[qubes-users] Screenreader - accessibility

2020-12-14 Thread 'Reece O'Bryan' via qubes-users
Thank you for the replies! This definitely helps me to understand Qubes better. 
If this is the process for an application being passed along with dom0, would 
it be possible to actually use this process to an advantage in my case? If you 
are saying what I think you are and essentially a scanned image (bitmap) of the 
application or whatever you have open is passed on, wouldn’t it be possible to 
implement an OCR program at this stage to convert the image into plaintext, 
which could then be read by any screenreader. 

My original plan was to try installing orca on dom0. I’m not sure if it is even 
compatible, but it may be worth a shot after reading the link to the “issue” on 
Github.(?) Reading that link also gave me an idea. Blind and visually impaired 
people obviously cannot benefit from the colored ribbons like those of you with 
vision. However, somewhat of an equivalent thing could be done by changing the 
voices spoken for a given app or Qube. A subtle change in pitch would suffice. 
Anyway, I’m getting ahead of myself. Step one is just virtualizing my first 
Qube. 

FYI: please edit this bid out if not allowed. I couldn’t find that this wasn’t, 
but I understand if it is... I want to use this operating system and have it 
available and accessible for people like me so bad that I would even pay for it 
to be something incorporated.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/8B2E241D-3845-452C-8C2C-9DA6FC0ABD6B%40icloud.com.


[qubes-users] Chromium causes OpenVPN VM to constantly reset connection

2020-12-14 Thread pudding

Hello, my setup is as follows:

Debian 10 AppVM (Chromium) - OpenVPN VMs (Mullvad or ProtonVPN, with 
Qubes-VPN-support made by Chris Laprise) - sys-whonix - clearnet


Recently I found that whenever I use Chromium inside my AppVM, OpenVPN 
always constantly reconnects. I looked up OpenVPN log and found these 
messages appeared many times:


Connection reset, restarting [0]
TCP/UDP: Closing socket
SIGUSR1[soft,connection-reset] received, process restarting
Restart pause, 5 second(s)

Both Mullvad and ProtonVPN VMs have this issue. I tried different 
Chromium versions, namely official 83.0.4103.116 in Debian Stable repo, 
  ungoogled-chromium 84.0.4147.135-1.buster1 and 
87.0.4280.67-1.unportable1, and Chromium 88.0.4287.0 AppImage. Only 
official 83.0.4103.116 does not cause this issue. But I prefer 
ungoogled-chromium for privacy reasons. Is there any way to fix this? 
Thanks in advance.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/e0229a97-38d1-0b46-4294-5544af7999dc%40cock.li.


[qubes-users] Re: Qubes Canary 025

2020-12-14 Thread Andrew David Wong

Dear Qubes Community,

Several users have pointed out a mistake in the canary below. "March 
2020" should instead be "March 2021". This was just a typographical 
error. We will be fixing this and updating the signatures on the canary. 
Thank you.


On 12/12/20 6:22 AM, Andrew David Wong wrote:

Dear Qubes Community,

We have published Qubes Canary 025. The text of this canary is
reproduced below.

Note: We have decided to make some minor formatting changes to the way
Qubes Canary and Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) numbers are printed,
such as dropping the '#' symbol and using hyphens instead of spaces.

This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary 025 in the qubes-secpack:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-025-2020.txt 



Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and
read it:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

View all past canaries:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/

```


     ---===[ Qubes Canary 025 ]===---


Statements
---

The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is December 8, 2020.

2. There have been 62 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

     427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of March 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.

Special announcements
--

None.

Disclaimers and notes
--

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised.  This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.

The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.

Proof of freshness
---

Tue, 08 Dec 2020 16:46:42 +

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International 
(https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Dangerous Accusations: German Tennis Star Alexander Zverev Faces Career 
Turning Point

Skiing in the Pandemic: Alpine Rivalries Flare amid Resort Closures
Biden's Goal of Saving the Iran Deal Just Got Harder - A Murder and an 
Ultimatum
Heiko Maas: Germany's Foreign Minister on the Future of Trans-Atlantic 
Relations
Generation Corona: The Pandemic Is Changing Our Children's Lives for the 
Worse


Source: NYT > World News 
(https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)

Covid-19 Live Updates: Britain Begins Vaccinating Citizens
U.K. Covid Vaccine: Side Effects, Safety, and Who Gets It First
U.S. Leaves Behind Afghan Bases  and a Legacy of Land Disputes
Covid Infections, and Blame, Rise Along Southeast Asian Borders
U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Officials Over Hong Kong Crackdown

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Safety data on Pfizer jab released by US
Lloyd Austin: Biden picks ex-general as defence secretary
The man saving monkeys in the Colombian Amazon
Charlie Hebdo attack: France seeks long jail terms in Paris trial
Christchurch massacre: Inquiry finds failures ahead of attack

Source: Blockchain.info
000c6550025327ca735099e0c621a9ad4599a49dab41f573

Footnotes
--

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
```

This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/12/12/canary-25/



--
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

--

Re: [qubes-users] qubes-os // stand-alone reactos fails

2020-12-14 Thread ser...@da.matta.nom.br
Dear Unman, 
Please,  why Qubes chooses to use /dev/xvda differently then the other 
softwares are expecting?
Since there is already a patch, it should be permanent to minimize problems.
Thank you
Em domingo, 13 de dezembro de 2020 às 21:54:58 UTC-3, unman escreveu:

> On Sun, Dec 13, 2020 at 03:07:06PM -0800, ludwig...@gmail.com wrote:
> > Hi I am trying to install reactos 0.4.13 as stand alone with 16G system 
> and 
> > 16g private.
> > I know, way too much.
> > Reactos fails with blue screen and red print: "Setup could not find a 
> > harddisk"
> > Enter = Reboot computer.
> > 
> > So why there is no harddisk in the vm?
> > Is there an editor to configure more options to the vm? So I would like
> > to see if the devices are there.
> > 
> > BTW: If someone could contribute a reactos template with common
> > tools like peazip and sumatrapdf it would be nice for all to play with 
> some
> > old windows stuff.
> > 
> > Regards
> > 
> > Ludwig
> > 
>
> This has come up a number of times on the list, both for ReactOS and
> Android installs.
> The issue is that ReactOS *has* to see a disk at /dev/sda or /dev/hda,
> whereas Qubes presents disks at /dev/xvda etc.
> Take a look at https://github.com/unman/notes/blob/master/disks_in_Qubes 
> If you look at https://github.com/unman/change_disk you'll see a
> possible solution: how to use those files is explained at 
> https://github.com/unman/notes/blob/master/InstallingAndroid.md
>
> Basically, you redefine the disks so that they are presented as disks
> that ReactOS will accept. Then you can just install to /dev/sda
>
> If you need help, just ask.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/bd2ef4ac-4490-4599-9d99-70851797af05n%40googlegroups.com.


Re: [qubes-users] qubes-os // stand-alone reactos fails

2020-12-14 Thread unman
On Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 01:05:59PM -0800, ser...@da.matta.nom.br wrote:
> Dear Unman, 
> Please,  why Qubes chooses to use /dev/xvda differently then the other 
> softwares are expecting?
> Since there is already a patch, it should be permanent to minimize problems.
> Thank you
> Em domingo, 13 de dezembro de 2020 ??s 21:54:58 UTC-3, unman escreveu:
> 
> > On Sun, Dec 13, 2020 at 03:07:06PM -0800, ludwig...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > Hi I am trying to install reactos 0.4.13 as stand alone with 16G system 
> > and 
> > > 16g private.
> > > I know, way too much.
> > > Reactos fails with blue screen and red print: "Setup could not find a 
> > > harddisk"
> > > Enter = Reboot computer.
> > > 
> > > So why there is no harddisk in the vm?
> > > Is there an editor to configure more options to the vm? So I would like
> > > to see if the devices are there.
> > > 
> > > BTW: If someone could contribute a reactos template with common
> > > tools like peazip and sumatrapdf it would be nice for all to play with 
> > some
> > > old windows stuff.
> > > 
> > > Regards
> > > 
> > > Ludwig
> > > 
> >
> > This has come up a number of times on the list, both for ReactOS and
> > Android installs.
> > The issue is that ReactOS *has* to see a disk at /dev/sda or /dev/hda,
> > whereas Qubes presents disks at /dev/xvda etc.
> > Take a look at https://github.com/unman/notes/blob/master/disks_in_Qubes 
> > If you look at https://github.com/unman/change_disk you'll see a
> > possible solution: how to use those files is explained at 
> > https://github.com/unman/notes/blob/master/InstallingAndroid.md
> >
> > Basically, you redefine the disks so that they are presented as disks
> > that ReactOS will accept. Then you can just install to /dev/sda
> >
> > If you need help, just ask.
> >
> 

Qubes is based on Xen, and Xen decided many moons ago to using xvdX for
block devices, instead of sdX. You might ask why ReactOS and Android are
so hidebound in their expectations for block devices.
This is more of a hack than a patch, so I think it unlikely it will be
incorporated in to Qubes.

On the issue of a template, you can install reactos as a template HVM,
and spawn other qubes off it. I could point you to an example if that
would be helpful.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20201215032122.GA26313%40thirdeyesecurity.org.


Re: [qubes-users] How to edit Qubes R4.0.3 ISO image file in Windows 10 system

2020-12-14 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users

Data Eight:

I am trying to install "Qubes-R4.0.3-x86-64 OS" on Windows 10 UEFI system.
Using Rufus created bootable media (DD image option selected). The
installation is done (till the message that qubes successfully installed
and ready to go) but after first reboot, the black screen not proceed
further.

I found to add two lines (bootnoexit=1; mapbs=1) in each kernel section
within bootx64.cfg  file within EFI folder.

But it is not working in Windows 10. Since I am a New user to Qubes OS, I
request help in this issue (Can't logging to Qubes).

Thanks in advance for your help.

Could you download a bootable Linux distribution of some kind and 
temporarily use that to edit the ISO?


--
- don't top post
Mailing list etiquette:
- trim quoted reply to only relevant portions
- when possible, copy and paste text instead of screenshots

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/3e6ff1f8-dd07-d47e-ed48-3311c3152be4%40danwin1210.me.


Re: [qubes-users] Screenreader - accessibility

2020-12-14 Thread Michael Carbone

On 12/13/20 5:17 PM, 'Reece O'Bryan' via qubes-users wrote:

Hello,

I am wondering if anyone has any ideas as to how I could run a screen reader in 
Qubes. I use Orca with Debian-based systems, would it be possible to do the 
same thing?
I do realize that blind people that want privacy or an extremely small 
minority. However, I think that people that are blind or that have became blind 
such as myself deserve the same right to privacy. :)


Thank you all very much in advance,

-Reece



Hi Reece,

We are interested in implementing screen-reading support and have an 
open issue about it here:


https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5907

as Sven mentions there are some technical/security aspects that make it 
difficult to implement right now, though with a dedicated GUI VM which 
is on the Qubes roadmap this will be made easier.


Michael

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/6afd5e2e-4953-678a-259c-636988b1fe52%40qubes-os.org.


OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature