[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-09-27 Thread Jesús Cea Avión
Changes by Jesús Cea Avión j...@jcea.es: -- nosy: +jcea ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___ ___ Python-bugs-list mailing list

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-09-27 Thread Jesús Cea Avión
Jesús Cea Avión j...@jcea.es added the comment: This issue is equivalent to MS Windows DLL hijacking (the MS situation is worse, because the DDL can be in network shares or, even , in remote webdav servers): http://blog.metasploit.com/2010/08/exploiting-dll-hijacking-flaws.html

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-06-10 Thread A.M. Kuchling
A.M. Kuchling li...@amk.ca added the comment: Demo/embed/demo.c calls PySys_SetArgv(), which may be where some people are copying their code from. I've updated it to use PySys_SetArgvEx() and added an explanatory comment in rev. 81881. -- nosy: +akuchling

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-06-10 Thread A.M. Kuchling
A.M. Kuchling li...@amk.ca added the comment: Since the function was also added to 2.6, the 2.6 What's New should mention it; added in rev81887. -- ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-21 Thread Tomas Hoger
Tomas Hoger tho...@redhat.com added the comment: + - If the name of an existing script is passed in ``argv[0]``, its absolute + path is prepended to :data:`sys.path` Absolute path to the directory where script is located. And I believe there's no absolute path guarantee for platforms

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-21 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Absolute path to the directory where script is located. And I believe there's no absolute path guarantee for platforms without realpath / GetFullPathName. Yes, this is more precise indeed. As for realpath(), I would expect it to be present on

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-21 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Committed in r81398 (trunk), r81399 (2.6), r81400 (py3k), r81401 (3.1). Thank you! -- resolution: - fixed stage: patch review - committed/rejected status: open - closed ___ Python tracker

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-20 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Here is a new patch giving more details in the doc, and explicitly mentioning the CVE entry. -- stage: needs patch - patch review Added file: http://bugs.python.org/file17418/setargvex2.patch ___

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-18 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Ok, I will try to write better documentation. -- versions: +Python 3.2 -Python 3.0 ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-18 Thread Tomas Hoger
Tomas Hoger tho...@redhat.com added the comment: My reading of PySys_SetArgv is that if argv is NULL, then char *argv0 = argv[0]; will read through NULL and thus will segfault on a typical platform. Right. I favor Antoine's approach in http://bugs.python.org/file13860/setargvex.patch of

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-17 Thread Dave Malcolm
Dave Malcolm dmalc...@redhat.com added the comment: Attempting to summarize IRC discussion about this. PySys_SetArgv is used to set up sys.argv There is plenty of code which assumes that this is a list containing at least a zeroth string element; for example warnings.warn (see msg89688).

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-04 Thread Tomas Hoger
Tomas Hoger tho...@redhat.com added the comment: Can anyone move this to Stage: patch review (for the fix approach proposed in msg90336)? Or does anyone have better idea on how to move this closer to final fix or wontfix / reject? Thank you! --

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-04 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Can anyone move this to Stage: patch review (for the fix approach proposed in msg90336)? Or does anyone have better idea on how to move this closer to final fix or wontfix / reject? Thank you! I stand by my opinion that adding another hack

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-05-04 Thread R. David Murray
R. David Murray rdmur...@bitdance.com added the comment: FWIW I agree with Antoine. -- nosy: +r.david.murray ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2010-01-18 Thread Tomas Hoger
Tomas Hoger tho...@redhat.com added the comment: Has anyone else had an opportunity to have a look at the change proposed in #msg90336? -- ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-10-16 Thread Dave Malcolm
Changes by Dave Malcolm dmalc...@redhat.com: -- nosy: +dmalcolm ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___ ___ Python-bugs-list

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-07-16 Thread Tomas Hoger
Tomas Hoger tho...@redhat.com added the comment: This is not really the same thing as issue 946373. That one seems to be about adding script's directory as the first thing in sys.path. Comments there seem to mix both interactive ('' in sys.path) and non-interactive

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-07-15 Thread Jan Lieskovsky
Jan Lieskovsky ian...@seznam.cz added the comment: Link to older Python tracker issue discussing the same problem and closed with won't fix: http://bugs.python.org/issue946373 Strange enough, but implied from reading above issue, just an idea (don't shoot :)). Wouldn't it be possible to

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-07-13 Thread Tomas Hoger
Tomas Hoger tho...@redhat.com added the comment: Additional API has one disadvantage - it requires a modification of all affected applications embedding python, which is not likely to happen soon after the API is introduced. Therefore, it may still be worth reviewing current behaviour (that

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-07-13 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Indeed, it would certainly be useful to review current behaviour and document it precisely; and then, perhaps change it in order to fix the current bug. The problem is that the current behaviour seems to have evolved quite organically, and it's

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-07-13 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Besides, the new API makes the behaviour more explicit and puts the decision in the hands of the embedding developer (which certainly knows better than us what he wants to do). As the Python Zen says: In the face of ambiguity, refuse the

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-07-12 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Tomas, your patch is breaking an existing API, which may break existing uses (I'm not sure which ones, but people are doing lots of things with Python). That's why I proposed a separate API, which has the additional benefit of making things

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-07-09 Thread Jan Lieskovsky
Jan Lieskovsky ian...@seznam.cz added the comment: Hello guys, what's the current state of this issue? The proposed patch hasn't still been projected into upstream Python code, so wondering: 1, when and if it will be? 2, if you have found another solution / patch? Thanks Regards, Jan. --

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-07-09 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Hello, what's the current state of this issue? The proposed patch hasn't still been projected into upstream Python code, so wondering: 1, when and if it will be? I was hoping for more feedback before committing it. While it has been labeled

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-07-09 Thread Tomas Hoger
Tomas Hoger tho...@redhat.com added the comment: Have you considered something like this? (patch against 3.1) --- Python/sysmodule.c.orig +++ Python/sysmodule.c @@ -1643,6 +1643,7 @@ PySys_SetArgv(int argc, wchar_t **argv) #endif /* Unix */ } #endif /* All others */ +

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-06-24 Thread Tanaka Akira
Tanaka Akira a...@fsij.org added the comment: src/if_python.c in vim-7.2 has a comment: /* Set sys.argv[] to avoid a crash in warn(). */ I think the crash is follows. % python Python 2.5.2 (r252:60911, Jan 4 2009, 17:40:26) [GCC 4.3.2] on linux2 Type help, copyright, credits or license for

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-07 Thread Gregory P. Smith
Gregory P. Smith g...@krypto.org added the comment: re: gedit I'm by no means an expert (I did not design the original python module extension), we simply copied from vim at the beginning. That said, it seems there are issues if you embed the python interpreter and do not explicitly set

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-06 Thread Martin v. Löwis
Martin v. Löwis mar...@v.loewis.de added the comment: I wonder why all these applications call PySys_SetArgv at all if they don't have any arguments to set. In the gedit case, I just removed the call from gedit, and it seems to work fine (sys.argv will be an empty list). --

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-06 Thread Glyph Lefkowitz
Glyph Lefkowitz gl...@divmod.com added the comment: It suggests to me that somewhere there's some documentation, or an example, that says this is the right way to embed python, call this function. If the right thing to do is to just not call the function at all, we need to get that knowledge

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-06 Thread Martin v. Löwis
Martin v. Löwis mar...@v.loewis.de added the comment: It suggests to me that somewhere there's some documentation, or an example, that says this is the right way to embed python, call this function. That may be an explanation. However, it would be immensely useful to know for sure, from the

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-06 Thread Glyph Lefkowitz
Glyph Lefkowitz gl...@divmod.com added the comment: IOW, I *really* want to understand what's happening before fixing it. This is a security issue, after all. Agreed. Does anyone currently subscribed to this ticket know the author of such an application? It would be very helpful to have

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-06 Thread Gregory P. Smith
Gregory P. Smith g...@krypto.org added the comment: gedit does it here: http://git.gnome.org/cgit/gedit/tree/plugin-loaders/python/gedit-plugin- loader-python.c#n542 I've emailed the file's author (Jesse) out of the blue to see if he knows why PySys_SetArgv() was called. --

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-05 Thread Martin v. Löwis
Martin v. Löwis mar...@v.loewis.de added the comment: I disagree that this issue is release critical. I'm still skeptical that this is a security bug; if it is, any solution created needs to be applied to all active branches - including the ones that would be blocked by this issue right now.

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-05 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Ok, downgrading to critical. I'm awaiting the reporter's answer anyway. -- ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-05 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Changes by Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr: -- priority: release blocker - critical ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___ ___

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-05 Thread Jan Lieskovsky
Jan Lieskovsky ian...@seznam.cz added the comment: Antoine, (re: #msg87083, #msg87084) -- while the API change is acceptable and reasonable, it doesn't solve the core of the problem. I understand the change needs to be 'backward compatible' and shouldn't break the existing Python behavior,

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-05 Thread Martin v. Löwis
Martin v. Löwis mar...@v.loewis.de added the comment: What's the question of 'security nature' of the issue, Glyph in message #msg86927 already uncovered potential implications -- The question is whether these are theoretical or real problems. I ran gedit (as proposed by Glyph) under

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-05 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Hello Jan, 1, doesn't avoid the need to fix the issue (by calling PySys_SetArgvEx(argc, argv, 0);) in all current applications embedding Python, As you said yourself, we don't want to break backwards compatibility for C API users --

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-05 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: The question is whether these are theoretical or real problems. I ran gedit (as proposed by Glyph) under strace(1), and it didn't try to open any files in the current directory. You have to use a Python-written gedit plugin for that to happen.

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-03 Thread Gregory P. Smith
Gregory P. Smith g...@krypto.org added the comment: both the behavior change and PySys_SetArgvEx() with an additional boolean parameter sounds good to me. Some people may disagree about changing the default behavior. So long as its documented in the whatsnew I personally think it is fine. But

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-03 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: By the way, the advantage of a new function over a behaviour change is that the new function could safely be backported to 2.6.3, since it is also a security fix. -- ___ Python tracker

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-03 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Changes by Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr: -- nosy: +barry, benjamin.peterson priority: critical - release blocker stage: test needed - needs patch versions: +Python 2.6, Python 3.0 ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-03 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Here is a patch for trunk. -- Added file: http://bugs.python.org/file13860/setargvex.patch ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-03 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: Jan, would the new API be ok to you? -- ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-02 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: I'm not sure we can change the behaviour of PySys_SetArgv() like that. At least not in a bugfix release. In 2.7/3.1, we could either change PySys_SetArgv(), or introduce a new PySys_SetArgvEx() with an additional argument indicating whether

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-01 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: What is the problem exactly? An user can run arbitrary Python code from a file in his own account -- well, sure, that's a feature. Unless I'm misunderstanding something. -- nosy: +pitrou ___ Python

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-01 Thread Antoine Pitrou
Antoine Pitrou pit...@free.fr added the comment: I wanted to read the patch at https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=334888 but apparently its access is restricted... -- ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-05-01 Thread Glyph Lefkowitz
Glyph Lefkowitz gl...@divmod.com added the comment: Antoine, The problem is that apparently every program that embeds Python calls PySys_SetArgv and does not understand the consequences of doing so. For example, a user running 'gedit' to edit some files in a potentially insecure directory may

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-04-28 Thread Glyph Lefkowitz
Changes by Glyph Lefkowitz gl...@divmod.com: -- nosy: +glyph ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___ ___ Python-bugs-list mailing

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-04-21 Thread Daniel Diniz
Changes by Daniel Diniz aja...@gmail.com: -- priority: - critical stage: - test needed ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-04-14 Thread Jan Lieskovsky
New submission from Jan Lieskovsky ian...@seznam.cz: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures assigned an identifier CVE-2008-5983 (and related CVE ids) to the following vulnerability: Untrusted search path vulnerability in the PySys_SetArgv API function in Python 2.6 and earlier, and possibly

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-04-14 Thread Jan Lieskovsky
Jan Lieskovsky ian...@seznam.cz added the comment: To sum up the behavior, the following table displays whether modules are read from the current working directory for various ways how the python scripts can be launched (unfixed/fixed version): unfixed fixed run as

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-04-14 Thread Jan Lieskovsky
Jan Lieskovsky ian...@seznam.cz added the comment: As no longer work of python ./foo.py after patch utilization may cause, the update won't be acceptable, could you guys review the above patch and potentially provide an another one? -- ___ Python

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-04-14 Thread Petr Splichal
Changes by Petr Splichal p...@gmail.com: -- nosy: +psss ___ Python tracker rep...@bugs.python.org http://bugs.python.org/issue5753 ___ ___ Python-bugs-list mailing

[issue5753] CVE-2008-5983 python: untrusted python modules search path

2009-04-14 Thread Jan Lieskovsky
Jan Lieskovsky ian...@seznam.cz added the comment: Just drop into /tmp and run (you will need the zenity package installed): python3.1 ./test.py or gedit# unfixed gedit in that directory. -- Added file: http://bugs.python.org/file13686/py_umspath_test.tar.gz