Re: [qubes-devel] NVIDIA RTX 20XX

2020-02-08 Thread Ralph Alexander Bariz
; > FYI, I tried few months ago to build NVIDIA module under Qubes but I hit > > a problem of allocating buffers. It was the same problem than a one > > reported on NVIDIA dev forum by another person using Xen as a desktop > > machine (not Qubes). > > > > Best

Re: [qubes-devel] NVIDIA RTX 20XX

2020-02-08 Thread Ralph Alexander Bariz
for manual installation of the rpm packages I lack the information of which are the ones to install Am Samstag, 8. Februar 2020 17:35:56 UTC+1 schrieb Ralph Alexander Bariz: > > sorry, if I'm acting stupid. coming from debian world, there I probably > would figure it out myself

Re: [qubes-devel] NVIDIA RTX 20XX

2020-02-08 Thread Ralph Alexander Bariz
sorry, if I'm acting stupid. coming from debian world, there I probably would figure it out myself. also do not really find anything to that Am Samstag, 8. Februar 2020 17:26:05 UTC+1 schrieb Ralph Alexander Bariz: > > well, trying to test it but I'm actually hanging at... how the hel

[qubes-devel] NVIDIA RTX 20XX

2020-01-24 Thread Ralph Alexander Bariz
Have the same problem with a rtx 2070. My temporary solution is to put a cheap gpu into my pc(nvidia geforce 710) into the second pci port and cut of the power of the 2070 when using qubes. the problem is simple. The included nouveau driver does not support it. You could install the properitary

[qubes-devel] Encrypted /boot using GRUB LUKS module (workaround for anti-evil maid tpm 1.2 limitation)

2020-01-15 Thread Ralph Alexander Bariz
Hi, Since I've got a TPM 2.0 and cannot downgrade it to 1.2 I'm at risk for evil maid attacks. When using Arch or debian, I used an /boot contained in LUKS+btrfs and the GRUB LUKS module. For sure, I realize that also GRUB can get tempered with, BUT 1.) it gets unloaded when kernel takes over

[qubes-devel] sys-usb and usb hid devices

2020-01-20 Thread Ralph Alexander Bariz
Hi, When setting up sys-usb and still using usb hid devices, I noted: * setting gets written to xen.cfg on efi partition... right? isn't this an invitation for an easy to do evil maid attack combined with a compromised usb device? If at least it would be part of initramfs so it is not that

Re: [qubes-devel] Encrypted /boot using GRUB LUKS module (workaround for anti-evil maid tpm 1.2 limitation)

2020-01-20 Thread Ralph Alexander Bariz
, 15. Januar 2020 21:16:12 UTC+1 schrieb Marek Marczykowski-Górecki: > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA256 > > On Wed, Jan 15, 2020 at 02:34:04AM -0800, Ralph Alexander Bariz wrote: > > Hi, > > > > Since I've got a TPM 2.0 and cannot downgrade it

Re: [qubes-devel] Encrypted /boot using GRUB LUKS module (workaround for anti-evil maid tpm 1.2 limitation)

2020-01-20 Thread Ralph Alexander Bariz
) BR Am Mittwoch, 15. Januar 2020 21:16:12 UTC+1 schrieb Marek Marczykowski-Górecki: > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA256 > > On Wed, Jan 15, 2020 at 02:34:04AM -0800, Ralph Alexander Bariz wrote: > > Hi, > > > > Since I've got a TPM 2.0 a