I did not know that; thank you. Mea culpa.
**
Paul Finkelman, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism
University of Pennsylvania
and
Scholar-in-Residence
National Constitution Center
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
518-439-7296
Not all bases of discrimination are the same and not all businesses are the
same. Discrimination based on the target’s immutable characteristics (race,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) is not the same as one based
on a difference in beliefs — political, religious, moral.
A
To add to this discussion from an IP perspective, it is worth noting that
photography presents a particularly interesting study of the application of
copyright's requirement of originality. Although photography was included in
the copyright statute as protectable subject matter as early as
Mark: would you defend her position if she refused to photograph an integrated
marriage? Or Hindu wedding? Does she have an absolute right to refuse to
work for people on the bases of race, religion, or gender?
**
Paul Finkelman, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Penn Program on
Then we simply postulate that the objection is stated, sincerely, to be on
the objector's religious beliefs. No race, no mere cosmetics, but a deeply
held religious belief on the nature of culture/nation.
On Sat, Feb 14, 2015 at 11:12 PM, Brad Pardee bp51...@windstream.net
wrote:
In the absence
I don’t think we have to postulate this, or focus on highly
out-of-the-mainstream religious groups. As I understand it, many a devout Jew
will approve, on religious grounds, of a wedding between an irreligious ethnic
Jew like me and another Jew, without any extra work that I
I was trying to avoid the problematic separation of religious and ethnic
identities involved with Judaism in particular. In reality of course
religion, language, national origin, race and ethnicity all get marvelously
complex.
Out of curiosity, for those who are of the opinion that
Brad writes of free speech doctrine:
[T]he court isn't determining if a person's words are mistaken . . . when
they say that free speech doesn't cover slander or libel.
we have long held that actual malice requires material falsity
*Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper*, 134 S. Ct. 852, 861,
Sorry -- I hit send accidentally before finishing my message below.
Here's the omitted paragraph:
What is clear from comparing the Court's free speech and free exercise
doctrines is that government *can* regulate false speech (with limits);
it *cannot* regulate false religious beliefs. As a
Alan: What do you thank about freelance writers? Say that
someone generally takes freelance gigs to write a wide range of press releases,
technical manuals, and pretty much anything else that comes in the door. Along
comes the Church of Scientology, asking the person to write
If a person is going into a bakery and buying a cake off the shelf without
the baker doing anything, that's one thing. But they wouldn't have to talk
to the baker for that. It's by talking to the baker, asking for a cake to
be specifically created or designed for this specific occasion that is
I was about to send this post when Eugene's came in. To some degree it makes
similar points. And it makes some points that are similar to Steve's helpful
post.
With regard to whether there should be a creative expression exception to
antidiscrimination laws, as Alan frames the issue:
Of
It's not about the Court saying that beliefs are mistaken, insubstantial,
plausible, logical, or comprehensible. It's about the Court determining what
is covered by the free exercise clause and what is not. Again, to parallel the
free speech guarantees, the court isn't determining if a
I think Steve's focus on the difficulty of drawing distinctions in this area
is helpful, but it also demonstrates the potential range of autonomy and/or
expressive exemptions from civil rights laws.
Let's put prostitution aside for the moment since it involves a form of
intimacy that is so
Dear All:
This goes back in time a bit, but I have had a busy weekend and wanted to
respond to those who wondered why I think the racist prostitute should be
subject to anti-discrimination laws.
One feature of several rights is that we do not allow people to commodify them,
or at least
Mark,
Do I take you to mean that not only do you not distinguish between services
once they have been placed into the stream of commerce, you do not
distinguish between services and goods?
-K
On Sun, Feb 15, 2015 at 8:26 PM, Graber, Mark mgra...@law.umaryland.edu
wrote:
Dear All:
This goes
... thanks for that. It's an interesting distinction.
Sent from my iPad
On Feb 15, 2015, at 8:26 PM, Graber, Mark mgra...@law.umaryland.edu wrote:
Dear All:
This goes back in time a bit, but I have had a busy weekend and wanted to
respond to those who wondered why I think the racist
I agree with Eugene that the free lance writer who doesn't want to work on an
advocacy piece is one of the strongest cases for an expressive exemption. But
what if we are not talking about an advocacy piece. May a small company that
does technical writing exclusively reject a female client
You are misunderstanding me. I'm not saying saying that there ar e true
religious objections and false religious objections. I'm saying that, just as
there is speech that is protected as free speech and there is speech that is
not protected, there are religious objections that are (or once
Got it -- you are making an argument that the state has a compelling
interest in prohibiting discrimination against interracial couples in the
commercial marketplace, but does not have a compelling interest in
prohibiting discrimination against same-sex couples in the commercial
marketplace.
The question isn't so much of whether the behavior is emotionally
intimate, but whether it is sufficiently physically (or intellectually)
intimate or personal that a person ought to have a right to choose her partners
for such behavior. There are prostitutes legally working in Nevada,
1. Say that a solo technical writer is asked to do technical
writing describing the proper use of abortion pills, which are indeed used
exclusively by women. I would think that the technical writer should have
every right to refuse to write that, especially if he thinks
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