Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-20 Thread raahelps
On Thursday, October 20, 2016 at 8:38:38 PM UTC-4, Manuel Amador (Rudd-O) wrote: > On 10/20/2016 05:12 PM, pleom...@gmail.com wrote: > > @Jeremy Rand > > > > realy sorry about that,i didnt think that someone get some emails. > > THOUSANDS of us get "some emails" from you. > > > But this thing of

Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-20 Thread Manuel Amador (Rudd-O)
On 10/20/2016 05:12 PM, pleom...@gmail.com wrote: > @Jeremy Rand > > realy sorry about that,i didnt think that someone get some emails. THOUSANDS of us get "some emails" from you. > But this thing of system security is important. > The fact that security — which you do not seem to understand

Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-15 Thread Andrew
pleom...@gmail.com: > or the worst thing if hacker cant do this he can try to compromize > sys-firewall in the same way as sysnet bcs its the same topology.And after > compromizing sys-firewall then can do whatever he like. > I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. Anyway it should be

Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-15 Thread raahelps
On Saturday, October 15, 2016 at 9:17:14 PM UTC-4, johny...@sigaint.org wrote: > > Andrew: > > This kind of security-first posture is what has made Qubes famous. > > I agree that Qubes separation is probably the most secure basis for a > reasonably usable PC-based platform today. It's all I'll

Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-15 Thread Manuel Amador (Rudd-O)
On 10/16/2016 12:16 AM, pleom...@gmail.com wrote: > look guys if someone compromize sys-net then go route trafic by fake dns and > sites.You paste your credit card or something and all data goes to the hacker. If someone compromises the network card of your AppArmor-enabled Ubuntu instance, the

Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-15 Thread johnyjukya
> Andrew: > This kind of security-first posture is what has made Qubes famous. I agree that Qubes separation is probably the most secure basis for a reasonably usable PC-based platform today. It's all I'll use. (I worry about 4.0 not working on my hardware, tho. And upgrading hardware brings

Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-15 Thread Andrew
pleom...@gmail.com: > But look every vms in qubes base on the same,so if someone compromize sys-net > VM then it should not be so hard to compromize other VMs. > It would compromise sys-net. Any writes to the template-based volume (with /bin, /usr, /var, etc.) are discarded upon VM reboot.

Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-15 Thread Andrew
Andrew: > pleom...@gmail.com: >> If there is no user acces control like a real root real user then its no >> sense to use it. >> > > I think you've missed something pretty fundamental. > > Throw out everything you know about the Linux kernel and how it enforces > security (including MAC).

Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-15 Thread Andrew
pleom...@gmail.com: > If there is no user acces control like a real root real user then its no > sense to use it. > I think you've missed something pretty fundamental. Throw out everything you know about the Linux kernel and how it enforces security (including MAC). Qubes takes the position

Re: [qubes-users] Re: philosofy on qubes and other environment

2016-10-15 Thread Manuel Amador (Rudd-O)
On 10/15/2016 01:04 PM, pleom...@gmail.com wrote: > you never break armored ubuntu,this is fact... dont try be einstein to know > some way to do this.No way. > This e-mail in particular has caused me to burst into uncontrollable laughter. -- Rudd-O http://rudd-o.com/ -- You received