Theodore Tso added the comment:
Larry, at least on FreeBSD, it sounds like the implementation could just the
kern.random.sys.seeded sysctl, and return . (Note: what is the
proposed behaviour if the PRNG is not seeded? Return Null?)
As far as OpenBSD is concerned, it's true that
Theodore Tso added the comment:
Oh --- and about people wondering whether os.random is being used for
cryptographic purposes or not "most of the time" or not --- again, welcome to
my world. I get complaints all the time from people who try to do "dd
if=/dev/urandom of=/dev
Theodore Tso added the comment:
One of the reasons why trying to deal with randomness is hard is because a lot
of it is about trust. Did Intel backdoor RDRAND to help out the NSA? You
might have one answer if you work for the NSA, and perhaps if you are willing
to assume the worst about
Theodore Tso added the comment:
I ran the experiment Colm asked me to run --- and yes, if you boot a system
with Python 3.5.1 with the boot options "init=/usr/bin/python3", you're going
to have a bad time. The problem is that in a KVM environment where things are
very quiet
Theodore Tso added the comment:
Hi. Colm alerted me to this bug, so I thought I would chime in as the author
of Linux's getrandom(2) function.
First of all, if you are OK with reading from /dev/urandom, then you might as
well use getrandom's GRND_NONBLOCK flag. They are