configuration of a restored AppVM still work in Qubes 4.1?
In Qubes 4.0 I had created rules on command line according to the following
pattern:
qvm-firewall untrusted add --before 0 accept 123.45.67.890/32 proto=tcp 465
Have a great day!
Michael Singer
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On 2/3/22 19:54, Sven Semmler wrote:
On 2/3/22 11:02, Michael Singer wrote:
Standard in the operating system Qubes is that an opening window automatically
becomes the active window on the desktop.
Maybe this is an XFCE thing? Have you tried:
a) unchecking the "Honor standard ICCCM
become active when I actively click on them, or in a way that it is
not possible to work with the windows of this AppVM at all until I revoke this
setting?
Have a great day
Michael Singer
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displays
an empty window.
I have experienced this with Qubes 4.0 and Gnome Debian. Does anyone have an
idea how to set it up so that the hard disk is still mounted after suspend mode?
Michael Singer
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Am 25.10.2021 12:12 schrieb Michael Singer:
Dear Qubes community,
my qubes r4.0 legacy installation does not boot any more. Very
abruptly, because I hadn't done any updates or changed anything in
dom0 lately. There was also no power loss or anything. And I didn't
move any larger files the last
m to a new
installation?
All the best and thank you in advance
Michael Singer
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connection via the NetworkManager tray icon, my
settings were not visible there. Maybe this is because when starting the Qube
first the network is booted before /rw is considered.
Do you have any ideas how this can be solved?
All the best
Michael Singer
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On Thu, Jul 17, 2021 at 12:29PM +0700, unman wrote> On Thu, Jul 15, 2021 at
06:07:59PM +0000, Michael Singer wrote:
>> On Thu, Jul 15, 2021 at 04:50:29PM +0700, unman wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 04:35:42PM +, Michael Singer wrote:
>>
>>
On Thu, Jul 15, 2021 at 04:50:29PM +0700, unman wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 04:35:42PM +0000, Michael Singer wrote:
>>
>> Would you let my Qube, which is supposed to connect to only one IP address on
>> the internet, be based on an extra firewall-vm? Would that more se
firewall-vm? Would that more secure?
In the Qube settings for the services there is the service
"disable-default-route". I have not found anything about what it does. In my
case, would it be better to leave it on or turn it off?
Thank you for your reply and all the best
Michael Singe
be no DNS traffic anymore, right?
What else would you do?
Best wishes
Michael Singer
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On 7/9/21 12:01 PM, Michael Singer wrote:
After decryption, my file system presents itself to me as an ordinary
directory
that I find somewhere under /media/xy. The encryption program used
works in a
way that the device in /dev/xvdi is always encrypted. Only what
could I solve this? What commands are necessary in disp1?
Best regards
Michael Singer
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"gnome-screenshot --help".
If it does not work, the program "gnome-screenshot" is not installed. Open a
terminal of the template and install the program with "sudo dnf install
gnome-screenshot" if it is a normal fedora template. If it is a Debian
template, type "
me thing at the qube level instead of in dom0?
You can install the autokey program, but it requires me to write a python
script, and I don't know how to express a simple shell command in python.
All the best
Michael Singer
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> Michael Singer:
>
>> I am looking for a really secure way to use Qubes for searching not
>> only a hard drive for file names, but for text that is in files.
>
>> The goal is to avoid an exploit in the searched files leading to a
>> takeover of the hard drive
plain text files,
"pdfgrep" for PDFs, and something for table files, databases, etc.
Is my idea feasible? And how secure would it be?
Best regards
Michael Singer
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