Re: [qubes-users] More information needed about Qubes security

2019-01-15 Thread Maillist
Hello, id suggest to configure coreboot so you can update it internally with the latest microcode-updates. Just make sure its correctly configured to only accept updates signed by yourself. Coreboot can/ will improve your security by a lot even with IME untouched for a number of reasons,

Re: [qubes-users] More information needed about Qubes security

2019-01-14 Thread 799
Hello Alexandre, Am Mo., 14. Jan. 2019, 12:17 hat Alexandre Belgrand < alexandre.belgr...@mailbox.org> geschrieben: > I am still brooding over before installing Qubes. > I suggest installing Qubes on a second harddrve and give it a try, before "brooding over" it ;-) I think the main question

Re: [qubes-users] More information needed about Qubes security

2019-01-14 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Le lundi 14 janvier 2019 à 07:16 -0500, Chris Laprise a écrit : > Check out Joanna's blog at Invisible Things Lab. Lots of Qubes' DNA > is > there. Got it, thanks: Intel x86 considered harmful https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/x86_harmful.pdf -- You received this message because you

Re: [qubes-users] More information needed about Qubes security

2019-01-14 Thread Achim Patzner
On 20190114 at 07:16 -0500 Chris Laprise wrote: > The only hardware alternative that has emerged is OpenPOWER CPUs because > they're an open source design and have no ME-like infrastructure. > Unfortunately, no Qubes-like OS currently runs on it. That's not quite true; you can do something very

Re: [qubes-users] More information needed about Qubes security

2019-01-14 Thread Chris Laprise
On 01/14/2019 06:17 AM, Alexandre Belgrand wrote: Hello, I am still brooding over before installing Qubes. My first thinking is that since Intel ME backdoors provide full access to authorities, there is no way we can stop government agencies. Recent research (read 1) shows that Intel ME has

[qubes-users] More information needed about Qubes security

2019-01-14 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Hello, I am still brooding over before installing Qubes. My first thinking is that since Intel ME backdoors provide full access to authorities, there is no way we can stop government agencies. Recent research (read 1) shows that Intel ME has access to all parts of a computer, even switched-off.

Re: [qubes-users] Are these needed by Qubes?

2016-09-19 Thread Steve Coleman
On 09/18/2016 11:03 PM, Drew White wrote: Are these packages (any there of) required by Qubes? Here is a quick hack to answer this kind of question. $ cat ./qubes_requires #!/bin/bash PACKAGES=`rpm -qa | grep -i qubes` REQUIRED=`repoquery --requires --recursive --resolve $PACKAGES 2>&1` for

Re: [qubes-users] Are these needed by Qubes?

2016-09-19 Thread Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Sun, Sep 18, 2016 at 08:03:34PM -0700, Drew White wrote: > Are these packages (any there of) required by Qubes? > > cdparanoia.x86_64 10.2-20.fc23 > cdrdao.x86_64 1.2.3-25.fc23 > dvd+rw-tools.x86_64 7.1-19.fc23 > enca.x86_64 1.18-1.fc23 >

[qubes-users] Are these needed by Qubes?

2016-09-18 Thread Drew White
Are these packages (any there of) required by Qubes? cdparanoia.x86_64 10.2-20.fc23 cdrdao.x86_64 1.2.3-25.fc23 dvd+rw-tools.x86_64 7.1-19.fc23 enca.x86_64 1.18-1.fc23 exempi.x86_64 2.2.1-12.fc23 genisoimage.x86_64 1.1.11-29.fc23 giflib.x86_64 4.1.6-14.fc23 gmime.x86_64 2.6.20-5.fc23