On Thu, 11 Apr 2019, jrsmi...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, April 10, 2019 at 3:25:34 AM UTC-7, unman wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 09, 2019 at 11:45:02AM -0700, jrsmi...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > If there is no signal on PS/2 ground or I can eliminate it, is this the
> > > more secure route or is it
On Wednesday, April 10, 2019 at 3:25:34 AM UTC-7, unman wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 09, 2019 at 11:45:02AM -0700, jrsmi...@gmail.com wrote:
> > If there is no signal on PS/2 ground or I can eliminate it, is this the
> > more secure route or is it worth doing the USB shuffle? I have 4 USB
> >
This is great input. This box will be in my home office on my home network
(Xfinity), and I have no reason to think that anyone would be interested enough
in what I’m doing to invest the resources necessary to enter my home when no
one is there and plant surveillance. This is more about
jrsmi...@gmail.com wrote on 4/10/19 7:13 PM:
To be concrete and transparent, the mobo with PS/2 is a Gigabyte X299 Designare
ex with four USB controllers and a header for a hardware TPM, which I’ve
populated. The other mobo is an ASUS X299 Prime Deluxe II with no PS/2, five
USB controllers
To be concrete and transparent, the mobo with PS/2 is a Gigabyte X299 Designare
ex with four USB controllers and a header for a hardware TPM, which I’ve
populated. The other mobo is an ASUS X299 Prime Deluxe II with no PS/2, five
USB controllers and only supports a firmware TPM. Both are
So if you have 4 or more USB controllers isolating one for its exclusive
use for kb and mouse is safer than PS/2?
If so that eliminates one of the two main reasons I had for buying a new
mobo for Qubes. The other is that the new one has a hardware TPM and the
one w/o PS/2 only has a firmware
On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:09:54AM +1000, haaber wrote:
> > On 4/10/19 9:50 AM, jrsmi...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > The PS/2 keyboard leaking to ground risk seems like it would only
> > > apply if an attacker had physical access. Is that right or is there a
> > > way it could be exploited remotely?
>
On Tue, Apr 09, 2019 at 11:45:02AM -0700, jrsmi...@gmail.com wrote:
> If there is no signal on PS/2 ground or I can eliminate it, is this the more
> secure route or is it worth doing the USB shuffle? I have 4 USB controllers
> available.
>
If you really have 4 USB controllers I would allocate
On 4/10/19 9:50 AM, jrsmi...@gmail.com wrote:
The PS/2 keyboard leaking to ground risk seems like it would only
apply if an attacker had physical access. Is that right or is there a
way it could be exploited remotely?
In principle that can be measured far away, with little hw cost Read you
On 4/10/19 9:50 AM, jrsmi...@gmail.com wrote:
The PS/2 keyboard leaking to ground risk seems like it would only apply if an
attacker had physical access. Is that right or is there a way it could be
exploited remotely?
In principle that can be measured far away, with little hw cost Read you
The PS/2 keyboard leaking to ground risk seems like it would only apply if an
attacker had physical access. Is that right or is there a way it could be
exploited remotely?
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Yet another approach might be to use a USB to PS/2 adapter to connect a USB
keyboard that supports PS/2 signaling to a native PS/2 port. Would that be a
good solution to avoid keyboard leaking signals to ground?
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If there is no signal on PS/2 ground or I can eliminate it, is this the more
secure route or is it worth doing the USB shuffle? I have 4 USB controllers
available.
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I really appreciate the responses. I bought a new mobo that does have native
PS/2 to use with Qubes. It arrived today and I’ll be trying it out after work
today. How would I go about determining if my keystrokes are being revealed on
ground? I have a storage scope so I think it would just be a
On Mon, Apr 08, 2019 at 09:49:28PM -0400, taii...@gmx.com wrote:
> I have stated this many times before.
>
> The PS/2 thing is from 2011 which is 8 years ago and applies to systems
> without more than one USB controller.
>
> Using PS/2 sends your keystrokes out on the ground wire.
>
> It is far
I have stated this many times before.
The PS/2 thing is from 2011 which is 8 years ago and applies to systems
without more than one USB controller.
Using PS/2 sends your keystrokes out on the ground wire.
It is far better to purchase a motherboard with a second USB controller
with separate
And then there’s this:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/usb-qubes/#enable-a-usb-keyboard-for-login.
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jrsmi...@gmail.com:
I just read Joanna’s 2011 article describing the challenges of USB security and
I think this answers my question. Connecting the PS/2 keyboard and mouse to a
USB device via an adapter still leaves the issue of securing the USB
controller, so it offers little or nothing in
I just read Joanna’s 2011 article describing the challenges of USB security and
I think this answers my question. Connecting the PS/2 keyboard and mouse to a
USB device via an adapter still leaves the issue of securing the USB
controller, so it offers little or nothing in the way of increased
On Saturday, April 6, 2019 at 6:51:59 PM UTC-7, jrsm...@gmail.com wrote:
> I have a motherboard that I would like to use with Qubes that has no PS/2
> ports. I have a PS/2 keyboard and mouse and would like to know if connecting
> them via a PS/2 to USB adapter is as secure (or nearly so) as
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