Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe
that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't).
If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from
mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the
analysis be just the
I agree entirely; I mention this partly because I occasionally
hear pork bans as examples of quintessential violations of the Establishment
Clause, though I don't think they would be.
To be sure, a general pork ban might have a different motivation than a prison
decision not to
It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In
2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to
serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele.
Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they remove all
River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012),
http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf .
Eugene
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If anyone is interested in the European controversy between animal rights
advocates and Muslim and Jewish minorities on animal slaughter, here is a
comprehensive, not too dated, article on the subject:
Pablo Lerner and Alfredo Mordechai Rabello The Prohibition of Ritual
Slaughtering
(Kosher
Ellis says that religious exemptions violate a requirement that laws be
secular in purpose and effect, which is what is required by the religion
clauses, as originally understood and as interpretetd by the court.
Both the original understanding half of this claim, and the as interpreted by
Ellis, you are right that I didn't respond directly to your question of
what secular means. And, I agree that religious entities and persons
should get everything that non-religious entities and persons do is too
broad a brush to explain what the issue is here.
I guess my answer sort of
Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that
RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and
effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not exist.
Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature?
In 1998, California banned the sale of horsemeat for human consumption,
based on nonrational aesthetic / moral judgments about the impropriety of
eating horses. Say that a state bans the sale of pork for human consumption,
based on the desire to minimize the risk that people would
You are right. Except many of the cases in which prisoners are requesting
kosher food involve inmates who are not Jewish (at least in the halachic
sense). E.g. many times Muslims, having no hope of getting halal food, request
kosher food which is apparently an acceptable alternative under
I wrote about this a while ago in Free Exercise of Religion and Animal
Protection: A Comparative Perspective on Ritual Slaughter, 39 Geo. Wash.
Int'l L. Rev. 839 (2007). The article includes a discussion of the 2002
German constitutional amendment that made animal protection a
constitutional state
Chip is right, of course.
But Eric's point requires a response.
I don't I don't think PETA folks would appreciate having their sincere concerns
about the humane treatment of
animals traced to the Nazis. To say that humane treatment concerns are more
often than
not pretext and then to have
Chip is right that the supposedly inhumane methods of kosher/halal slaughter
(something US law defines as humane, btw) is one of the main public
justifications for banning the practice. But as our brief in the New Zealand
kosher slaughter ban case pointed out --
And France clearly pushes a form of universalism as a national value in a way
this country has not for some time.
On Apr 12, 2012, at 10:26 AM, Finkelman, Paul paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edu
wrote:
The french experience with intolerance is very different than ours and thu
leads to different
Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise
cases about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the
efficiencies of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular
purposes to me.
On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis ew...@richmond.edu wrote:
Nick Kristoff has an interesting piece in today's NYTimes,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/opinion/kristof-is-an-egg-for-breakfast-worth-this.html?_r=1hp
decrying the treatment of chickens by egg factories. (One of my own feeble
gestures, presumably predictable by reference to my economic
I am already on the PETA blacklist because of my Santeria goat sacrifice case,
so no harm done to my relationship with them.
The reason I cited examples from the 1930s is that before New Zealand's
short-lived ban in 2010, all but one of the previous sharia bans were passed in
the 1890-1930s
This is true. It is also true that many prisoners are paranoid about their food
and therefore want kosher food out of a misguided belief that it is especially
safe for consumption.
That said, most of those cases arise after there is a kosher accommodation in
place and other prisoners seek
Marie, I certainly have no objections to exemptions in general just as I have
no objections to laws in general from which persons are often exempted—provided
the laws (and exemptions?) are secular in purpose and effect, which is what is
required by the religion clauses, as originally understood
Except that PETA itself has in the past referred to the way commercial farm
animals are raised as rep[licating conditions in concentration camps.
Marc
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of hamilto...@aol.com
Sent: Thursday, April
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