/2019/10/13/canary-21/
--
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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ng your interesting results!
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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Any suggestions for how to stop this happening?
>
Are you, by any chance, copying into Vi/Vim? That sort of thing happens
when you have "smart indentation" (or similar) enabled in Vim.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
;
Use Emacs in an AppVM.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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BmXuCoBOhuftWyWjwwsP8PSMTbT/p3
On 2019-10-04 3:25 AM, 'Oli Sturm' via qubes-users wrote:
On Friday, October 4, 2019 12:43 AM, Andrew David Wong
wrote:
On 2019-10-03 11:42 AM, 'awokd' via qubes-users wrote:
'Oli Sturm' via qubes-users:
Hi,
I found a problem yesterday: I had some markdown text rendered to
HTML
ideos on Qubes",
> you're trying to reach practically everyone and yet Qubes is too
> away from that point.
>
Thank you for the feedback. I will discuss this with the rest of the
Qubes team.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community M
ing change that I can change back?
>
> It's Thunderbird that changed, but the issue is already fixed.
> Update the thunderbird-qubes package from the current-testing repo
> and you're back in business!
>
> /Sven
>
For further details, please see:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-i
e it, might be worth submitting a new
> issue referencing that one?
>
Possibly related: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2845
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3hen
e 4 Signing Key"
pub rsa4096 2017-03-06 [SC]
5817A43B283DE5A9181A522E1848792F9E2795E9
uid [ full ] Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key
sig 31848792F9E2795E9 2017-03-06 Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key
sig DDFA1A3E36879494 2017-03-08 Qubes Master Signing Key
Is it
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 9/23/19 4:49 AM, duc...@disroot.org wrote:
> Andrew David Wong:
>> On 9/22/19 6:39 AM, duc...@disroot.org wrote:
>>> In the official documentation "Copying from (and to) dom0",
>>> there is no m
t;
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/copy-from-dom0/#copying-to-dom0
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAl2Hy1IACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDBPfA/+Pe8OGl/VQb+jDPMQzMlDm0MoOYTBZ6zbEm
ing list
rather than qubes-devel. (I'm moving this thread there now.)
You can read more about the different mailing lists here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/support/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7
o-privacybeast-qubes-certification/
[8]
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-laptop-insurgo-privacybeast-x230
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/09/18/qubes-presentations-at-platform-security-summit-2019/
- --
And
872
The documentation has been updated. (Thank you, awokd.)
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAl16+ooACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDADkQ//e1TyE2ZNMCoFALN6Rtu4oBi36TuovhkYfL
hunderbird gets its setting from the OS.
>
> Thank you.
>
This is a known bug in Thuderbird:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1426907
I managed to get ISO dates by following the workaround in this comment:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1426907#c144
- --
e
> this is not in place currently. See [3] for a description of the
> non-public gcc plugin from grsecurity which implements this approach.
>
> [2]:
> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-07/msg00982.html
> [3]: https://grsecurity.net/respectre_announce.p
t dom0 filling up. I
thought we had solved this problem a long time ago. I remember running
into the same problem years ago, and I thought we had subsequently
moved to restoring in smaller chunks so that only a small amount of
temporary storage in dom0 is required when restoring.
Is this not
-devel.
>
The Qubes Security Team is preparing an answer to this question.
Please stand by.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAl1
as we know more.
[1]
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/09/qubes-4-0-2-rc1/#release-candidate-planning
[2] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5149
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
--
ommended) on my part here. Any thoughts?
[1] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=902413
[2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1658487
[3] https://unix.stackexchange.com/q/364782
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
one level deep. But it's been a long time since I've done this.)
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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MDD7dRAAhG/7LS4k3YFaMaBBF2nTXslPakIiJfE/QeKotiuOZl76
nce it was
relatively small.
On the other hand, if it would be a lot of work that you
(understandably) don't want going to waste, then it would better to
open an issue that describes your proposed documentation enhancement,
and we can hash it out there before you submit a PR.
- --
Andrew David Wong
se I know the data is already there in a verified Qubes
backup, and I've tested my ability to manually recover it
independently of Qubes as a last resort.)
Aside from these caveats, your plan sounds like what I would do.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-o
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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On 01/09/2019 8.03 AM, Claudia wrote:
> Andrew David Wong:
>> On 31/08/2019 11.23 AM, Claudia wrote:
>>> The "Custom Installation" doc gives instructions about how to
>>> create a non-default dm-c
dition* to the
> steps outlined in the documentation
> <https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/backup-restore/>?
>
> (I'm on Qubes OS v4 latest)
>
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX
why it didn't. I can
simply remove it from the documentation if it's no longer working.
> 3) Is there a way around it that doesn't involve the hacky
> post-installation migration?
Not that I know of.
> 4) Does qubes provide any way to sidestep the graphical installer,
> i.e. something a
re updated?
Thanks!
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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xEY04SxU7fUpz7uNu+CmU1w/QCOmhK
tant as the negative feedback, since this
helps us decide when it's okay to migrate packages to stable. This
results in a faster development cycle for Qubes and a better
experience for everyone. Thank you for contributing!
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os
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On 18/08/2019 12.36 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 18/08/2019 11.59 AM, O K wrote:
>> I have a verified copy of Qubes installed and want to install it
>> on a second hard drive, so I was hoping to avoid the whole
>> verifica
ewhere in order to
>> provide us with the warm fuzzy feeling of a false sense of
>> security.
>>
>> Instructions here on how to verify the latest Qubes ISO is
>> legitimate:
>> https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/
>>
- --
A
>>
>>
>> On Friday, August 16, 2019 at 10:51:11 AM UTC-4, O K wrote:
>>>
>>> Mint lets you do it, but not sure about Qubes.
>>>
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATU
ws items).
>
Right, it's just the standard meaning of unsupported or end-of-life
software: no more bug fixes or updates. (Since security updates are a
type of update, that means no more security updates.)
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-
rticipants/project-qubes
[4] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/doc-guidelines/
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/08/07/announcing-our-2019-season-of-docs-project/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qu
; configured and listening on port 8082, so can I just enable caching
> of those packages somewhere in Qubes' networking stream to speed up
> those downloads?
>
> Thanks.
>
Please have a look at this issue:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1957
- --
Andrew David Wo
:51:02 dom0 qubesd[2584]: File
> "/usr/lib/python3.5/site-packages/qubes/tarwriter.py", line 130, in
> copy_sparse_data
> Aug 04 03:51:02 dom0 qubesd[2584]: output_stream.write(buf_trailer)
> Aug 04 03:51:02 dom0 qubesd[2584]: BrokenPipeError: [Errno 32] Broken pipe
>
Yes, I've expe
y/qubes.UpdatesProxy
>
> # Default rule for all TemplateVMs - direct the connection to sys-net
> $type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-net
>
> and change it to sys-firewall or sys-net2
>
> because I'm getting complaint that my pci device is already attached to
- --
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
```
This announcement has also been updated on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/24/qsb-050/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE
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On 25/07/2019 8.21 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 25/07/2019 3.27 AM, Claudio Chinicz wrote:
>> Hi Andrew,
>
>> I needed to reinstall Whonix-gw after having removed all
>> templates. I've followed the inst
t "qubes-template-whonix-gw" is the correct
package name and that there shouldn't be a version number (e.g., 15)?
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvD
-linux/commit/552fd062ea2bb6c2d05faa1e64e172503cacbdbf#diff-6b87ee5cdb9e63b703415a14e5a505cdL192
- --
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
```
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/24/qsb-050/
- --
Andrew David Wong
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 24/07/2019 9.22 AM, unman wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 07:38:27PM -0500, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>>
>> Sorry, I'm not following your example. What does it mean to "do the
>> equivalent of qvm-create and qvm-prefs
ank password into an untrusted web browsing qube.
Having different colors for these makes it easier to avoid such
mistakes.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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On 22/07/2019 11.05 AM, unman wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 03:56:31PM -0500, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>> On 16/07/2019 9.35 AM, unman wrote:
>>> On Sun, Jul 14, 2019 at 09:13:16PM -0500, Andrew David Wong
>>> wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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On 16/07/2019 9.35 AM, unman wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 14, 2019 at 09:13:16PM -0500, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>> On 14/07/2019 9.08 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>>> On 14/07/2019 8.19 AM, unman wrote:
>>>> On Sat, Jul 13, 20
website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/18/insurgo-privacybeast-qubes-certification/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAl0xRMEACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDAEVQ
t want to check that out first if you're not
familiar with vim.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAl0tJjEACgkQ203TvDlQ
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-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 14/07/2019 9.08 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 14/07/2019 8.19 AM, unman wrote:
>> On Sat, Jul 13, 2019 at 06:40:00PM -0500, Andrew David Wong
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> 1. When using the Qubes Update widget, a mgmt
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On 14/07/2019 8.19 AM, unman wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 13, 2019 at 06:40:00PM -0500, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>>
>> 1. When using the Qubes Update widget, a mgmt DisposableVM is
>> started. Why is that? Is it just for execu
that does the same thing as the Qubes Update widget?
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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S
issue open to address part of this:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4215
> This is annoying. But if it's allowed to run uninteruppted, it'll
> do the job. <3 /panina
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qu
/security/xsa/#300
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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F1lGEIs4sQgJiXhIizWWnGq4tPKMbQ/wQfCQ
to set the Default
DisposableVM Template for this qube to one with equally restrictive
Networking settings.
Related issue:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5115
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://w
] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
```
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/04/canary-20/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-B
imal as possible.
In any case, it would better to have both signed packages _and_
transit via HTTPS. If I had to choose just one, I'd pick signed
packages, since it wouldn't be difficult for an attacker to serve
malicious packages over HTTPS. But, again, both would be better.
- --
Andrew David
which is bloody
> insecure thanks to being just plaintext and susceptible to MITM
> attacks.
>
> [...]
Fedora packages are digitally signed. dnf checks the signature by
default. If the signature is not valid, the package will not be
installed.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager,
ps://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/01/whonix-15-has-been-released/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 27/06/2019 8.15 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 27/06/2019 6.44 PM, haaber wrote:
>> Hi, by running qvm-ls a directed graph of which qubes depends on
>> which other as netVM can be obtained. I thought that this would
>
-journey-to-mirage-os-as-xen-pvh-marek-marczykowski-gorecki-invisible-things-lab
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/06/27/marek-marczykowski-gorecki-xen-summit-2019/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.
seem to find it now, though, so either:
1. It was in 3.2 but not carried over to 4.0, or
2. It's accessed from Qubes Global Settings, which is currently broken.
There's also this open issue:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2575
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Man
es/4792#issuecomment-502472832
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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YXoo1IIxH0qd4O
es-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
>
Unman is correct. You tried to unsubscribe from qubes-announce, not
qubes-users. The attempt to unsubscribe from qubes-announce failed
because you were not subscribed to that list.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Commun
one else has done so either.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAl0GgZkACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDBsbw/+MpmHKuf9m5gZvriA6dah5aT0Drhh/GvlCrn8nbhpAuRB5ov
ach such file in my
home directory so that they get included in my normal dom0 backups.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlz/BrgACgkQ203TvD
ted the same problem and was able to fix it by
enabling "SVM Mode" in their BIOS settings.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlz91IAACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDBtxg/+MBt
able to find one. All I found was these two somewhat
related issues:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1835
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2443
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIz
stable repo is 5.1.2 which doesn't contain the
> wireguard module.
>
> So any idea how I can put this to work?
>
> Thank you
>
It looks like this was just addressed in this issue:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3591
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager,
hy the retailer matters
if you already know the precise model of the machine. Surely that's
sufficient to find search for it online?
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDA
ge has been rejected
because it was a duplicate.)
Please see:
https://www.qubes-os.org/support/#do-not-send-duplicates
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 02/06/2019 4.13 PM, Yethal wrote:
> W dniu sobota, 1 czerwca 2019 22:29:31 UTC+2 użytkownik Andrew David Wong
> napisał:
> Dear Qubes Community,
>
> A new Fedora 30 TemplateVM is now available. We previously announced
> that
hanks! I found them:
>
> Brightness: FN+Brightness +/-
> Volume Up: amixer set Master 5%+
> Volume Up: amixer set Master 5%-
> Volume Mute/Unmute: amixer set Master toggle
>
> Documented the findings so far here:
> https://github.com/csriq/qubes-os-usage/blob/master/qubes-
related, but when booting to Qubes,
>>>>> and watching the boot process, I can still see Qubes is
>>>>> trying to boot AppVMs which are for months deleted, with
>>>>> "Failed to start" the VM. How do I delete it permanently?
>
>&
/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzy4B4ACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDCgTw//Yn4xHJxAIhGq6PgZW99FwAz+5/lI8JYy0H62aC5ngZG7MnNrRlw/+cx9
YtdtCXF
leVM to your vault could itself be malicious.
You are assuming that if the file decrypts to a recognizable
plaintext, then it must not have been maliciously modified, and it
must not have just compromised the environment in which it was
decrypted. This does not follow.
In practice, though, this mig
es to the vault?
>
The problem is that, if the decrypted files have been compromised, they
could compromise the vault when you open them inside the vault.
P.S. -- Please avoid top-posting.
>> -------- From: Andrew David Wong
>> Sent: Thu May 30 06:54:05 CE
ch are for months deleted, with "Failed to
>>> start" the VM. How do I delete it permanently?
>
>
>> I haven't heard of this problem before. Please consider
>> reporting this bug if it hasn't been reported yet:
>
>> https://www.qubes-os
ad:
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/DlCcShB-kbU/discussion
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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MDAywBAAjeXrdR2cItYI
an announcement, as
>> usual.
>
> Actually, it is already in the stable repo:
> https://ftp.qubes-os.org/repo/yum/r4.0/templates-itl/rpm/
>
Thank you; I wasn't aware of that. I'll follow up on this on the issue.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
ht
quot; the VM.
> How do I delete it permanently?
>
I haven't heard of this problem before. Please consider reporting this
bug if it hasn't been reported yet:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/reporting-bugs/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-B
mented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/tools/
In particular, the qubes-prefs man page is available here:
https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/core-admin-client/en/latest/manpages/qubes-prefs.html
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-B
.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#note-on-dom0-and-eol
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzwjSMACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDCaexAAi5PzP+sAwzFYhEydSXG5l5Wy+7HefNe41rdcSxl2D0YaBEiiGd
attacker, it could exploit a hypothetical vulnerability
in your restore process (e.g., by feeding malformed input to the
program performing decryption), possibly resulting in a silent
compromise of your vault.
This is the sort of attack scenario that qvm-backup was designed to
protect against.
- --
/templates/fedora/#installing
[5] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#note-on-dom0-and-eol
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/29/fedora-28-eol/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes
release of Fedora 31:
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_Release_Life_Cycle
> Just curious, haven't heard anything.
>
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlz
click this link, it should just download the file:
https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
(This is also in the instructions.)
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGI
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 27/05/2019 11.28 AM, drok...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Sunday, May 26, 2019 at 7:21:54 PM UTC-7, Andrew David Wong
> wrote: On 26/05/2019 9.17 PM, drok...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>> On Sunday, May 26, 2019 at 6:54:40 PM UTC-7,
>&
searched so I thought I'd suggest putting a link to thier
> qubes setup page.
>
Thanks. Added:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/#security-guides
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-B
eedback on updates-status:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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MDCqshAAiNESVvVnar/IB4i94uoEScf
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 26/05/2019 5.04 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>
> On 26/05/2019 3.39 PM, Eva Star wrote:
>
>>>> If 4.19 is this problematic, should the update be pulled?
>>>
>>> Yes, please pull 4.19.43-1 kernel update, if
>
> Chris, thanks! Now solved. I'm at EFI. It was not possible to select
> something on the boot time or I don't know how to do this.
>
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBC
The devs have been notified:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4934#issuecomment-496034991
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzrDiAACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDC
es/issues/4934#issuecomment-496034991
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzrDXoACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDD/Jg//Qx+rud/Fu0xp3k9/Gw6NI03e5ZOYyQq2yB3bKXSCxiCVF2v7ZKNywRVf
Sq0Wagv6EwLaq
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 26/05/2019 4.47 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 26/05/2019 3.31 PM, drok...@gmail.com wrote:
>> Can't launch Qubes Global settings window. I get:
>
>> [Dom0] Houston, we have a problem...
>
>> Whoops. A
>> delete them all.
>>
>> See https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4946 on how to move
>> the restored dom0 files to the right place, it's pretty straight-forward.
>
> Thanks that was very helpful.
>
Thanks for sharing your experience. I've updated the
broken. Maybe I should just wipe the drive
> and start all over again. One more time after all of this is just
> par for the course. Then again, I might as well wait until there
> is a fix for the current kernel not liking my Radeon card.
>
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Commun
or legwork. Please send an email to Michael and me
if you're interested. Thank you!
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 19/04/2019 10.15 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 19/04/2019 1.12 AM, Michael Carbone wrote:
>> On 3/20/19 3:53 PM, Michael Carbone wrote:
>>> On 3/15/19 3:27 AM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>>>> On 14/03/2019
g/doc/templates/fedora-minimal/#customization
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAly6jfEACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDB55RAA0Ezlnn14cwUGlveYmEmwtWSiVwaWmoArOasqu7V9Pi3nLtybYOPrAGcg
Lb+rTrxkACnW
eds* action too: [...]
>
Thank you for bringing this to our attention. There was a
miscommunication with the Whonix project that led to this error in the
announcement. After consulting with the Whonix project, I have corrected
the announcement to say that the Debian instructions also apply
bes-os.org/news/2018/01/23/qubes-whonix-next-gen-tor-onion-services/
[2] https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Onionizing_Repositories
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/17/tor-onion-services-available-again/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Communi
l-devel-5.0.4-200.fc29.x86_64
> kernel-modules-5.0.4-200.fc29.x86_64
>
>
> How do I get this right?
> Thank you!
>
This looks like:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4074
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manage
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