Re: [qubes-users] Smart cards, split GPG, and timing attacks

2019-01-13 Thread demiobenour
That makes sense. Would it be okay to place them all in one VM and use QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN to pick the key? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

Re: [qubes-users] Smart cards, split GPG, and timing attacks

2019-01-13 Thread Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 12:27:04PM -0800, demioben...@gmail.com wrote: > That makes sense. How should one best handle GitHub accounts? One per > project? GitHub does not seem to allow per-project SSH keys, sadly. Actually, you can have separate

Re: [qubes-users] Smart cards, split GPG, and timing attacks

2019-01-12 Thread demiobenour
That makes sense. How should one best handle GitHub accounts? One per project? GitHub does not seem to allow per-project SSH keys, sadly. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving

Re: [qubes-users] Smart cards, split GPG, and timing attacks

2019-01-11 Thread Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Tue, Jan 08, 2019 at 01:15:39AM +, 'awokd' via qubes-users wrote: > Demi Obenour wrote on 1/7/19 3:16 PM: > > Looking through the GPG CVE list, it appears that GPG has a fantastic > > security record. This seems to jus Most of the recent

Re: [qubes-users] Smart cards, split GPG, and timing attacks

2019-01-07 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users
Demi Obenour wrote on 1/7/19 3:16 PM: Looking through the GPG CVE list, it appears that GPG has a fantastic security record. This seems to jus Most of the recent vulnerabilities have been side-channel attacks. Is it useful to use split-GPG with a hardware token to prevent side-channel attacks?