Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

On Fri, Nov 27, 2020 at 8:04 PM Catangiu, Adrian Costin wrote: > On 27/11/2020 20:22, Jann Horn wrote: > > On Fri, Nov 20, 2020 at 11:29 PM Jann Horn wrote: > >> On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 4:35 PM Catangiu, Adrian Costin > >> wrote: > >>> This patch is a driv

Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

[resend in the hope that amazon will accept my mail this time instead of replying "550 Too many invalid recipients" again] On Fri, Nov 20, 2020 at 11:29 PM Jann Horn wrote: > On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 4:35 PM Catangiu, Adrian Costin > wrote: > > This patch is a driver th

Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 4:35 PM Catangiu, Adrian Costin wrote: > This patch is a driver that exposes a monotonic incremental Virtual > Machine Generation u32 counter via a char-dev FS interface that > provides sync and async VmGen counter updates notifications. It also > provides VmGen counter

Re: [PATCH] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 8:09 PM Alexander Graf wrote: > There are applications way beyond that though. What do you do with > applications that already consumed randomness? For example a cached pool > of SSL keys. Or a higher level language primitive that consumes > randomness and caches its seed

Re: [PATCH] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 8:44 AM Willy Tarreau wrote: > On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 07:52:48AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > > On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 7:37 AM Willy Tarreau wrote: > > > On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 07:01:31AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > > > > Microsoft

Re: [PATCH] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 7:37 AM Willy Tarreau wrote: > On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 07:01:31AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > > Microsoft's documentation > > (http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709) says that the VM > > Generation ID that we get after a fork "is a 128-

Re: [PATCH] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 6:34 AM Colm MacCarthaigh wrote: > On 16 Oct 2020, at 21:02, Jann Horn wrote: > > On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 5:36 AM Willy Tarreau wrote: > > But in userspace, we just need a simple counter. There's no need for > > us to worry about anything else, like t

Re: [PATCH] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 5:36 AM Willy Tarreau wrote: > On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 03:40:08AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > > [adding some more people who are interested in RNG stuff: Andy, Jason, > > Theodore, Willy Tarreau, Eric Biggers. also linux-api@, because this > >

Re: [PATCH] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

[adding some more people who are interested in RNG stuff: Andy, Jason, Theodore, Willy Tarreau, Eric Biggers. also linux-api@, because this concerns some pretty fundamental API stuff related to RNG usage] On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 4:33 PM Catangiu, Adrian Costin wrote: > - Background > > The VM

[Qemu-devel] seccomp blacklist is not applied to all threads

Hi! I have noticed that when a QEMU build from git master is started with "-seccomp on", the seccomp policy is only applied to the main thread, the vcpu worker thread and the VNC thread (I'm using VNC in my config); the seccomp policy is not applied to e.g. the RCU thread because it is created

Re: [Qemu-devel] insecure git submodule URLs

On Sun, Jul 15, 2018 at 11:18 PM Peter Maydell wrote: > > On 15 July 2018 at 20:50, Jann Horn via Qemu-devel > wrote: > > I noticed that when I build QEMU from git for the first time, it pulls > > in submodules over the insecure git:// protocol - in other words, as > >

[Qemu-devel] insecure git submodule URLs

Hi! I noticed that when I build QEMU from git for the first time, it pulls in submodules over the insecure git:// protocol - in other words, as far as I can tell, if I'm e.g. on an open wifi network while building QEMU for the first time, even if I cloned the main repository over https, anyone

[Qemu-devel] [BUG] user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation caching

This is an issue in QEMU's system emulation for X86 in TCG mode. The issue permits an attacker who can execute code in guest ring 3 with normal user privileges to inject code into other processes that are running in guest ring 3, in particular root-owned processes. == reproduction steps == -

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] linux-user: limit number of arguments to execve

On Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 4:56 PM, Peter Maydell wrote: > On 3 March 2017 at 14:54, Eric Blake wrote: >>> +ret = -TARGET_EFAULT; >>> +break; >>> +} >>> argp = alloca((argc + 1) * sizeof(void *));

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] linux-user: limit number of arguments to execve

from >> a user program, as large number of them could lead to a bad >> guest address error. >> >> Reported-by: Jann Horn <ja...@google.com> >> Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <p...@fedoraproject.org> >> --- >> linux-user/syscall.c | 7 +++ >&

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 23/29] 9pfs: local: chmod: don't follow symlinks

On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 4:23 PM, Eric Blake wrote: > On 02/24/2017 04:34 AM, Greg Kurz wrote: >> On Thu, 23 Feb 2017 15:10:42 + >> Stefan Hajnoczi wrote: >> >>> On Mon, Feb 20, 2017 at 03:42:19PM +0100, Greg Kurz wrote: The local_chmod() callback

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 07/29] 9pfs: local: introduce symlink-attack safe xattr helpers

On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Eric Blake wrote: > On 02/20/2017 08:40 AM, Greg Kurz wrote: >> All operations dealing with extended attributes are vulnerable to symlink >> attacks because they use path-based syscalls which can traverse symbolic >> links while walking through