[qubes-users] My farewell to Qubes OS!

architecture and writing some early PoC code... Today, I've made an announcement I'm switching focus to another area of work and joining the Golem Project as a Chief {Strategy, Security} Officer: https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/10/25/the-next-chapter/ https://blog.golemproject.net/joanna-rutkowska

[qubes-users] Introducing the Next Generation Qubes Core Stack

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hello, FYI, I've posted today a new article about the new Core Stack that has been brought along with Qubes 4.0. The article attempts to be a practical intro for (power) users, but it also touches a few architectural and philosophical topics.

[qubes-users] Compromise recovery on Qubes OS

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hello, Just a FYI that we have recently implemented a so called "Paranoid Mode" backup recovery for Qubes OS. Arguably this is a new approach to dealing with full system compromises (thanks to Qubes architecture (TM)). The packages for Qubes 3.2

[qubes-users] Qubes OS 3.2 has been released!

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hello, We have just released Qubes OS 3.2: https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/09/29/qubes-32/ Enjoy! joanna. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJX7PbOAAoJEDOT2L8N3GcYxCwP/15v8dVR0gfevXUefHLCuZFF

Re: [qubes-users] AMD Zen Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 11:58:18AM -0700, kev27 wrote: > > Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) integrates main memory encryption > > capabilities with the existing AMD-V virtualization architecture to support > > encrypted virtual machines.

Re: [qubes-users] Thinkpwn?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 11:06:32AM +0200, Joanna Rutkowska wrote: > On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 12:55:10PM -0700, el...@tutanota.com wrote: > > Just to clarify, that means that even if the UEFI is exploited, it does not > > matter with Qu

Re: [qubes-users] Thinkpwn?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 12:55:10PM -0700, el...@tutanota.com wrote: > Just to clarify, that means that even if the UEFI is exploited, it does not > matter with Qubes? Yes. Unless the isolation-provider that Qubes happens to be using -- currently

[qubes-users] Qubes Security Bulletin #24 (Critical bug)

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Dear Qubes users, We have just released a new Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB #24) for a critical bug in the Xen hypervisor: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-024-2016.txt Please install the updates, immediately.