Re: [qubes-users] Shredding VM images

On 08/20/2018 11:34 AM, tierl...@gmail.com wrote: What's the most convenient way to wipe these images? (I'm just talking about individual VM images) To clarify on your first question: Since encryption is protecting the storage pool that contains the disk images and its on an SSD, the only

[qubes-users] Re: Best Laptop for Qubes 4+ and Heads

Also, you can build your own linux and integrate it into Bios chip. It is amazing. ;) https://www.coreboot.org/Payloads Payloads Linux-Kernel The Linux kernel can be used as a payload, and, if it fits into the flash ROM chip, even a distribution can be a payload. But it’s more common to let

[qubes-users] Re: Best Laptop for Qubes 4+ and Heads

On Friday, August 10, 2018 at 5:00:43 PM UTC+3, jonbrown...@gmail.com wrote: > Heyo, > > I am looking for the best laptop for Qubes 4.0+ to take advantage of all the > features along with Heads. I know Heads only officially supports Lenovo > Thinkpad 230 but is that the best choice to future

[qubes-users] Shredding VM images

What's the most convenient way to wipe these images? (I'm just talking about individual VM images) I'm on Qubes 4.0, and I understand it's not that simple on SSDs, but whats the situation? I see that /dev/mapper has a number of links to ../dm devices, these are encrypted, right? Where is the

Re: [qubes-users] Shredding VM images

On 08/20/2018 11:34 AM, tierl...@gmail.com wrote: What's the most convenient way to wipe these images? (I'm just talking about individual VM images) I'm on Qubes 4.0, and I understand it's not that simple on SSDs, but whats the situation? The SSD's firmware determines 100% whether or not

[qubes-users] Re: Can I hope to run Qubes OS on Macbook Air 2013

On Wednesday, January 13, 2016 at 12:41:37 PM UTC-5, Eric Shelton wrote: > On Wednesday, January 13, 2016 at 8:15:06 AM UTC-5, mariusz...@gmail.com > wrote:Same as topic name. I am currently running mac os with heavy virtual > machines usage to get more security/privacy. I will probably switch

Re: [qubes-users] Shredding VM images

On 08/20/18 12:49, Chris Laprise wrote: On 08/20/2018 11:34 AM, tierl...@gmail.com wrote: What's the most convenient way to wipe these images? (I'm just talking about individual VM images) To clarify on your first question: Since encryption is protecting the storage pool that contains the

[qubes-users] Re: X1 Carbon again; Qubes DSDT override?

On Saturday, August 11, 2018 at 6:28:41 PM UTC-4, rich...@gmail.com wrote: > Success! > > By process of elimination, I was able to pinpoint the wakeup issue to sys-usb. > > With further testing, I found that removing the USB-C Thunderbolt 3 > Controller from sys-usb's device list resolved the

[qubes-users] Any way to draw characters on lockscreen/encryption screen?

I'm interested in drawing out characters as a method of invisibleish input on either a touchpad or touchscreen since I want to bring my qubes device anywhere. I couldn't find any mention of this in a fedora google search or a qubes search nor in qubes settings. I doubt it exists but I just

[qubes-users] Re: Both dVM gnome-terminals are not launching

On 08/16/2018 03:09 AM, Marcus Linsner wrote: > On Friday, June 1, 2018 at 11:31:14 PM UTC+2, > qube...-DIVuIKq8I9LqlBn2x/y...@public.gmane.org wrote: >> The Qubes docs at: >> >> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/dispvm-customization/ >> >> note the following for disposable vms: >> >> __ >> >> Note

Re: [qubes-users] how do you clear "move/copy to other app vm" context windows

On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 12:16:05PM +0200, cubit wrote: > 18. Aug 2018 11:22 by un...@thirdeyesecurity.org > : > > > On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 08:32:35PM +0200, cubit wrote: > >> Is there a way to copy the suggested VMs in the "move/copy to other app > >> vm" as

[qubes-users] New Foreshadow exploits CPU bug

So the new Foreshadow exploit bypasses all Intel CPU protections even secure enclaves SGX promised to solve. Additionally it bypasses all VM protections. Check it out below: https://foreshadowattack.eu/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

Re: [qubes-users] New Foreshadow exploits CPU bug

SGX is another ME service slash intel marketing gimmick invented for DRM not security. If the person who purchased the computer can't examine the VM's running on it then they are not owning it simply licensing it which is why SGX is a bad technology and people shouldn't buy x86. -- You received

Re: [qubes-users] Changing colors?

On Monday, 26 March 2018 18:25:19 UTC-4, Chris Laprise wrote: > On 03/26/2018 05:08 PM, sevas wrote: > > Ah, I mean to change the values of each color. > > > > I want my green to be #00ffae and by blue to #00! > > > > Vibrance! > > > > IIRC, you can't edit the Xfce4 Qubes colors, but for

Re: [qubes-users] Whonix 14 has been Released

On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 10:21 AM, awokd wrote: > On Mon, August 20, 2018 11:27 am, Franz wrote: > > > > Thanks > > a /var/log/tor/log file does not exists. There are no files in > > /var/log/tor/ folder. > > > > > > It did not happened before, but now I'm getting the enclosed alert > > window,

Re: [qubes-users] New Foreshadow exploits CPU bug

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 2018-08-20 20:19, jonbrownmaste...@gmail.com wrote: > So the new Foreshadow exploit bypasses all Intel CPU protections > even secure enclaves SGX promised to solve. Additionally it > bypasses all VM protections. Check it out below: > >

Re: [qubes-users] Re: Yubikey in challenge/response mode to unlock LUKS on boot

Something unrelated completely corrupted my system. dom0 got hosed and I was not able to recover. So I have reinstalled qubes from scratch, but this time I am using a software raid on 2 nvme pcie drives. Qubes 4 set up does allow for an encrypted raid the graphical setup. It does not create

[qubes-users] Re: Both dVM gnome-terminals are not launching

On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 2:28:53 AM UTC+2, John S.Recdep wrote: > On 08/16/2018 03:09 AM, Marcus Linsner wrote: > > On Friday, June 1, 2018 at 11:31:14 PM UTC+2, qube...-...@public.gmane.org > > wrote: > >> The Qubes docs at: > >> > >> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/dispvm-customization/ > >>

[qubes-users] Re: off topic - invite codes to 'riseup'

I need an invite code for riseup.net account. Please help. It is for educational purpose. Thanx. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

Re: [qubes-users] how do you clear "move/copy to other app vm" context windows

18. Aug 2018 11:22 by un...@thirdeyesecurity.org : > On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 08:32:35PM +0200, cubit wrote: >> Is there a way to copy the suggested VMs in the "move/copy to other app vm" >> as I have a few entries that no longer exist and would like to get rid

Re: [qubes-users] Whonix 14 has been Released

20. Aug 2018 11:27 by 169...@gmail.com : > Thanks > a /var/log/tor/log file does not exists. There are no files in /var/log/tor/ > folder. > > It did not happened before, but now I'm getting the enclosed alert window, > which tells about permission errors. > > Perhaps

Re: [qubes-users] Whonix 14 has been Released

On Mon, August 20, 2018 11:27 am, Franz wrote: > Thanks > a /var/log/tor/log file does not exists. There are no files in > /var/log/tor/ folder. > > > It did not happened before, but now I'm getting the enclosed alert > window, which tells about permission errors. > > Perhaps it is better to try