nlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, October 04, 2012 1:44 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: RFRA and claimants' theories of complicity
Of course when criminal law or tort law makes someone liability
for co
knowing
and worshipping our Lord Jesus Christ.
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, October 04, 2012 1:44 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: RFRA and claimants' theories
the
criminal law or tort law treats it as leading to liability, and RFRA law treats
it as justifying a claim of substantial burden?
Eugene
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu
Sent: Thursday, October 04, 2012
In these cases about landlord or employer liability or criminal complicity,
the landlord or employer is denying complicity, and the law imposes
objective standards to adjudicate the question. It would never be the case
that the law would allow the landlord or employer to escape liability by
saying
Eugene's analogies in the insurance context are hypothetical. Similar analogies
in the landlord-tenant context are very real.
If a tenant uses leased premises for prostitution, the landlord is responsible.
There are California cases on this, and I don't think they are in any way
unusual. But w
I continue to think that, when someone claims that a law
substantially burdens their religious beliefs by requiring them to do something
that they view as religiously wrong because it is complicit with evil, the
question should be whether the claimant sincerely believes that theo
