On 5/12/19 11:51 PM, google-urqzgfyzkpiwjxpxxpr...@public.gmane.org wrote:
related:
https://www.mail-archive.com/qubes-users-/jypxa39uh5tlh3mboc...@public.gmane.org/msg27890.html
system may appear stable for over a month then flat-out reboot or may
reboot within days. quite unpredictable.
On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 11:44:40PM -0700, Eccentric Butterfly wrote:
> Services include for example: clocksync, cups, qubes-firewall.
>
> I would in particular like to know what meminfo-writer does as
> https://qubes-os.org/doc/disposablevm-customization/ tells you to disable the
> service on
On Thu, 16 May 2019, g80vmgm...@riseup.net wrote:
> From XSA297:
> """
> Work is ongoing on xen-devel to develop core-aware scheduling, which
> will mitigate the cross-domain leak by ensuring that vcpus from
> different domains are never concurrently scheduled on sibling threads.
> However, this
Eccentric Butterfly:
I'm curious if and how someone could hack into your appVMs if there is a
firewall VM in the way. How would they detect that there is a VM on your PC
that is accessing the network connection provided by that VM? Would it just
appear to them that all the network traffic is
Eccentric Butterfly:
Services include for example: clocksync, cups, qubes-firewall.
I would in particular like to know what meminfo-writer does as
https://qubes-os.org/doc/disposablevm-customization/ tells you to disable the
service on any new sys-net VM that you create. This is confusing
Hello is there any way to see the date an AppVM/s were created ? This
would be convenient.
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Ilpo Järvinen:
> On Thu, 16 May 2019, g80vmgm...@riseup.net wrote:
>
>> From XSA297:
>> """
>> Work is ongoing on xen-devel to develop core-aware scheduling, which
>> will mitigate the cross-domain leak by ensuring that vcpus from
>> different domains are never concurrently scheduled on sibling
On 2019-05-15 12:48, unman wrote:
x230 i7 16GB on docking station.
x230 i7 16GB - coreboot
x230 i7 12GB
alright, i'll report back once i've done some testing. thank you unman!
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On 2019-05-14 11:33, goo...@subvertising.org wrote:
calling unman et al. : what systems are sporting 60+
days uptime?
according to unman, the i7 X230 does not reboot spontaneously.
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To
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> Dear Qubes Community,
>
> We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) #49: Microarchitectural
> Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297).
> The text of this QSB is reproduced below.
> This QSB
For the newest security updates mention in
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-049-2019.txt how
can I install the security updates from security-testing repo but from source
code? I prefer to compile or install everything from source code. I do not
trust pre-baked
On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 12:51 PM wrote:
> Hello everyone!
>
> I would like to know if it's possible to use Bluetooth devices (mouse,
> keyboard...) on Qubes OS?
>
> I use Qubes 4.0 on a SanDisk Extreme Pro 256gb USB 3.1 key.
>
>
There is no way to get any form of security with bluetooth. So it is
I'm getting a hash sum error when updating my whonix-gw-14 template
today. No error occurred when updating whonix-ws-14.
See below for the apt-get output...
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Chris Laprise, tas...@posteo.net
https://github.com/tasket
https://twitter.com/ttaskett
PGP: BEE2 20C5 356E 764A 73EB 4AB3 1DC4 D106
On 5/15/19 6:24 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
Only Intel processors are affected.
I think the pattern showing AMD to be more conscientious in their
processor designs is now undeniable. Even if its only a matter of
degree, the difference appears to be rather substantial.
You should
I already have all the patches installed including the ones fixing MDS. And all
CVEs are reported to be NOT VULNERABLE by this tool.
https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
Also, same result by the one whonix provides.
But this poc still works, why?
On Thursday, 16 May 2019 09:49:25 UTC+3, Eccentric Butterfly wrote:
> There seems to not be much information on this. Are there any steps you can
> or should take to harden your firewall vm? There are services in the qube
> settings called: qubes-firewall, qubes-network, qubes-update-check,
>
I'm curious if and how someone could hack into your appVMs if there is a
firewall VM in the way. How would they detect that there is a VM on your PC
that is accessing the network connection provided by that VM? Would it just
appear to them that all the network traffic is coming from
There seems to not be much information on this. Are there any steps you can or
should take to harden your firewall vm? There are services in the qube settings
called: qubes-firewall, qubes-network, qubes-update-check, qubes-updates-proxy.
Neither of them are used in sys-net or sys-firewall.
Services include for example: clocksync, cups, qubes-firewall.
I would in particular like to know what meminfo-writer does as
https://qubes-os.org/doc/disposablevm-customization/ tells you to disable the
service on any new sys-net VM that you create. This is confusing because the
service
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