Re: [Qemu-devel] security implications of caching with virtio pmem (was Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device)

2019-02-11 Thread Michael S. Tsirkin
On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 11:58:15PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 11.02.19 23:29, Dave Chinner wrote: > > On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 02:29:46AM -0500, Pankaj Gupta wrote: > >> Hello Dave, > >> Are we okay with this? > > > > Sure. > > > > I'm not sure I agree with all the analysis presented, bu

Re: [Qemu-devel] security implications of caching with virtio pmem (was Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device)

2019-02-11 Thread David Hildenbrand
On 11.02.19 23:29, Dave Chinner wrote: > On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 02:29:46AM -0500, Pankaj Gupta wrote: >> Hello Dave, >> Are we okay with this? > > Sure. > > I'm not sure I agree with all the analysis presented, but, well, I > haven't looked any deeper because I'm tired of being shouted at and >

Re: [Qemu-devel] security implications of caching with virtio pmem (was Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device)

2019-02-11 Thread Dave Chinner
On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 02:29:46AM -0500, Pankaj Gupta wrote: > Hello Dave, > Are we okay with this? Sure. I'm not sure I agree with all the analysis presented, but, well, I haven't looked any deeper because I'm tired of being shouted at and being called argumentative for daring to ask hard quest

Re: [Qemu-devel] security implications of caching with virtio pmem (was Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device)

2019-02-10 Thread Pankaj Gupta
Hi Michael, Thanks for looking into this and summarizing in detail. > > This patch series has implementation for "virtio pmem". > > "virtio pmem" is fake persistent memory(nvdimm) in guest > > which allows to bypass the guest page cache. This also > > implements a VIRTIO based asynchronou

Re: [Qemu-devel] security implications of caching with virtio pmem (was Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device)

2019-02-06 Thread Michael S. Tsirkin
On Wed, Feb 06, 2019 at 03:00:26PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 04.02.19 23:56, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > On Wed, Jan 09, 2019 at 08:17:31PM +0530, Pankaj Gupta wrote: > >> This patch series has implementation for "virtio pmem". > >> "virtio pmem" is fake persistent memory(nvdim

Re: [Qemu-devel] security implications of caching with virtio pmem (was Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device)

2019-02-06 Thread David Hildenbrand
On 04.02.19 23:56, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 09, 2019 at 08:17:31PM +0530, Pankaj Gupta wrote: >> This patch series has implementation for "virtio pmem". >> "virtio pmem" is fake persistent memory(nvdimm) in guest >> which allows to bypass the guest page cache. This also >> i

Re: [Qemu-devel] security implications of caching with virtio pmem (was Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device)

2019-02-04 Thread Pankaj Gupta
+CC [Dave Chinner], to maintain updated CC list > > This patch series has implementation for "virtio pmem". > > "virtio pmem" is fake persistent memory(nvdimm) in guest > > which allows to bypass the guest page cache. This also > > implements a VIRTIO based asynchronous flush mechanism. >

[Qemu-devel] security implications of caching with virtio pmem (was Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device)

2019-02-04 Thread Michael S. Tsirkin
On Wed, Jan 09, 2019 at 08:17:31PM +0530, Pankaj Gupta wrote: > This patch series has implementation for "virtio pmem". > "virtio pmem" is fake persistent memory(nvdimm) in guest > which allows to bypass the guest page cache. This also > implements a VIRTIO based asynchronous flush mechanis