On 04/16/2018 06:00 AM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:53:41AM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
>> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:31:18AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
>>> Essentially this is abusing the export name as a crude authentication
>>> token. There are NBD servers
On 04/13/2018 02:26 PM, Nir Soffer wrote:
> When a management application expose images using qemu-nbd, it needs a
> secure way to allow temporary access to the disk. Using a random export
> name can solve this problem:
>
> nbd://server:10809/22965f19-9ab5-4d18-94e1-cbeb321fa433
I share
On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:53:41AM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:31:18AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> > Essentially this is abusing the export name as a crude authentication
> > token. There are NBD servers that expect NBD_OPT_LIST to always succeeed
>
> I
On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:31:18AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> Essentially this is abusing the export name as a crude authentication
> token. There are NBD servers that expect NBD_OPT_LIST to always succeeed
I guess you mean "NBD clients" ...
> when they detect that the new style protocol
On Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 10:26:03PM +0300, Nir Soffer wrote:
> When a management application expose images using qemu-nbd, it needs a
> secure way to allow temporary access to the disk. Using a random export
> name can solve this problem:
>
>
On Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 10:26:03PM +0300, Nir Soffer wrote:
> When a management application expose images using qemu-nbd, it needs a
> secure way to allow temporary access to the disk. Using a random export
> name can solve this problem:
>
>
When a management application expose images using qemu-nbd, it needs a
secure way to allow temporary access to the disk. Using a random export
name can solve this problem:
nbd://server:10809/22965f19-9ab5-4d18-94e1-cbeb321fa433
Assuming that the url is passed to the user in a secure way, and