Okay, I’ll bite. I don’t have firm views yet on this. My questions below all
go to the “front end” of the analysis. And I get the distinction between a
court’s engaging in its own (God’s-eye?) analysis of whether a practice is
important to a religion simpliciter/in the abstract and a court’s
(This) one would hope.
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.
From: on behalf of Marty Lederman
Reply-To: Law & Religion issues for Law
rofit corporation, or other kind of association.
But even if you disagree, and would find a substantial burden, it would still
be unconstitutional to give churches special political-speech rights--and
avoiding that constitutional violation means the government ought to win under
RFRA.
On Thu, May
In Branch Ministries, “the Church d[id] not maintain that a withdrawal from
electoral politics would violate its beliefs.” 211 F.3d at 142. This fact
played a role in the court’s “no substantial burden” reasoning. If a Church
did so maintain today, Marty, what extra analysis would you
It strikes me that suggestions that (some) trans men should just use men’s
restrooms in South Carolina and would get away with it because they would be
perceived as a men does not really speak to the fact that to do so, they will
now have to be lawbreakers. This to me just underscores and/or
Utter silence could be a reflection of the time of the school year and holiday
timing.
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.
From:
>
Judge Roth always struck me as a very careful judge when I was clerking for the
late Judge Becker at the Third Circuit. Her concurrence here is thus all the
more striking. I’m assuming she meant something like "in other types of
discrimination cases" where strict scrutiny is not required by
matter to the validity of the licenses
because ...," I am asking because I don't understand what comes after "because."
If the answer is "yes," I am wondering what the name of the county clerk is, if
not Kim Davis.
David's premise seems to be that the answer is in Ky. Rev. S
I think you’ve said this (quotation below) at least a couple times now, Mark,
but I’m a bit puzzled by it. Don’t federal courts always make such assessments
any time a plaintiff sues a state actor for violating a federal constitutional
right that is judicially protected with strict scrutiny?
). Whatever the veteran can
recover for the denial of service itself, I can’t see how he can recover for
speech about the denial of service, even if the speech “was related to the
discriminatory act” in the sense of having been motivated by the lawsuit
related to the act.
Eugene
David
but not against others?
Eugene
David Cruz writes:
If they are publishing in newspapers, interviewing on radio or television, or
displaying signs at their home, they should be fine. (Signs in the workplace
could implicate whether they’re equally treating their customers, which is
related
public accommodation
law
So would you advise the client to ignore the logic of the ruling?
On Fri, Jul 3, 2015 at 11:41 AM, David Cruz
dc...@law.usc.edumailto:dc...@law.usc.edu wrote:
Nor should some aspect' of the reasoning supporting an order lead is to embrace
a facially implausible
Nor should some aspect' of the reasoning supporting an order lead is to embrace
a facially implausible and certainly not inevitable interpretation of that
order in contradiction of the (incorporated) First Amendment rights of freedom
of speech.
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of
Under California law,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=famgroup=1-01000file=400-402m
solemnization may be performed by religious leaders, judges, legislators or
certain other state officers, county supervisors, some city clerks, certain
mayors, and “deputy
Since Michael Worley asked these questions of Marty in a post, rather than
private email, I'd like to ask for a clarification of what he's asking with
number 2: Permissions from whom? Who/what is entitled to, is able to, and/or
is in the habit of conveying such “permissions”?
David B. Cruz
Is it permissible under current law for government actors to assess whether
“religious reasons for exemption are stronger in very small businesses that
generally are personally run by the owner than in larger and generally more
impersonal businesses” (emphases added)? I thought plenty of cases
It still sounds like Chip still may be exercised (no pun intended) about
Scalia’s comments. One need not take “I would not have enacted” so far as
indicating stupidity or silliness; there are other ways short of that that
something could be bad policy. Recall Justice O’Connor’s dissent in
The accuracy of the ostensible scare claims depends, I suppose, on what they
actually said, and whether men-using-women’s-restrooms, as it was characterized
by Allen Asch, is the same as people who were assigned one sex at birth based
usually on genitalia using restrooms in conformity with
Marty’s blog contribution says:
“In other words, the majority is of the view that where someone decides to
assault someone else for nonreligious reasons--where, in the majority's words,
a nonreligious ground was the motive for the assault--but specifically chooses
to physically force the
Although to the extent “the debate” is so framed, it overlooks the place of sex
discrimination in the Title VII/EO antidiscrimination regime and occludes the
possibilities that sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination might
properly be understood as akin to sex discrimination, or
Thanks for the citation, Eugene.
-David
From: Volokh, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu
Reply-To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
religionlaw@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Date: Wednesday, July 23, 2014 at 3:53 PM
To: Law Religion issues for
Is the government actually claiming it has a compelling interest in use of the
form? If so, I apologize in advance to Mark for the following comment: I
thought the form was a means toward an end, so one would examine the means for
the requisite constitutional degree of tailoring. But the
Hobby Lobby was a RFRA case, so I’m puzzled below by the references below to
the First Amendment (point 1) and a “constitutionally protected right” (point
6).
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.
From: Daniel J.
I share Chip’s concerns about Mark’s attempt to exempt trespass suits
categorically from the scope of RFRAs, but Doug’s comments below made me think
that perhaps Mark’s approach might try to draw some support from Flagg Brothers
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
I'd like to see a bunch of examples before I'd conclude this is common in any
circle. It is possible I just have not read or heard the right people or have
failed to notice it, but I'm usually fairly attentive to sex-differentiated
language. I don't see that this goes to the substance of
I apologize for obtuseness, but I do not understand how a belief can do
anything, such as file a lawsuit. May I please ask for a clarification of what
Michael Worley meant by this phrasing below?
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles,
Alan,
Did you mean the two quoted passages below to be equivalent? They seem
somewhat different (at least potentially) to me. That is, the cost of having
the government rather than employers provide a benefit might outstrip the
amount an employer gains by not providing the benefit, might it
I know I'm not the listmod, but could we please keep the posts on topic for the
listserv?
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.
On Aug 1, 2013, at 6:32 PM, Volokh, Eugene
http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2013/07/prop-8-proponents-ask-california.html
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.
On Jul 15, 2013, at 5:17 PM, Jean Dudley
jean.dud...@gmail.commailto:jean.dud...@gmail.com wrote:
know for sure that there is no jurisdictional bar so cases will have
to be scrutinized by the courts and subject to judicial interpretation. Marci
On Jan 11, 2012, at 8:58 PM, David Cruz
dc...@law.usc.edumailto:dc...@law.usc.edu wrote:
It seems to me an easy distinction between the case
It seems to me that part of the problem with the framing of the
distinction between Smith and Hosanna-Tabor is that physical acts vs.
internal governance does not well describe in parallel the concerns of
the state in both cases. Internal governance is what Hosanna Tabor
protects for religious
It seems to me an easy distinction between the case of the undocumented
minister posited by Howard and today's case is that if the government deports
someone for being unlawfully present, that is in no way predicated upon a
decision by a church to select that person as a minister; the church's
The Ketubah at issue in Aviztur provided (in the English version): “[W]e, the
bride and bridegroom * * * hereby agree to recognize the Beth Din of the
Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America or its duly
appointed representatives, as having authority to counsel us in
Agreed -- though I would add that hair length restrictions can and do oppress
more than just those students who have religious reasons for not complying with
them.
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.
On Jul 21,
I'm not sure my understanding of the CLS policy agrees 100% with Doug's.
Whether or not you call it a disparate impact, I believe there is what groups
like Lambda have been litigating as an insurmountable obstacle faced by
same-sex couples that different-sex couples don't face. My
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of David Cruz
Sent: Wednesday, April 08, 2009 8:24 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Law.com - 3rd Circuit Rejects Muslim Cop's Bid
to Wear ReligiousScarf
I don't understand why counsel would not have argued
If Steve thinks that Brad's asserted fear is preposterous, then I don't
think that fearmongering would be an improper way for him to characterize
it, as one need not have dishonesty (though one might perhaps infer that
depending on how outlandish another's claim seemed) for someone to be
'involved
I¹m getting ready to teach Constitutional Law and Federal Courts today and
for the start of The Global Arc of Justice conference I¹ve been helping plan
(http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/programs/GlobalArcofJustice2009.h
tml), so I haven¹t had time to read the bill or about it. Question:
Maybe you were thinking of Browne v. U.S., 176 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1999),
although they claimed a right to withhold some taxes and then have the
IRS levy it without interest or penalty.
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA
Dear Carol Moore,
I would encourage you to contact the Alabama ACLU affiliate.
http://www.aclualabama.org/ContactUs/ContactUs.htm
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.
-Original Message-
From: CAROL MOORE
Wouldn't it involve less posturing, if the legislature and the governor
truly care about the issue, to change the outcome by simply amending the
statute upon which the Court of Appeal (not Court of Appeals, as
erroneously denominated in the resolution below) relied, rather than
calling upon the
Maybe his Kiryas Joel dissent accepts current EC doctrine arguendo,
though his preferred view (as revealed in his Lukumi and Edwards v.
Aguillard opinions) would render legislative motivation irrelevant in
cases of facially neutral laws?
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern
Just looking at the text, it's not clear to me that it would be violated by a
state's allowing a custodial parent to send a kid to a school of that parent's
choosing. A noncustodial parent would not get her way (or not during the time
the other parent had custody under a joint arrangement),
Alan suggests that holding a march expressing an anti-Semitic message
in a town where many Jews live does not present a sufficiently focused
location/context/message to trigger my balancing analysis. What if
it's the Village of Kiryas Joel? I ask not to be facetious but to
explore the extent of
I too found that comment a little cryptic. If Michael meant to be
doctrinal rather than just attitudinally predictive, my guess would be
that he didn't mean that a different First Amendment rule would apply,
but that those decisions might somehow justify a conclusion that there's
a compelling
For more recent cases, see http://www.aclu.org/defendingreligion. [In
an abundance of caution I will note that I am on the board of directors
of the ACLU-Southern California and of the national ACLU, and am one of
the national ACLU's General Counsel.] Happy holidays, all.
David B. Cruz
Add a forward slash after com in the URL of the View Full Story link
if you want it to work, viz.,
http://www.sltrib.com/null/ci_4668752?source=email .
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.
Dear Mr. Sanders:
Thank you for calling Dent out on this. Let us hope he corrects his
falsehoods before hard copy publication somewhere. (Professor now Judge
Michael McConnell failed to do so even after I had immediately cited him
to Badgett when he circulated a draft chapter for an anthology.)
Dear Paul,
I am very sorry to hear of the loss of your friend Kermit. I hope that
your and others' fond memories of him and his work will be of some
consolation to you in this sad time.
-David
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
[EMAIL
On Mon, 3 Jul 2006, Douglas Laycock wrote:
Does New York maybe prohibit religious discrimination in places of
public accommodation?
Douglas Laycock
Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law
The University of Texas at Austin
And aren't public accommodations perhaps so designated based on
On Mon, 3 Jul 2006, Paul Finkelman wrote:
[snip]
The other difference, of course, is that one IS religious and the other
is not. It was not Catholic night at the ball park and I bet there
were few priests bringing their sunday school class in for Polish
Catholic night.
If Paul's point is
On Sun, 16 Apr 2006 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[snip]
If mine is a sound reading of the statute, what to do with the situation in
which a party comes to court (federal court, that is) and seeks some relief
(injunctive, declaratory, damages). Is the Court obliged to be aware of the
I too am unconvinced. If the Court reverses a lower court, it says it was
wrong for the lower court to have reached the merits. Treating a decision
that wrongly reached the merits as BINDING seems fishy, at best. Guess
I'll have to look up the lower court law on prudential reversals.
David B.
On Wed, 14 Sep 2005, Marty Lederman wrote:
Why is it inconsistent? Assume a court of appeals that, after briefing
and argument, carefully considers the merits question in case A and
holds X. The judgment in case A is not binding on lower courts and
future panels dealing with different
In Frances Paterson's defense, while this may be the place for the
noting that Henderson did, considerations of appropriate time are also
relevant. And just now, when we don't even know how many people have
died, haven't recovered their bodies, haven't even necessarily rescued all
the trapped,
On Thu, 28 Jul 2005 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Exodus 20:1-3: And God spake all these words, saying, I am the LORD
thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the
house of bondage.Thou shalt have no other gods before me. --- John
Lofton.
Could John Lofton please explain
On Thu, 28 Jul 2005, Gene Garman wrote:
Article 6 is clearly stated and very specific:
[snip]
(3) The ... members of the several State legislatures, and all
executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the
several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to
On Fri, 15 Apr 2005, West, Ellis wrote:
[snip] If, however, the reason for these prayers
is because the members of the Board truly want divine guidance or
blessing from the deity in which they believe, the God of the
Judeo-Christian faith, [snip]
Does that count as a *secular* purpose?? I
Perhaps: At least three main lines of enquiry addressed particularly to
school aid have emerged to complement evenhandedness neutrality. . . .
Third, we have found relevance in at least five characteristics of the
aid itself . . . .
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern
In this self-styled non-precedential opinion, the atheistic plaintiff, for
whatever reason, based her constitutional claim *only* on rational basis
review under the Equal Protection Clause (with Amos being dispositive of
the standard of equal protection review to apply to the religious
Yes, but can state-run schools' principals call students to their office
(out of class, recess, or lunch, presumably) and urge them to stand?
Ann distinguished (or repeated a distinction) between requiring and
urging.
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Law School
On Wed, 14 Jul 2004, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
[snip]
SIMPLE 2 STEP PROCESS
First, fill out a form that affirms your membership in any Maryland
Episcopal Church, [snip]
Any potential EC issues lurking in this requirement?
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Law
The Washington Post is reporting that all eight participating Justices
agreed that Newdow did not have standing.
David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Law School
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.
___
To post, send message
On Mon, 14 Jun 2004, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
Now I don't want to constrain Paul's imagination, fascinat[ion], or
sense of irony -- all three of which are fine things to have, and give
ourselves a lot of pleasure. But as best I can tell, Paul's posts are
largely ways to express his contempt
On Thu, 8 Apr 2004, Petron, David wrote:
Marty's mention of the Madison case (in which my colleagues in the Religious
Institutions Practice Group here at Sidley represent the respondent) prompts
me to bring another recent cert. petition to the list's attention. Along
with John Mauck and
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Gene Summerlin wrote:
Do you know what the criminal charge is? I could certainly envision the
state refusing to recognize the marriages performed by the ministers or,
perhaps, the state revoking the ministers licensure, but what is the
criminal law which they have
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
[snip]
(2) PUNISHING THE CLERGY FOR VIOLATING A VALID LAW: Now the question
is whether the expression of this opinion leaves the clergy open to
punishment for violating a valid law. Tom says yes -- but I don't see
why. There is a valid law that
On Wed, 4 Feb 2004, Rick Duncan wrote:
The 10th Circuit finally came down in Axson-Flynn (the
case involving the LDS drama student who refused to
say the F word or to curse in God's name as part of
class exercises at the U of Utah). The Court ruled in
her favor and reversed and remanded.
On Tue, 27 Jan 2004, Scarberry, Mark wrote:
This isn't academic freedom, in my view. Rather, this is nearly the opposite
of academic freedom. The university is not just allowing teachers to teach
what they believe to be the best academic understanding of a subject.
Instead the university as
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