow suffixes: (example.org/app1, example.org/app2), but the manifest 
URL by itself is insufficient.


-Anant



Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-14 Thread Scott Wilson

On 14 May 2012, at 18:12, Anant Narayanan wrote:

 Hi Scott,
 
 Thanks for your comments, more inline.
 
 On 5/13/12 12:06 PM, Scott Wilson wrote:
 On 12 May 2012, at 19:02, Anant Narayanan wrote:
 Q. Why not simply reuse the widgets spec [2]?
 
 A. Aside from naming (we're talking about apps, the word widget seems to 
 imply an artificial limitation),
 
 To be fair, you can call your implementation anything you want even if it 
 implements the Widget specs. Maybe we could rename the Widget specs 
 Widgets, Apps, Gadgets or Whatever specs.
 
 If you really, really hate the word that much you could decide to call the 
 TWI widget object app instead in your own documentation, and just silently 
 convert window.widget to window.app whenever you come across it. To 
 reciprocate, I could add a line somewhere in Apache Wookie and Apache 
 Cordova that does the exact opposite. Interoperability FTW!
 
 I'm trying to understand how building on the widget spec would work in 
 practice. I'm not opposed to it on principle, but we (Mozilla) have chosen 
 not to implement the widget spec in the past, but we have already implemented 
 the JSON manifest and API spec. If we rework this proposal as an extension to 
 the widget spec, does it mean we will have to implement the entirety of the 
 widget spec too?

Entirety of the widget spec isn't much - you've done most of it already. If 
you mean would you have to support an XML manifest, or support packaged apps as 
well as naked manifests? No, I can't see a reason you would.

Comparing TWI with the proposal, the only things in TWI that are additional are 
shortName, authorEmail, and preferences. Preferences may not make sense for 
Mozilla's implementation - if so, don't use them, or autowire into WebStorage.

 Essentially, I'd like to make both spec independently implementable, even if 
 we chose to extend some objects defined in the widget spec.

 
 and replacing XML with JSON;
 
 No objections to representing the manifest in JSON either. Would a 
 serialization of The Widget Interface as a JSON manifest file obviate the 
 need for defining basically the same metadata in a different spec? We can 
 then just focus on the things that definitely aren't part of existing specs, 
 such as the security model, installation events, and default orientation, 
 all of which look like interesting extensions.
 
 Rich Tibbett from Opera did precisely that, you can see a mapping here: 
 http://people.opera.com/richt/release/specs/manifests/widgets_to_app_manifest.html
 
 It looks good to me in general, but I'm a little wary of committing to all 
 fields that are valid keys in the XML schema. Is there a way we can take a 
 subset instead?

The spec defines the set of widget metadata. If you only choose to use a subset 
in implementation, thats fine. 

Also, don't worry about the XML - I think the main point of comparison is the 
Widget Interface spec which already maps a subset of the XML manifest 
properties to JS properties that make sense in the browsing context of a 
running widget. 

So manifest properties that only really apply to a packaged widget wouldn't 
necessarily be used in a JSON representation for a hosted widget.

 
 the other fundamental difference is that the widget spec describes packaged 
 apps, whereas our manifest describes hosted apps.
 
 Widgets is also used for hosted as well as packaged apps e.g. Apache Wookie 
 + Apache Rave...
 
 Ah, that's really good to know; I hadn't come across a widget that was hosted 
 before, but looks like it is possible.
 
 We think hosted apps have several interesting and unique web-like 
 properties that are worth retaining. Hosted apps can be made to work 
 offline just as well as packaged apps with AppCache (which is in need of 
 some improvement, but can be made to work!).
 
 Which are the bits of this proposal that are important for this and which 
 aren't found in Widgets? Can we add those to the existing specs to fill any 
 gaps?
 
 The manifests in the proposal don't have an id field, because an app is 
 simply identified by the domain from which the manifest for it was fetched. 
 This is the key difference, but I'll have to look deeper at the Widget spec 
 to see if there are any more.

The id property is optional in widgets anyway.

 
 Packaged apps do have their own advantages though, which we acknowledge, 
 and are open to extending the spec to support both types of apps.
 
 Hmm, that does kind of negate the previous point... but moving on..!
 
 We don't support packaged apps yet, either in the specification or the 
 implementation. If possible we'd like to go hosted + appcache as far as we 
 can. I mentioned this because I don't want packaged apps to be a reason for 
 this spec to be rejected.
 
 I'm very positive about this proposal and would love to see it merged into 
 Widgets:PC  TWI, with perhaps a separate spec on web app/widget 
 installation including the work Mozilla has done on installation APIs and 
 events.
 

Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-14 Thread Marcos Caceres

Hi Anant,

On 14/05/2012 18:12, Anant Narayanan wrote:

Hi Scott,

Thanks for your comments, more inline.

On 5/13/12 12:06 PM, Scott Wilson wrote:

On 12 May 2012, at 19:02, Anant Narayanan wrote:

Q. Why not simply reuse the widgets spec [2]?

A. Aside from naming (we're talking about apps, the word widget 
seems to imply an artificial limitation),


To be fair, you can call your implementation anything you want even 
if it implements the Widget specs. Maybe we could rename the Widget 
specs Widgets, Apps, Gadgets or Whatever specs.


If you really, really hate the word that much you could decide to 
call the TWI widget object app instead in your own documentation, 
and just silently convert window.widget to window.app whenever 
you come across it. To reciprocate, I could add a line somewhere in 
Apache Wookie and Apache Cordova that does the exact opposite. 
Interoperability FTW!


I'm trying to understand how building on the widget spec would work in 
practice. I'm not opposed to it on principle, but we (Mozilla) have 
chosen not to implement the widget spec in the past, but we have 
already implemented the JSON manifest and API spec. If we rework this 
proposal as an extension to the widget spec, does it mean we will have 
to implement the entirety of the widget spec too?
Absolutely not: there would be no need to support the XML format. You 
just support a particular serialization (JSON) and not the packaging 
side (which is also orthogonal). But the semantics and data model remain 
the same across the specs where appropriate.
Essentially, I'd like to make both spec independently implementable, 
even if we chose to extend some objects defined in the widget spec.
Yes, that would be ideal. Historically, we renamed the Widget spec to 
Packaging and *XML Configuration* on purpose, because we've been 
anticipating the JSON format for a long long time (our requirement 
document has mentioned JSON as a target for many years [1]). We sat on 
it because we were waiting for Google or you guys to jump on it :)


Ideal situation: JSON format should be usable by UAs that currently 
support XML format (if there is support for that from implementers like 
Opera). If you guys have new/interesting use cases, then we should keep 
the specs in sync. I'm happy to help keep them in synchornized.

and replacing XML with JSON;


No objections to representing the manifest in JSON either. Would a 
serialization of The Widget Interface as a JSON manifest file obviate 
the need for defining basically the same metadata in a different 
spec? We can then just focus on the things that definitely aren't 
part of existing specs, such as the security model, installation 
events, and default orientation, all of which look like interesting 
extensions.


Rich Tibbett from Opera did precisely that, you can see a mapping 
here: 
http://people.opera.com/richt/release/specs/manifests/widgets_to_app_manifest.html


It looks good to me in general, but I'm a little wary of committing to 
all fields that are valid keys in the XML schema. Is there a way we 
can take a subset instead?
Absolutely! That would totally be ok. There is nothing required in the 
widget XML format at all. So, if you don't have a use case for something 
in the Widgets PC spec, then you can simply ignore it. This is by design.


the other fundamental difference is that the widget spec describes 
packaged apps, whereas our manifest describes hosted apps.


Widgets is also used for hosted as well as packaged apps e.g. Apache 
Wookie + Apache Rave...


Ah, that's really good to know; I hadn't come across a widget that was 
hosted before, but looks like it is possible.

There is a long legacy, dating back to the original Google Gadgets.
We think hosted apps have several interesting and unique web-like 
properties that are worth retaining. Hosted apps can be made to work 
offline just as well as packaged apps with AppCache (which is in 
need of some improvement, but can be made to work!).


Which are the bits of this proposal that are important for this and 
which aren't found in Widgets? Can we add those to the existing specs 
to fill any gaps?


The manifests in the proposal don't have an id field, because an app 
is simply identified by the domain from which the manifest for it was 
fetched. This is the key difference, but I'll have to look deeper at 
the Widget spec to see if there are any more.


Looking forward to seeing what you find. And remember, we are open to 
changes so feel free to discuss.
Packaged apps do have their own advantages though, which we 
acknowledge, and are open to extending the spec to support both 
types of apps.


Hmm, that does kind of negate the previous point... but moving on..!


We don't support packaged apps yet, either in the specification or the 
implementation. If possible we'd like to go hosted + appcache as far 
as we can. I mentioned this because I don't want packaged apps to be a 
reason for this spec to be rejected.

I think that is 

RE: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-13 Thread SULLIVAN, BRYAN L
At least in the widget model, the manifest (including feature elements) 
provides a means of disclosure to the user about the APIs that the app wants to 
access. Of course if one assumes that users are brainless click-happy 
automatons then such disclosures are useless, but at that end of the extreme 
the value of curated appstore services is clear, to me at least. I note that 
appstores are big businesses for native platform vendors also, and I assume 
that they support extension of that model to Webapps.

There will always be a tension between the pure protection that a perfect Web 
security model will provide (good luck with that), and the (perhaps, sometimes 
misplaced) trust in a system of curation. But even in the apps come from 
servers camp, there is curation involved, by the Website operator (who creates 
links) and the user (who chooses what sites to visit). Someone has to choose. I 
personally do not think we can design a Web security model that eliminates all 
need for intelligent choices, whether supported through informed consent or by 
personal experience with a Website / app author.

On whether the concept of installation fits into the Web model, I note that 
Webapp device platforms are nearing launch, which will depend upon installation 
of apps as they will take the place of native apps (they become the native 
apps). A lot of apps will still of course be transient, as server-based models 
still have unique valuable features. But the Web is growing beyond the browser 
(as with Webview API's it's already been growing for a number of years), and to 
do so it needs to accommodate the curator-trust model of appstores, and the 
metadata that enables informed user consent.

Thanks,
Bryan Sullivan

-Original Message-
From: Marcos Caceres [mailto:w...@marcosc.com] 
Sent: Saturday, May 12, 2012 2:57 PM
To: Anant Narayanan; Ian Hickson
Cc: public-webapps
Subject: Re: App Manifest  API Proposal



On Saturday, 12 May 2012 at 21:14, Ian Hickson wrote:

 On Sat, 12 May 2012, Anant Narayanan wrote:
   
  Q. Apps are just web pages, why bother installing them?
   
  A. This has been previously discussed on the list [4].
  [4] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2012JanMar/0464.html
  
  
  
 This has already received a reply:
  
 http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2012JanMar/0465.html
  
  
  There are clear differences in perception between an app and a website  
  for most users. Most web content is expected to be free, but the same  
  content wrapped in an app is something people seem to be willing to pay  
  for. Monetization is important to encourage a thriving web developer  
  community.
  
  
  
 I don't think it makes sense to use a technical solution to a  
 non-technical problem.

It's sometimes nice to have a curated space to find interesting apps - though I 
agree that this is not a technical problem, though the manifest format 
facilitates this to some respect *iff it fills gaps in the HTML spec with 
regards to metadata* (or maybe some API aspect, though I've not looked at those 
in any detail). If this warrants standardisation, I don't know… guess that is 
what we are trying to figure out. 
  Additionally, treating certain installed websites as apps gives us a  
  context separate from loading pages in a browser, which allows us to  
  provide privileged APIs to such trusted apps, APIs we would normally not  
  give to untrusted web content.
  
  
  
 Desktop operating systems have demonstrated over a period of many years  
 that this approach simply doesn't work. Users find it very difficult to  
 understand what it means to trust an app. The Web's security model is  
 IMHO significantly superior than any of the app security models we have  
 seen in native operating systems, as demonstrated by the way that when  
 malware is written to the app model it has to be dealt with by curating  
 the application market space, whereas when malware is written to the Web  
 model it is almost always because of errors in the design or  
 implementation of the Web platform that, once fixed, preclude any similar  
 attack from being performed again.
  
 The installation security model of asking the user up-front to grant  
 trust just doesn't work because users don't understand the question, and  
 the installation security model of curating apps and trying to determine  
 by empirical examination whether an application is trustworthy or not just  
 doesn't scale.
  

I agree with Ian about the above, which is why I was hopeful that feature 
thing is not needed in the manifest format (or the manifest format is not 
needed at all). Features have historically enable proprietary APIs (in Chrome 
extension, Opera extensions, and WAC for example), which likely won't 
interoperate (so features will also require standardisation).  

In my email I said that we (the widget-side of the Webapps WG) were hopeful 
that HTML would provide the needed app metadata

RE: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-13 Thread SULLIVAN, BRYAN L
Hi Anant,

Thanks for the proposal. It's good to see this moving forward, following the 
workshop we had last year after TPAC. 

Some initial comments:

1) Re version: A string that represents the version of this manifest. The 
User-Agent does not interpret this value in any way and is opaque to everyone 
but the application itself.: it's also likely that the privileged caller may 
also need to interpret this, as one key use case for the a privileged caller is 
an appstore client.

2) How do you propose that the manifest information be trusted, through 
signature on the JSON file?

3) Re softening of the requirement There must only be one application per 
origin.: you will likely need an App ID field (a URI), for which there should 
be only one installation at a time (otherwise per the manifest trust above, an 
untrusted app could pose as another app).

4) For which of the attributes, instead of being in a manifest, could we 
achieve the same purpose with HEAD section elements in the start page of the 
app? I guess this question comes down to what is the inherent value of a 
manifest, and also how can we get similar value for these attributes on normal 
Web pages (with no manifest).

Thanks,
Bryan Sullivan 

-Original Message-
From: Anant Narayanan [mailto:an...@mozilla.com] 
Sent: Saturday, May 12, 2012 11:02 AM
To: public-webapps
Subject: App Manifest  API Proposal

Hi everyone,

I recently joined the webapps working group and I'd like to introduce 
myself! I work at Mozilla and for the past year or so have been working 
on our Apps initiative [1]. Our goal has been to make it very easy for 
developers to build apps using web technologies that can go above and 
beyond what one might achieve using native SDKs on platforms like iOS 
and Android. We're also trying to make it really easy for users to find 
and acquire these apps, and use them on any device they happen to own 
regardless of platform.

As part of this work we have devised a simple JSON based manifest format 
to describe an installable web app, in addition to a few DOM APIs to 
install and manage these apps. We have a working implementation of the 
entire system in our latest Nightly builds.

The manifest and corresponding APIs are described in an early draft at:
http://dvcs.w3.org/hg/app-manifest/raw-file/tip/index.html

We'd like to propose using that draft as the basis for a FPWD on this 
topic. I look forward to your feedback!


FAQs
--
There are a few questions I anticipate in advance, which I will try to 
answer here, but we can definitely go in more depth as necessary on the 
list:

Q. Why not simply reuse the widgets spec [2]?

A. Aside from naming (we're talking about apps, the word widget seems 
to imply an artificial limitation), and replacing XML with JSON; the 
other fundamental difference is that the widget spec describes packaged 
apps, whereas our manifest describes hosted apps.

We think hosted apps have several interesting and unique web-like 
properties that are worth retaining. Hosted apps can be made to work 
offline just as well as packaged apps with AppCache (which is in need of 
some improvement, but can be made to work!). Packaged apps do have their 
own advantages though, which we acknowledge, and are open to extending 
the spec to support both types of apps.


Q. Why is the DOM API in the same spec as the manifest?

A. One success condition for us would be standardize the DOM APIs so 
that users will be able to visit any app marketplace that publishes web 
apps conforming to the manifest spec in any browser and be able to 
install and use them.

We understand there might be other platforms on which a JS API may not 
be feasible (for eg: A Java API to install and manage these apps is 
equally important), but that shouldn't preclude us from standardizing 
the DOM API in browsers. The manifest and the API go hand-in-hand, as we 
think each of them is dramatically less useful without the other.


Q. Why only one app per origin?

A. We originally placed this restriction for security reasons. In 
Firefox (and most other browsers), the domain name is the primary 
security boundary - cookie jars, localStorage, XHRs are all bound to the 
domain. For supporting multiple apps per domain we would have to do some 
extra work to ensure that (potentially sensitive) permissions granted to 
one app do not leak into another app from the same domain. Additionally, 
this lets us use the origin of the domain as a globally unique 
identifier. Note that app1.example.org and app2.example.org are two 
different origins under this scheme.

That said, we've received a lot of developer feedback about the 
inconvenience of this restriction, and we are actively looking to lift 
it [3]. We cannot do this without a few other changes around permissions 
and enforcing specific UA behavior in app mode (as opposed to browser 
mode), but is something we can work towards.


Q. Apps are just web pages, why bother installing them?

A. This has been 

Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-13 Thread Anant Narayanan

On 5/12/2012 2:57 PM, Marcos Caceres wrote:

On Saturday, 12 May 2012 at 21:14, Ian Hickson wrote:


The installation security model of asking the user up-front to grant
trust just doesn't work because users don't understand the question, and
the installation security model of curating apps and trying to determine
by empirical examination whether an application is trustworthy or not just
doesn't scale.



I agree with Ian about the above, which is why I was hopeful that feature thing is not 
needed in the manifest format (or the manifest format is not needed at all). Features 
have historically enable proprietary APIs (in Chrome extension, Opera extensions, and WAC for 
example), which likely won't interoperate (so features will also require standardisation).

In my email I said that we (the widget-side of the Webapps WG) were hopeful that HTML 
would provide the needed app metadata to allow apps to be installed in some 
meaningful way (e.g., HTML provides icon support already, and I think Opera exploits this 
in speed dial - which serve a similar purpose to a installed app/visual bookmarks).

So I'm left wondering, what is missing (if anything) from HTML to meet the use 
cases that Moz's proposed manifest and API sets out to provide?


The big difference is runtime vs. install/launch time. As I noted in the 
other review email, we'd like to give developers, stores and UAs a 
little more information about any given app before they actually let the 
user purchase/install/launch the app.


-Anant



Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-13 Thread Anant Narayanan

Hi Sullivan,

Thanks for your comments, some responses inline:

On 5/13/2012 1:11 AM, SULLIVAN, BRYAN L wrote:

1) Re version: A string that represents the version of this manifest. The User-Agent does not 
interpret this value in any way and is opaque to everyone but the application itself.: it's 
also likely that the privileged caller may also need to interpret this, as one key use 
case for the a privileged caller is an appstore client.


Yes, absolutely.


2) How do you propose that the manifest information be trusted, through 
signature on the JSON file?


We haven't devised any signing scheme yet, we are only relying on 
manifests being served over SSL for establishing trust. I recall someone 
from Google saying something quote-worthy regarding this: If it's good 
enough for your banking, it's good enough to install some apps :)


That said, we are definitely open to adding signatures. This already 
seems required for packaged apps for highly sensitive apps like phone 
dialers, as we are discovering for B2G.



3) Re softening of the requirement There must only be one application per 
origin.: you will likely need an App ID field (a URI), for which there should be 
only one installation at a time (otherwise per the manifest trust above, an untrusted app 
could pose as another app).


Correct, this is one of the reasons we enforce one app per origin 
(posing as another app becomes very hard). Relaxing that restriction 
won't be trivial as we have to consider this and many other repercussions.



4) For which of the attributes, instead of being in a manifest, could we 
achieve the same purpose with HEAD section elements in the start page of the 
app? I guess this question comes down to what is the inherent value of a 
manifest, and also how can we get similar value for these attributes on normal 
Web pages (with no manifest).


As I mentioned in another email, I'm not too worried about duplication 
in two places as the goals are different. The point of storing such 
information in the manifest is to enable various parties to make 
decisions about how they will handle an app before 
purchase/install/launch time.


As you noted in your previous email, the manifest is also an appropriate 
place to let the developer declare what APIs they intend to use, 
regardless of whether the UA asks for user permission up-front or at 
run-time.


Regards,
-Anant



Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-13 Thread Scott Wilson

On 12 May 2012, at 19:02, Anant Narayanan wrote:

 Hi everyone,
 
 I recently joined the webapps working group and I'd like to introduce myself! 
 I work at Mozilla and for the past year or so have been working on our Apps 
 initiative [1]. Our goal has been to make it very easy for developers to 
 build apps using web technologies that can go above and beyond what one might 
 achieve using native SDKs on platforms like iOS and Android. We're also 
 trying to make it really easy for users to find and acquire these apps, and 
 use them on any device they happen to own regardless of platform.
 
 As part of this work we have devised a simple JSON based manifest format to 
 describe an installable web app, in addition to a few DOM APIs to install and 
 manage these apps. We have a working implementation of the entire system in 
 our latest Nightly builds.
 
 The manifest and corresponding APIs are described in an early draft at:
 http://dvcs.w3.org/hg/app-manifest/raw-file/tip/index.html
 
 We'd like to propose using that draft as the basis for a FPWD on this topic. 
 I look forward to your feedback!
 
 
 FAQs
 --
 There are a few questions I anticipate in advance, which I will try to answer 
 here, but we can definitely go in more depth as necessary on the list:
 
 Q. Why not simply reuse the widgets spec [2]?
 
 A. Aside from naming (we're talking about apps, the word widget seems to 
 imply an artificial limitation),

To be fair, you can call your implementation anything you want even if it 
implements the Widget specs. Maybe we could rename the Widget specs Widgets, 
Apps, Gadgets or Whatever specs. 

If you really, really hate the word that much you could decide to call the TWI 
widget object app instead in your own documentation, and just silently 
convert window.widget to window.app whenever you come across it. To 
reciprocate, I could add a line somewhere in Apache Wookie and Apache Cordova 
that does the exact opposite. Interoperability FTW!

 and replacing XML with JSON;

No objections to representing the manifest in JSON either. Would a 
serialization of The Widget Interface as a JSON manifest file obviate the need 
for defining basically the same metadata in a different spec? We can then just 
focus on the things that definitely aren't part of existing specs, such as the 
security model, installation events, and default orientation, all of which look 
like interesting extensions.

 the other fundamental difference is that the widget spec describes packaged 
 apps, whereas our manifest describes hosted apps.

Widgets is also used for hosted as well as packaged apps e.g. Apache Wookie + 
Apache Rave...

 We think hosted apps have several interesting and unique web-like properties 
 that are worth retaining. Hosted apps can be made to work offline just as 
 well as packaged apps with AppCache (which is in need of some improvement, 
 but can be made to work!).

Which are the bits of this proposal that are important for this and which 
aren't found in Widgets? Can we add those to the existing specs to fill any 
gaps?

 Packaged apps do have their own advantages though, which we acknowledge, and 
 are open to extending the spec to support both types of apps.

Hmm, that does kind of negate the previous point... but moving on..!

I'm very positive about this proposal and would love to see it merged into 
Widgets:PC  TWI, with perhaps a separate spec on web app/widget installation 
including the work Mozilla has done on installation APIs and events. 

I'd be interested in implementing those in Apache Wookie, Apache Rave and 
related projects and initiatives that build on them, as web app installation 
and app store APIs are something thats come up in quite a few implementations 
and it would be great to have a spec for that. 

Just don't tie it to another competing manifest format, please!

 
 Q. Why is the DOM API in the same spec as the manifest?
 
 A. One success condition for us would be standardize the DOM APIs so that 
 users will be able to visit any app marketplace that publishes web apps 
 conforming to the manifest spec in any browser and be able to install and use 
 them.
 
 We understand there might be other platforms on which a JS API may not be 
 feasible (for eg: A Java API to install and manage these apps is equally 
 important), but that shouldn't preclude us from standardizing the DOM API in 
 browsers. The manifest and the API go hand-in-hand, as we think each of them 
 is dramatically less useful without the other.
 
 
 Q. Why only one app per origin?
 
 A. We originally placed this restriction for security reasons. In Firefox 
 (and most other browsers), the domain name is the primary security boundary - 
 cookie jars, localStorage, XHRs are all bound to the domain. For supporting 
 multiple apps per domain we would have to do some extra work to ensure that 
 (potentially sensitive) permissions granted to one app do not leak into 
 another app from the same domain. Additionally, this 

Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-13 Thread SULLIVAN, BRYAN L
Ok, thanks for the responses.

For (1) we can expect a text change, right?

For (2), If the app manifest if obtained over non-secure HTTP, it is subject to 
modification. If the app is delivered over non-secure HTTP, even more can be 
modified. So is the plan to provide some kind of user warning when the manifest 
and/or app (including assets from the same origin) are delivered via non-secure 
HTTP (in the absence of a manifest signature)? And even if a manifest signature 
is provided how does it ensure protection of the assets (e.g. JS, CSS, and 
HTML) if they are delivered over non-secure HTTP? Does HTTPS need to be 
enforced, and cert domain validation as well?

For 3), I understand. We went through a lot of the similar issues in WAC, so 
maybe some of that experience will be useful in the discussion.

For 4), the ability to present the user with info/options prior to downloading 
the app (or its root page), or to process the manifest in an app manager / 
AppStore client, is probably the key added value. So from that perspective, i 
agree that supporting similar info In a Web page markup doesn't add value in 
this case, and does prevent the pre-processing capability.

Thanks,
Bryan Sullivan

On May 13, 2012, at 7:04 PM, Anant Narayanan an...@mozilla.com wrote:

 Hi Sullivan,
 
 Thanks for your comments, some responses inline:
 
 On 5/13/2012 1:11 AM, SULLIVAN, BRYAN L wrote:
 1) Re version: A string that represents the version of this manifest. The 
 User-Agent does not interpret this value in any way and is opaque to 
 everyone but the application itself.: it's also likely that the privileged 
 caller may also need to interpret this, as one key use case for the a 
 privileged caller is an appstore client.
 
 Yes, absolutely.
 
 2) How do you propose that the manifest information be trusted, through 
 signature on the JSON file?
 
 We haven't devised any signing scheme yet, we are only relying on manifests 
 being served over SSL for establishing trust. I recall someone from Google 
 saying something quote-worthy regarding this: If it's good enough for your 
 banking, it's good enough to install some apps :)
 
 That said, we are definitely open to adding signatures. This already seems 
 required for packaged apps for highly sensitive apps like phone dialers, as 
 we are discovering for B2G.
 
 3) Re softening of the requirement There must only be one application per 
 origin.: you will likely need an App ID field (a URI), for which there 
 should be only one installation at a time (otherwise per the manifest trust 
 above, an untrusted app could pose as another app).
 
 Correct, this is one of the reasons we enforce one app per origin (posing as 
 another app becomes very hard). Relaxing that restriction won't be trivial as 
 we have to consider this and many other repercussions.
 
 4) For which of the attributes, instead of being in a manifest, could we 
 achieve the same purpose with HEAD section elements in the start page of the 
 app? I guess this question comes down to what is the inherent value of a 
 manifest, and also how can we get similar value for these attributes on 
 normal Web pages (with no manifest).
 
 As I mentioned in another email, I'm not too worried about duplication in two 
 places as the goals are different. The point of storing such information in 
 the manifest is to enable various parties to make decisions about how they 
 will handle an app before purchase/install/launch time.
 
 As you noted in your previous email, the manifest is also an appropriate 
 place to let the developer declare what APIs they intend to use, regardless 
 of whether the UA asks for user permission up-front or at run-time.
 
 Regards,
 -Anant
 



Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-12 Thread Marcos Caceres
Hi Anant,  
Great to see Moz pushing this forwards - and welcome to the WG!:) I'm excited 
to see this proposal and I'm looking forward to working with you on it as part 
of the WG.  

On Saturday, 12 May 2012 at 19:02, Anant Narayanan wrote:

 Q. Why not simply reuse the widgets spec [2]?
  
 A. Aside from naming (we're talking about apps, the word widget seems
 to imply an artificial limitation), and replacing XML with JSON;  

Renaming the W3C widget spec would take about seconds :) No one is married to 
the name as we all know the name widgets is stupid (who would have figured 
stupid names matter so much:)). Bikesheds aside, I think quite a few people on 
this list would like to see the two efforts merged. Quite a lot of investment 
has been made into the widgets specs by various companies here so it would be 
good not to throw the baby out with the bathwater (e.g., the Moz proposal uses 
the same element semantics in its JSON format than the W3C widgets format, the 
i18n models are essentially the same… and most notably, the Moz proposal sorely 
lacks a parsing/error recovery model, which could simply be adapted from the 
W3C widgets spec).
 the
 other fundamental difference is that the widget spec describes packaged
 apps, whereas our manifest describes hosted apps.


This is not exactly true. The metadata format is consequently bound to the zip 
file (but the relationships are pretty weak between a config.xml and its 
container… some places require a file path, but those could just be swapped out 
with a URL or path relative to some origin). The only reason that there is a 
weak relationship between a config.xml and the package is because:  

 a. HTML was supposed to handle the metadata for the app.  
 b. There was no drive to standardise what is being proposed now 6 years ago 
(and slightly related, XML was still all the rage back then… and it's even so 
today on some platforms like Android).  

Another counter to the packaged/hosted app assertion is Apache Wookie's use 
of W3C widgets to embed widgets the Web:
http://incubator.apache.org/wookie/

 We think hosted apps have several interesting and unique web-like
 properties that are worth retaining. Hosted apps can be made to work
 offline just as well as packaged apps with AppCache (which is in need of
 some improvement, but can be made to work!).

Yes, it is common knowledge that AppCache is a douchebag (technical term) :)   
 Packaged apps do have their
 own advantages though, which we acknowledge, and are open to extending
 the spec to support both types of apps.

So, to be honest, my concern with the current proposal is that we have 
regressed back a little bit compared to widgets: the current proposal is a good 
start, but is lacking several key things (e.g., the parsing/error handling 
model). I would urge the group to consider a merge between the two approaches 
so that the JSON format could also be used with packaged apps (and that we drop 
the archaic/stupid/hated word widget once and for all).  

Kind regards,
Marcos  

--  
Marcos Caceres
http://datadriven.com.au






Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-12 Thread Ian Hickson
On Sat, 12 May 2012, Anant Narayanan wrote:
 
 Q. Apps are just web pages, why bother installing them?
 
 A. This has been previously discussed on the list [4].
 [4] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2012JanMar/0464.html

This has already received a reply:

   http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2012JanMar/0465.html


 There are clear differences in perception between an app and a website 
 for most users. Most web content is expected to be free, but the same 
 content wrapped in an app is something people seem to be willing to pay 
 for. Monetization is important to encourage a thriving web developer 
 community.

I don't think it makes sense to use a technical solution to a 
non-technical problem.


 Additionally, treating certain installed websites as apps gives us a 
 context separate from loading pages in a browser, which allows us to 
 provide privileged APIs to such trusted apps, APIs we would normally not 
 give to untrusted web content.

Desktop operating systems have demonstrated over a period of many years 
that this approach simply doesn't work. Users find it very difficult to 
understand what it means to trust an app. The Web's security model is 
IMHO significantly superior than any of the app security models we have 
seen in native operating systems, as demonstrated by the way that when 
malware is written to the app model it has to be dealt with by curating 
the application market space, whereas when malware is written to the Web 
model it is almost always because of errors in the design or 
implementation of the Web platform that, once fixed, preclude any similar 
attack from being performed again.

The installation security model of asking the user up-front to grant 
trust just doesn't work because users don't understand the question, and 
the installation security model of curating apps and trying to determine 
by empirical examination whether an application is trustworthy or not just 
doesn't scale.

-- 
Ian Hickson   U+1047E)\._.,--,'``.fL
http://ln.hixie.ch/   U+263A/,   _.. \   _\  ;`._ ,.
Things that are impossible just take longer.   `._.-(,_..'--(,_..'`-.;.'



Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-12 Thread Anant Narayanan

On 5/12/2012 1:14 PM, Ian Hickson wrote:

On Sat, 12 May 2012, Anant Narayanan wrote:

There are clear differences in perception between an app and a website
for most users. Most web content is expected to be free, but the same
content wrapped in an app is something people seem to be willing to pay
for. Monetization is important to encourage a thriving web developer
community.


I don't think it makes sense to use a technical solution to a
non-technical problem.


The proposed spec is not the solution, but rather forms the technical 
basis for the actual solution which is to build an app ecosystem around 
web technologies. It is futile to try and educate users of how the web 
*really* works, and thus we must move to terminology and conventions 
that they already know and understand (purchase/install apps from stores).



Additionally, treating certain installed websites as apps gives us a
context separate from loading pages in a browser, which allows us to
provide privileged APIs to such trusted apps, APIs we would normally not
give to untrusted web content.


Desktop operating systems have demonstrated over a period of many years
that this approach simply doesn't work. Users find it very difficult to
understand what it means to trust an app. The Web's security model is
IMHO significantly superior than any of the app security models we have
seen in native operating systems, as demonstrated by the way that when
malware is written to the app model it has to be dealt with by curating
the application market space, whereas when malware is written to the Web
model it is almost always because of errors in the design or
implementation of the Web platform that, once fixed, preclude any similar
attack from being performed again.

The installation security model of asking the user up-front to grant
trust just doesn't work because users don't understand the question, and
the installation security model of curating apps and trying to determine
by empirical examination whether an application is trustworthy or not just
doesn't scale.


We are not suggesting that a web app be automatically given privileges 
simply on the virtue of being installed. Untrusted installed apps are 
no different from any web page in that regard. Neither are we suggesting 
that all permissions be asked up-front. For some APIs it makes sense to 
ask up front, for others, run-time is more appropriate. The real 
security comes from curated stores, ratings, signed apps, pro-active 
take-downs and many other such measures.


The main point is that creating a layer of trust beyond what we have for 
web pages allows such privileges to be granted to a set of apps that 
meet certain criteria. We are discussing the security model for each 
type of API in detail on the dev.webapps list [1], but the general idea 
is to categorize every API into one of three buckets:


Regular content (unauthenticated web pages and apps)
Trusted content (apps authenticated by publisher)
Certified content (apps vouched for by trusted 3rd party)

Apps in a curated store fall in the 2nd category, whereas sensitive apps 
like the dialer on a phone would fall into the 3rd category because they 
are, for example, pre-bundled and signed. A regular web app that simply 
adds an install button to their page would fall in the first category.


The real value to such a system is on mobile devices rather than 
desktops. The fact remains that most users spend less time in a browser 
than in an app when they are using a phone or tablet. The open web 
platform needs to regain some of that lost attention.


Regards,
-Anant

[1] 
https://groups.google.com/group/mozilla.dev.webapps/browse_thread/thread/52d86024cbfd0da6




Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-12 Thread Andreas Gal

 The installation security model of asking the user up-front to grant 
 trust just doesn't work because users don't understand the question, and 
 the installation security model of curating apps and trying to determine 
 by empirical examination whether an application is trustworthy or not just 
 doesn't scale.

Installing an application doesn't mean up-front grant of permissions. It merely 
means that we offer a way to get away from a mere visit document mode to a 
run interactive applications mode. In our Boot 2 Gecko implementation we use 
the fact that the user installed a web app as a general grant of some low-risk 
privileges such as yep, you can use app cache and we won't bother you with 
quota dialogs. Beyond that, we use the regular web security model wherever 
possible (e.g. geolocation). The UX crowd seems to think that offering the 
ability to grant these permissions at install time as an option (opt-in) is 
good practice, so thats a good additional way to handle this. But the general 
principle is to stick with the web's pay-as-you-go model (doorhangers etc). I 
definitely agree with you that thats the better model.

As for using curation, I agree that it doesn't scale if all web content needs 
high risk privileges that rely on curation. In practice most web apps need 
minimal or no privileges that can be handled with the traditional model, and 
very few web apps rely on curation to get access to risky privileges.

Andreas

 
 -- 
 Ian Hickson   U+1047E)\._.,--,'``.fL
 http://ln.hixie.ch/   U+263A/,   _.. \   _\  ;`._ ,.
 Things that are impossible just take longer.   `._.-(,_..'--(,_..'`-.;.'
 




Re: App Manifest API Proposal

2012-05-12 Thread Marcos Caceres


On Saturday, 12 May 2012 at 21:14, Ian Hickson wrote:

 On Sat, 12 May 2012, Anant Narayanan wrote:
   
  Q. Apps are just web pages, why bother installing them?
   
  A. This has been previously discussed on the list [4].
  [4] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2012JanMar/0464.html
  
  
  
 This has already received a reply:
  
 http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2012JanMar/0465.html
  
  
  There are clear differences in perception between an app and a website  
  for most users. Most web content is expected to be free, but the same  
  content wrapped in an app is something people seem to be willing to pay  
  for. Monetization is important to encourage a thriving web developer  
  community.
  
  
  
 I don't think it makes sense to use a technical solution to a  
 non-technical problem.

It's sometimes nice to have a curated space to find interesting apps - though I 
agree that this is not a technical problem, though the manifest format 
facilitates this to some respect *iff it fills gaps in the HTML spec with 
regards to metadata* (or maybe some API aspect, though I've not looked at those 
in any detail). If this warrants standardisation, I don't know… guess that is 
what we are trying to figure out. 
  Additionally, treating certain installed websites as apps gives us a  
  context separate from loading pages in a browser, which allows us to  
  provide privileged APIs to such trusted apps, APIs we would normally not  
  give to untrusted web content.
  
  
  
 Desktop operating systems have demonstrated over a period of many years  
 that this approach simply doesn't work. Users find it very difficult to  
 understand what it means to trust an app. The Web's security model is  
 IMHO significantly superior than any of the app security models we have  
 seen in native operating systems, as demonstrated by the way that when  
 malware is written to the app model it has to be dealt with by curating  
 the application market space, whereas when malware is written to the Web  
 model it is almost always because of errors in the design or  
 implementation of the Web platform that, once fixed, preclude any similar  
 attack from being performed again.
  
 The installation security model of asking the user up-front to grant  
 trust just doesn't work because users don't understand the question, and  
 the installation security model of curating apps and trying to determine  
 by empirical examination whether an application is trustworthy or not just  
 doesn't scale.
  

I agree with Ian about the above, which is why I was hopeful that feature 
thing is not needed in the manifest format (or the manifest format is not 
needed at all). Features have historically enable proprietary APIs (in Chrome 
extension, Opera extensions, and WAC for example), which likely won't 
interoperate (so features will also require standardisation).  

In my email I said that we (the widget-side of the Webapps WG) were hopeful 
that HTML would provide the needed app metadata to allow apps to be installed 
in some meaningful way (e.g., HTML provides icon support already, and I think 
Opera exploits this in speed dial - which serve a similar purpose to a 
installed app/visual bookmarks).

So I'm left wondering, what is missing (if anything) from HTML to meet the use 
cases that Moz's proposed manifest and API sets out to provide?

--  
Marcos Caceres
http://datadriven.com.au