Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-06-02 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 31/05/2023 22:24, Sean Christopherson wrote: On Tue, May 30, 2023, Rick P Edgecombe wrote: On Fri, 2023-05-26 at 17:22 +0200, Micka�l Sala�n wrote: Can the guest kernel ask the host VMM's emulated devices to DMA into the protected data? It should go through the host userspace mappings

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-31 Thread Sean Christopherson
On Tue, May 30, 2023, Rick P Edgecombe wrote: > On Fri, 2023-05-26 at 17:22 +0200, Micka�l Sala�n wrote: > > > > Can the guest kernel ask the host VMM's emulated devices to DMA into > > > > the protected data? It should go through the host userspace mappings I > > > > think, which don't care

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-30 Thread Edgecombe, Rick P
On Fri, 2023-05-26 at 17:22 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > > Can the guest kernel ask the host VMM's emulated devices to DMA > > > into > > > the protected data? It should go through the host userspace > > > mappings I > > > think, which don't care about EPT permissions. Or did I miss > > >

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-30 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 25/05/2023 20:34, Trilok Soni wrote: On 5/25/2023 6:25 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: On 24/05/2023 23:04, Trilok Soni wrote: On 5/5/2023 8:20 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: Hi, This patch series is a proof-of-concept that implements new KVM features (extended page tracking, MBEC support, CR

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-26 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 25/05/2023 17:52, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote: On Thu, 2023-05-25 at 15:59 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: [ snip ] The kernel often creates writable aliases in order to write to protected data (kernel text, etc). Some of this is done right as text is being first written out (alternatives for

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-26 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 25/05/2023 15:59, Mickaël Salaün wrote: On 25/05/2023 00:20, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote: On Fri, 2023-05-05 at 17:20 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: # How does it work? This implementation mainly leverages KVM capabilities to control the Second Layer Address Translation (or the Two

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-26 Thread James Morris
[Side topic] Would folks be interested in a Linux Plumbers Conference MC on this topic generally, across different hypervisors, VMMs, and architectures? If so, please let me know who the key folk would be and we can try writing up an MC proposal. -- James Morris

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-25 Thread Edgecombe, Rick P
On Thu, 2023-05-25 at 09:07 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Thu, May 25, 2023, Rick P Edgecombe wrote: > > I wonder if it might be a good idea to POC the guest side before > > settling on the KVM interface. Then you can also look at the whole > > thing and judge how much usage it would get

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-25 Thread Trilok Soni
On 5/25/2023 6:25 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: On 24/05/2023 23:04, Trilok Soni wrote: On 5/5/2023 8:20 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: Hi, This patch series is a proof-of-concept that implements new KVM features (extended page tracking, MBEC support, CR pinning) and defines a new API to protect

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-25 Thread Sean Christopherson
On Thu, May 25, 2023, Rick P Edgecombe wrote: > I wonder if it might be a good idea to POC the guest side before > settling on the KVM interface. Then you can also look at the whole > thing and judge how much usage it would get for the different options > of restrictions. As I said earlier[*],

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-25 Thread Edgecombe, Rick P
On Thu, 2023-05-25 at 15:59 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: [ snip ] > > The kernel often creates writable aliases in order to write to > > protected data (kernel text, etc). Some of this is done right as > > text > > is being first written out (alternatives for example), and some > > happens > >

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-25 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 25/05/2023 00:20, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote: On Fri, 2023-05-05 at 17:20 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: # How does it work? This implementation mainly leverages KVM capabilities to control the Second Layer Address Translation (or the Two Dimensional Paging e.g., Intel's EPT or AMD's RVI/NPT)

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-25 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 24/05/2023 23:04, Trilok Soni wrote: On 5/5/2023 8:20 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: Hi, This patch series is a proof-of-concept that implements new KVM features (extended page tracking, MBEC support, CR pinning) and defines a new API to protect guest VMs. No VMM (e.g., Qemu) modification is

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-24 Thread Edgecombe, Rick P
On Fri, 2023-05-05 at 17:20 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > # How does it work? > > This implementation mainly leverages KVM capabilities to control the > Second > Layer Address Translation (or the Two Dimensional Paging e.g., > Intel's EPT or > AMD's RVI/NPT) and Mode Based Execution Control

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-24 Thread Trilok Soni
On 5/24/2023 3:20 PM, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote: On Fri, 2023-05-05 at 17:20 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: # How does it work? This implementation mainly leverages KVM capabilities to control the Second Layer Address Translation (or the Two Dimensional Paging e.g., Intel's EPT or AMD's RVI/NPT)

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-24 Thread Trilok Soni
On 5/5/2023 8:20 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: Hi, This patch series is a proof-of-concept that implements new KVM features (extended page tracking, MBEC support, CR pinning) and defines a new API to protect guest VMs. No VMM (e.g., Qemu) modification is required. The main idea being that kernel

[RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-05 Thread Mickaël Salaün
Hi, This patch series is a proof-of-concept that implements new KVM features (extended page tracking, MBEC support, CR pinning) and defines a new API to protect guest VMs. No VMM (e.g., Qemu) modification is required. The main idea being that kernel self-protection mechanisms should be delegated