RE: RLUIPA Unanimously Upheld in Cutter

Footnote 8 in Justice Ginsburgs opinion suggests that the state has no obligation to pay for aninmates devotional accessories. What does this sentence-which involved no issue litigated in Cutter mean for the cost of chaplains (especially for minority faiths),for religious diets, or for

Re: RLUIPA Unanimously Upheld in Cutter

My guesses:On Jun 1, 2005, at 9:30 AM, Marc Stern wrote: Footnote 8 in Justice Ginsburgs opinion suggests that the state has no obligation to pay for aninmates devotional accessories. What does this sentence-which involved no issue litigated in Cutter mean for the cost of chaplains (especially

Re: RLUIPA Unanimously Upheld in Cutter

I have had some experience with this issue in two locations which had accepted a "reasonable accommodation" model [now probably "exceedingly burdensome"]. I believe this was referring to special clothing, devotional objects, and the like. This was [and maybe still is] a major issue as to

Re: RLUIPA Unanimously Upheld in Cutter

Are you taking the position that RLUIPA places a burden on every prison to accommodate every religious diet request? I don't see howRLUIPA creates a requirement that the prison pay for any dietary request. There are literally hundreds of diet variations amongthe many religions. No prison

Legislative Prayer Revisited

by individual lawmakers--apparently on a rotating and volunteer basis. http://www.southbendtribune.com/stories/2005/06/01/local.20050601-sbt-LOCL-A1-ICLU_wants_Jesus_out.sto Dan Conkle ** Daniel O. Conkle Professor of Law Indiana University School of Law

Nullifying RLUIPA

In response to Marci's query whethere there is some limit on what prisons must do, of course there is. No one says the prisoners win every case; that is herstraw man. Some diet claims are insincere; some demand that the religious requirements be met in a different way, although the prison

RE: Nullifying RLUIPA

In addition to what Doug has written, I would note that many prisons have a common fare diet which satisfies the dietary restrictions of many faiths. That their might be some dietary claims that could not be met-the legendary steak and sherry claims of the church of the new song in the

Re: Nullifying RLUIPA

My observation was not intended to raise a straw man and is quite sincere.Where is the limit for the prisons under RLUIPA when it comes to diet? Here's the problem -- in this day and age, a prison could easily have a mix of Buddhists, Hindus, Orthodox Jews, Nation of Islam members, and

RE: Legislative Prayer Revisited

lawmakers--apparently on a rotating and volunteer basis. http://www.southbendtribune.com/stories/2005/06/01/local.20050601-sbt-LOCL-A1-ICLU_wants_Jesus_out.sto Dan Conkle ** Daniel O. Conkle Professor of Law Indiana University School of Law Bloomington

Re: Nullifying RLUIPA

I'm just curious if anyone in the ivory tower believes that an inmate's dietary demands, based on religion, can ever be denied under RLUIPA? (And set aside the games-playing CONS and their steak and sherry-- I am talking about sincere religious believers making a variety of dietary

RE: Nullifying RLUIPA

It may be a legal question, but the answer is not necessarily to draw a line somewhere. The problem has to be managed, and I suspect that standards and balancing tests, rather than bright-line rules are likely to be the sum and substance of the answer. You wouldnt say that a functionalist

RE: Nullifying RLUIPA

But see Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding issue of material factin claim thatdenial of wine during communion was substantial burden on religion). From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steven JamarSent: Wednesday, June 01,

Cutter and the Separation of Church and State

In Cutter, the Court starts its analysis by flatly stating that the Establishment Clause commands a separation of Church and State. Given the considerable effort in conservative legal circles to discredit the separation doctrine,* how notable do people think it is that Chief Justice Rehnquist and

RE: Cutter and the Separation of Church and State

The separation myth rejected by many of us is a myth of strict separationism, in which religion is to be banished from the public square and religious persons and organizations denied equal treatment with regard to otherwise available public benefits. I doubt there is anyone on the list who does

Re: Cutter and the Separation of Church and State

Coyle, Dennis wrote: If we read separation to forbid a national church, all justices would agree. If we read it to mean no discriminatory treatment in favor of a specific religious group, or no policies specifically designed to advance a particular denomination, the conservatives would still

Cutter and the Separation of Church and State

Prof. Coyle writes that one answer is semantic: conservatives read 'separation' more narrowly. It is certainly true that some justices read separation more narrowly than others. Indeed, even in Everson, where the Court first embraced the idea that the Establishment Clause requires a separation