Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Ilpo Järvinen
On Tue, 29 Jan 2019, Alexandre Belgrand wrote: > Le mardi 29 janvier 2019 à 00:59 +0200, Ilpo Järvinen a écrit : > > There are many technical reasons raising from plain > > physics/electronics > > which make an attack chip of that size with the described > > capabilities to > > seem quite

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Le mardi 29 janvier 2019 à 00:59 +0200, Ilpo Järvinen a écrit : > There are many technical reasons raising from plain > physics/electronics > which make an attack chip of that size with the described > capabilities to > seem quite utopistic (and the article therefore bogus). ...But of > course

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Ilpo Järvinen
On Mon, 28 Jan 2019, Alexandre Belgrand wrote: > Le lundi 28 janvier 2019 à 13:08 -0800, goldsm...@riseup.net a écrit : > > I'm intrigued how you know can catagorically state "CAs and GNU/Linux > > distributions are #1 targets for national > > China: >

[qubes-users] Re: Cannot add new user to Thunderbird address book

2019-01-28 Thread John Goold
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 1/25/19 2:52 PM, John Goold wrote: > There is only one issue in my complete transition to a Qubes > system. This is the first. > > When I attempt to add a "New Contact" to Thunderbird's address > book, the "OK" button will change to show it is

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Le lundi 28 janvier 2019 à 13:08 -0800, goldsm...@riseup.net a écrit : > I'm intrigued how you know can catagorically state "CAs and GNU/Linux > distributions are #1 targets for national China:

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Le lundi 28 janvier 2019 à 13:08 -0800, goldsm...@riseup.net a écrit : > To Alexandre Belgrand > > I'm intrigued how you know can catagorically state "CAs and GNU/Linux > distributions are #1 targets for national > intelligence agencies". This is classified information and therefore > only

Re: [qubes-users] Debian Template APT Vulnerability - A ticking bomb?

2019-01-28 Thread goldsmith
On 2019-01-28 19:46, billol...@gmail.com wrote: > On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 10:27:32 AM UTC-5, gold...@riseup.net wrote: >> On 2019-01-27 19:15, billol...@gmail.com wrote: >> > On Sunday, January 27, 2019 at 12:22:03 PM UTC-5, unman wrote: >> >>[snip] >> >> Qubes provides a framework for

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Le lundi 28 janvier 2019 à 16:47 +0100, qubes-...@tutanota.com a écrit : > What do you yourself use? Hope I can answer too. I use an X230 with Intel ME disabled from BIOS. It costs about 160€ on the second hand market and it has pretty decent hardware. Lenovo claims that Intel ME can be

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread goldsmith
On 2019-01-27 14:33, Alexandre Belgrand wrote: > Le dimanche 27 janvier 2019 à 13:11 +, Holger Levsen a écrit : >> I *believe* they probably misunderstood evil32.com and it's fallout. > > CAs and GNU/Linux distributions are #1 targets for national > intelligence agencies. > > Debian

Re: [qubes-users] Debian Template APT Vulnerability - A ticking bomb?

2019-01-28 Thread billollib
On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 10:27:32 AM UTC-5, gold...@riseup.net wrote: > On 2019-01-27 19:15, billol...@gmail.com wrote: > > On Sunday, January 27, 2019 at 12:22:03 PM UTC-5, unman wrote: > >>[snip] > >> Qubes provides a framework for using software - it doesn't take away the > >> onus on

[qubes-users] Upgrades for dom0-Qubes 4; on system reboot skips plymouth, usb kb dies, can't enter decrypt pw

2019-01-28 Thread qubert
First visible error on screen: [FAILED] Failed to start Setup Virtual Console Second vis error: [FAILED] Failed to start Show Plymouth Boot Screen. No problem, eh? Because a few lines later, it prompts me for the passphrase for the encrypted disk. Awesome. But every time, as soon as it gets

getting rid of ME on modern CPUs (Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability)

2019-01-28 Thread Holger Levsen
On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 11:46:55AM -0600, Stuart Perkins wrote: > Up to a certain manufacture, you can go to coreboot and lose the ME entirely. > After that point, setting the HAP bit may be your best option. We need > someone to to reverse engineer the ME and implement enough of it in

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Stuart Perkins
On Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:47:08 +0100 (CET) wrote: >Jan 27, 2019, 5:04 PM by alexandre.belgr...@mailbox.org: > >> Le dimanche 27 janvier 2019 à 16:47 +, unman a écrit : >> >>> I'd be interested to know what system has been graced with your >>> approval. >>> If you believe all this, then

[qubes-users] HCL - System76 Oryx Pro

2019-01-28 Thread Shahin
ubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/1f94e8ca-744e-1985-6e30-6e7cf94e8212%40gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. Qubes-HCL-System76-Oryx_Pro-20190128-114149.yml Description: application/yaml

[qubes-users] Reversing dom0 testing repo installation

2019-01-28 Thread qubes-fan
hi, I accidentaly downloaded and installed the dom0 update from the testing repo. Is there any way to reverse the action and keep only the stable version? I already disabled the testing repo in the /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-dom0.repo Thank you -- You received this message because you are

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread qubes-fan
Jan 27, 2019, 5:04 PM by alexandre.belgr...@mailbox.org: > Le dimanche 27 janvier 2019 à 16:47 +, unman a écrit : > >> I'd be interested to know what system has been graced with your >> approval. >> If you believe all this, then what makes you think that national >> intelligence agencies

Re: [qubes-users] Debian Template APT Vulnerability - A ticking bomb?

2019-01-28 Thread goldsmith
On 2019-01-27 19:15, billol...@gmail.com wrote: > On Sunday, January 27, 2019 at 12:22:03 PM UTC-5, unman wrote: >>[snip] >> Qubes provides a framework for using software - it doesn't take away the >> onus on users to use that software properly, and to ensure they are aware >> of good practice.

Re: [qubes-users] Backup stops when the backup file reaches 3Gb

2019-01-28 Thread Mike Keehan
On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 13:52:55 + Mike Keehan wrote: > On Thu, 24 Jan 2019 11:29:50 + > unman wrote: > > > On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 01:00:15AM -0500, Chris Laprise wrote: > > > On 01/23/2019 08:15 PM, js...@bitmessage.ch wrote: > > > > Mike Keehan: > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > >

Re: [qubes-users] Qube Window Manager; unable to list all open windows

2019-01-28 Thread Franz
On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 1:16 PM Chris Laprise wrote: > On 01/27/2019 09:32 AM, Franz wrote: > > Command `wmctrl -l` gives the following error > > > > |Cannot get client list properties. (_NET_CLIENT_LIST or > _WIN_CLIENT_LIST)| > > This works for me with KDE. > > > > > > But when I use |wmctrl|

[qubes-users] Qubes 4 crashes

2019-01-28 Thread aaq via qubes-users
Hello! I have experienced a couple of times now that my Qubes 4 installation crashes at different times. I do not expect this to be an issue with Qubes, but it would be nice if I could debug this some how. I have no idea where to look for the necessary logs though. Some details: The crash