WELCOME TO IWPR'S REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA, No. 495, June 2, 2007 SPECTACULAR FALL FROM GRACE FOR KAZAK PRESIDENTS SON-IN-LAW The authorities move against a powerful political figure despite his family connections. By Daur Dosybiev in Almaty
COMMENT: KAZAK CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM STRENGTHENS PRESIDENT Changes to the political structure and election system have been portrayed as democratic, but the current head of state is the main beneficiary. By Andrei Chebotarev in Almaty TAJIKS SEEK PERMANENT GATEWAY TO CHINA Tajikistans isolated southeast has benefited from a new trade route to China, but locals say restrictions at the border crossing are making life harder than it needs to be. By Saodat Asanova in Badakhshan and Dushanbe **** NEW AT IWPR ****************************************************************** KURK SCHORK AWARDS DEADLINE FOR ENTRIES APPROACHING (June 15) The deadline for entries to the Kurt Schork Awards in International Journalism is just two weeks away. Two annual prizes of $5,000 each are awarded - one to an international freelance print/internet-based reporter; and the second to a local journalist in the developing world. The deadline for receipt of emailed or posted entries is June 15th. The awards are being administered by IWPR, on behalf of the Kurt Schork Memorial Fund, with the two winners celebrated at an event to be held in London in November. A video of last years event hosted by Christiane Amanpour of CNN can be seen on IWPRs website www.iwpr.net For details on how to apply electronically or by post, contact Alan Davis ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) or click here http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?p=-&apc_state=henitri&s=o&o=top_ksa_07.html COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (CIJ) TRIAL REPORTS ARCHIVE: When CIJ closed in 2006, it donated its searchable Trial Reports Archive to IWPR in recognition of our own reporting work and to ensure these courtroom reports would remain available to the public. Milosevic and other ICTY Trial Reports as well as Sierra Leone Reports are now available at <http://iwpr.net/?apc_state=hen&s=c> MIANEH is a new, independent web-based initiative run as a project by the Institute for War & Peace Reporting. Mianeh aims to be an open space for ideas, news and debate where writers in Iran can reach out to each other as well as to those outside the country who are interested in learning more about the vibrant and dynamic society that is Iran today. Go to <http://www.mianeh.net/> to find out more. NEW PODCAST: THIS WEEK ON IWPR A regular audio programme produced by IWPR US, highlighting IWPR news and analysis on issues of conflict, human rights and international justice, written by our contributors around the world. To listen to the programme or for details on how to subscribe see http://iwpr.net/?apc_state=hen&s=u&p IRAQ PHOTO DIARIES, NIGHT RAIDS: Peter van Agtmael documents the late-night raids carried out by American and Iraqi troops against the homes of suspected insurgents. This series of photographs was awarded a 2nd place in the General News Stories category at the World Press Photo Awards in 2007. http://iwpr.net/?apc_state=henh&s=o&o=top_galleries_index.html NEWS BRIEFING CENTRAL ASIA is a new concept in regional reporting, comprising analysis and news behind the news in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Available at: www.NBCentralAsia.net **** www.iwpr.net ******************************************************************** REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA RSS: http://www.iwpr.net/en/rca/rss.xml TURKMEN RADIO: INSIDE VIEW is an IWPR radio training and broadcast project for Turkmenistan. View at: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=trk&s=p&o=-&apc_state=henh RECEIVE FROM IWPR: Readers are urged to subscribe to IWPR's full range of free electronic publications at: http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=henh&s=s&m=p GIVE TO IWPR: IWPR is wholly dependent upon grants and donations. For more information about how you can support IWPR go to: http://www.iwpr.net/donate.html **** www.iwpr.net ******************************************************************** SPECTACULAR FALL FROM GRACE FOR KAZAK PRESIDENTS SON-IN-LAW The authorities move against a powerful political figure despite his family connections. By Daur Dosybiev in Almaty Married to the president and occupying a series of high-profile positions, Rahat Aliev seemed to be part of an untouchable inner circle in Kazak politics. But in the last two weeks he has gone from being ambassador to Austria to a wanted suspect, and his career now seems irreparable Analysts say the arrest warrant for Aliev, formerly deputy head of Kazakstans intelligence agency, the National Security Committee, head of the presidential security service, and deputy foreign minister, is the culmination of a murky conflict pitting factions against each other within the political hierarchy created by President Nursultan Nazarbaev. Aliev is married to the presidents elder daughter Dariga, a prominent politician with a seat in parliament and head of the Kazakstan Congress of Journalists. On May 23, Kazakstan's interior ministry announced that Aliev had been charged in connection with the abduction and assault of two officials of Nurbank, in which he is a key shareholder. Abilmajen Gilimov, at the time chairman of Nurbank, and his deputy Joldas Timraliev, disappeared in January. After their release a day later, they resigned from the bank. Family members alleged that they had been beaten to force them to give up shareholdings in Nurbank and sign away the building. Ten associates of Aliev including several who had worked for him in the presidential security service were also charged on May 23. The interior ministry said investigations were also focusing on alleged links to organised crime and unspecified financial crimes. The following day, the prosecutor general ministry suspended Alievs KTK television channel and newspaper Karavan from operating. The official reason was that they were not carrying enough material in Kazak, as they are legally required to do. But the media outlets had carried material that presented Alievs side of the story. Aliev was packed off to Vienna in February after the kidnapping allegations surfaced, as ambassador to Austria and to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, which Kazakstan hopes to chair in 2009. But on May 26, after the criminal charges were brought against Aliev, Nazarbaev sacked him from both positions. The question now is whether he will return to face charges. On May 30, Kazakstan submitted a formal request to the Austrian authorities to extradite him. Stripped of his diplomatic immunity, he has now applied for political asylum. Aliev has previously denied any connection with the abductions, filing defamation suits against the wives of Gilimov and Timraliev for allegations they had made against him. In a statement circulated on May 29 in the Kazak media, Aliev suggested he was being victimised merely because he told his father-in-law in private that he too would like to be president one day. A few months ago I told Nursultan Abishevich [Nazarbaev] that Id decided to stand as a candidate in the next presidential election in 2012. It would be a natural progression for my political career, he said. He said the charges against him were open lawlessness and a return to the totalitarian past. As for the attack on the bank [ie the alleged abductions], I will say the following the situation is becoming absurd in the extreme, he said, listing a number of grave flaws in the way the interior ministry was conducting the case. A case is being fabricated against me and people close to me. Referring to the temporary closure of KTK and Karavan, he added, At the same time, popular independent TV companies and newspapers are being closed down merely because they have covered the events that are happening. Aliev has been a political thorn in Nazarbaevs side for some time. In 2001, a group of businessmen believed to be in favour with the president wrote to the Kazak parliament accusing Aliev of attempting to move in on their businesses and assets. This year, Aliev and his father publicly embarrassed Nazarbaev by criticising an amendment to the constitution - now passed - which will allow him to stand for an unlimited number of terms in office. That perceived disloyalty may have predisposed Nazarbaev not to back his son-in-law in the event of another public scandal. However, it seems that he was forced to take action by the interior ministrys revelations, rather than choosing the timing himself. The way the allegations came out and the swiftness with which the authorities moved to prosecute Aliev suggest that he has lost out in an ongoing war between competing political and business groups all of them regime insiders, but with differing interests and allegiances. These groupings consist of banks, financial institutions and industrial companies headed by high-profile figures with an inside track to the corridors of political power. On May 22, Aliev announced publicly that he was in possession of documents containing damaging information about the mayor of Almaty, Imangali Tasmagambetov, and Interior Minister Baurjan Mukhamejanov. By the following day, Gilimov was speaking on the state television channel Astana, alleging that it was Aliev personally, along with armed accomplices, who kidnapped him and Timraliev back in January and held them hostage for about 24 hours, threatening to kill them if they did not sign over their bank assets. Criminal charges were brought against Aliev the same day. On May 30, a group of leading businessmen, including the heads of three major banks and a number of successful companies, made a statement to the media expressing support for the president and attacking Aliev. Many of us have experienced his [Alievs] methods of doing business and using law-enforcement agencies to apply political pressure for his own ends. Any one of us could have been in the place of the kidnapped bankers, said the statement. According to local human rights advocate Yevgeny Zhovtis, the balance of power has clearly shifted away from those associated with Aliev to others, which are underlining their loyalty to the head of state. It is clear that there is a kind of consensus among the majority of groupings about the war against Alievs group. And as long as the president doesnt change his mind for other reasons such as family ties Alievs political future is unenviable, to put it mildly, he said. An official in the Almaty mayors office, who wished to remain anonymous, agrees that Alievs fate is sealed. He went too far, he said. Referring to the reported rivalry between Aliev and other business factions, he said it was inevitable that one side was going to win, They [both sides] were openly taking businesses away from each other, and you cant do that and go unpunished. On this occasion, Aliev went after his father-in-laws friends. A defiant Aliev has insisted that he remains a political player. I want to make it clear that I am always going to be in politics. Im going to do everything in my power to prevent the country sliding backwards into the totalitarian Soviet past, he said in his statement. I know I have many, many supporters in our country. I am convinced the future is ours, not yours, Mr President-for-Life. With an international arrest warrant bearing his name and an extradition request filed in Vienna, Alievs immediate future looks unpromising. Yet there is still the matter of his family ties to the president, which some analysts think might end in a face-saving arrangement rather than a high-profile trial. Its one thing to charge Aliev the official, but another thing to charge the husband of your eldest daughter, commented political analyst Andrei Chebotarev. Chebotarev thinks Aliev could be banished to some distant foreign posting, or if there is no rapprochement, reconfigure himself as an opposition leader in exile. According to Eduard Poletaev, the chief editor of the Mir Yevrazii magazine, if Aliev were brought to trial, he might try to defend himself by making damaging claims against Nazarbaev and his entourage Our leaderships image is already shaky in the wake of Kazakgate and the other corruption cases that have come to light, said Poletaev, referring to the ongoing trial in the United State in which James Giffen, a former advisor to Nazarbaev, is accused of facilitating the payment of massive bribes by US oil companies to top Kazak officials. But Poletaev thinks the very fact that so much is known about these allegations would reduce the impact of any new revelations Aliev might come up with, so theres no point in blackmailing anyone with such material. In the short term, said Poletaev, Alievs future may depend on the prosecution and trial of Alievs associates. A lot depends on how quickly these people are brought into custody, and what they say, he said. Independent journalist Sergei Duvanov believes that Alievs fate is not sealed yet, as the case against him rests on statements made by injured parties and witnesses, and these could still be retracted or changed. I wouldnt be surprised if the whole situation is reversed so that Aliev becomes the victim and other people the accused, he said. Daur Dosybiev is an IWPR contributor in Almaty. COMMENT: KAZAK CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM STRENGTHENS PRESIDENT Changes to the political structure and election system have been portrayed as democratic, but the current head of state is the main beneficiary. By Andrei Chebotarev in Almaty The constitutional changes which came into force in Kazakstan on May 21 have consolidated the presidents power, and do not represent significant progress towards democracy. Political power remains excessively centralised, and the constitutional amendments largely amount to a redistribution of authority among branches of government. One important change is that Nursultan Nazarbaev, as Kazakstans first and so far only president, can seek re-election as many times as he wants. In other words, he can seek a new term in 2012 and again in future ballots until such time he himself decides it is time to step down. Although the changes have been advertised as strengthening political pluralism and the legislature, Nazarbaev will be able to use the parliamentary majority of his party Nur Otan to dominate both the legislative process and the government. Nur Otan has considerable public influence, not least because civil servants are more or less compelled to join it, as are the employees of private companies whose owners are Nazarbaev supporters. The presidents influence over lawmakers is also boosted because nine seats in the lower house or Majilis will now be nominated by the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakstan, over which he has influence, and he will also appoint 15 members to the upper chamber or Senate instead of seven as was the case before. In all likelihood, the main reason why Nazarbaev has pushed these changes through is because since he was re-elected in 2005, he appears to have lost some of his grip on the political elite in particular, and developments in the country as a whole. Two clear signs of this were the murder of opposition politician Altynbek Sarsenbayuly in February last year and the current prosecution of the presidents son-in-law Rahat Aliev. Both incidents suggested not only that there was a crisis in the elite, but also that the authorities dealt poorly with such crises. This turbulence may have prompted Nazarbaev to seek to regain control and restore the balance of forces within the regime. The removal of limitations on the number of times Nazarbaev can be president will take the pressure off him as the 2012 election approaches. Although he still has the option of not standing, the possibility that he might should defuse some of the infighting in the elite over the succession issue. At the same time as bolstering his own powers, President Nazarbaev has tried to show the world that these constitutional reforms represent progress on political reforms and that the system is moving ever closer to international democratic standards. That is of particular importance as Kazakstan is bidding to chair the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2009. Some of the changes have certainly met with approval from the international community as well as the domestic constituency. One big shift is that the Majilis will be expanded from 77 to 107 seats, and all will be electable by proportional representation using the party list system, except the nine that are coopted by the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakstan. Introducing proportional representation has some clear advantages. It will mean increased opportunities for political parties to take part in drafting legislation, and more chance that those parties that currently have no seats in the Majilis might be represented in future. Some parties may also try to adopt more distinct identities and start building up grassroots support. However, the constitutional amendments fail to introduce mechanisms to ensure free and fair elections. Nor do they incorporate a proposal made by a government agency to lower the threshold for winning seats in parliament from seven to five per cent of the vote. Both omissions may make it harder for parties to win Majilis seats. The use of a party-list system for almost all seats will prevent people from standing as independents. The constitutional amendments largely failed to incorporate better protections for peoples civil and political rights and liberties, especially to defend them against unlawful actions committed by the state. One exception is a provision whose wording de facto abolishes the death penalty. Capital punishment will now only be applied in convictions for particularly brutal crimes during war time and terrorist attacks that result in fatalities. The downside is that this could foster a sense of impunity among criminals and result in an increase in murder and other serious crimes. Another potential area of ambiguity is the introduction of rules requiring the approval of a court before a formal arrest can be made, and allowing the accused to appeal against the decision. On the one hand, the law-enforcement agencies now have a legal framework within which to operate, but on the other, the high level of corruption in the judicial system could lead to abuses where arrests are sanctioned in pursuit of personal vendettas or as part of a conspiracy between judges and police. Overall, the constitutional reform has both pros and cons. The fact that changes have been made for the first time since 1998 overcoming initial opposition and then procrastination on the part of the authorities can be seen as a step forward in itself. However, the changes were simply passed by parliament rather than by asking the nation by means of a referendum. Nor was there any attempt to engage the public in a debated on the proposed amendments. As a result, the people of Kazakstan from whom state power nominally emanates were sidelined once again. All in all, this latest reform does not even approximate to a genuine exercise in democracy-building for Kazakstan. Andrei Chebotarev is a political scientist and director of the Alternativa think-tank. TAJIKS SEEK PERMANENT GATEWAY TO CHINA Tajikistans isolated southeast has benefited from a new trade route to China, but locals say restrictions at the border crossing are making life harder than it needs to be. By Saodat Asanova in Badakhshan and Dushanbe Traders in Badakhshan are asking for the border crossing with China to be open more of the time so they can move freely back and forth and generate stronger economic growth in this remote mountain region of Tajikistan. The Tajik-China trade route, opened in 2004, runs between from Khorog, the administrative centre of Badakhshan province in southeastern Tajikistan, over a high-altitude plateau and then down into China, where it ends in the city of Kashgar, 700 kilometres away. But because conditions are so tough at the Kulma border crossing located on a mountain pass 4,400 metres high the gateway only stays open 15 days out of every month, while from November through April it is closed altogether. EASTWARD ROUTE OPENS UP NEW OPPORTUNITIES The road has boosted external trade for Tajikistan, whose other neighbours are landlocked Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and created employment for many people in Badakhshan. Bilateral trade in goods going via Kulma has gone from zero to reach 400 million US dollars in 2006. The main direction of trade is westwards cheap Chinese consumer goods sell well in Tajikistans markets. Badakhshan accounts for 45 per cent of Tajikistans land area but the inhospitable mountain terrain means it is very sparsely populated, and infrastructure is poorly developed. In Soviet times the authorities would stockpile essential goods ahead of winter, when snowfalls cut the road from the capital Dushanbe, and Khorog can only be reached from Kyrgyzstan to the north. Declining economic conditions in post-independence Tajikistan made it harder to sustain Badakhshan, as the governments priority was addressing economic problems in the more populated and easier-to-reach parts of the country. But independence eventually created opportunities for warmer relations with China, and the Khorog-Kashgar road created a new channel for the movement of shuttle traders people moving back and forth across the border with consignments of consumer goods which characterises so much of trade between Central Asia and western China. The boom in trade belies the fact that the road is little more than a dirt track in places, and so high that travellers risk getting altitude sickness. Vehicles also suffer frequent problems because engines do not run well on rarefied air. As Chinese trucks usually travel in convoy, if one breaks down the entire column grinds to a halt. In April, officials from Badakhshan and Kashgar agreed there was a need to rebuild the section running from Khorog to Murgab to cope safely with larger vehicles. PRESSURE FOR PERMANENT CROSSING Residents of Badakhshan and the traders who use the border - both Tajik and Chinese - say the restricted opening times make it difficult to complete a round trip without getting stuck on the wrong side of an inhospitable frontier. Most people here see the road and the traffic it has brought with it as an unmitigated success, but believe trade would really take off if the border crossing was kept open permanently. The regional government in Badakhshan has repeatedly urged the authorities in Dushanbe to open the route permanently. The Badakhshan authorities have also recommended the opening of a Chinese consulate and a Tajik foreign ministry branch in Khorog to make it easier for locals to get visas. At the moment, Tajik traders have to travel 700 km in the other direction to collect a Chinese visa at the embassy in Dushanbe. Chinese and Tajik officials reached a verbal agreement to do this last year, but there are still documents to be drawn up to make this happen. Boymamad Alibakhshev, head of the government department for investment and state property in Badakhshan, said that the opening restrictions are holding back trade. If the checkpoint functioned on a permanent basis, there would be an increase in Tajik-Chinese trade turnover, which has already increased sixfold in the last three years, he told IWPR. Khushomad Alidodov, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Partys branch in Badakhshan, said the local authorities unheeded appeals exemplified the lack of devolved power in Tajikistan. The centralisation of government in this country means the Badakhshan authorities do not have powers to resolve issues at a local level, he said. EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNTIES Apart from the abundance of Chinese-made goods, the hotels, cafés and warehouses which have sprung up in Badakhshan are evidence of the boost to the regions economy. Whenever the Kulma crossing is open, casual employment doubles. Some men find work loading freight on and off trucks for wages of 100 to 120 somoni, up to 35 US dollars, a day, while others ferry passengers and goods as far as the border and back to Khorog. They cannot drive into China itself because of a clause in the agreement underpinning the crossing which stated that all goods vehicles have to travel laden. This disadvantages Tajik traders, who have little to sell and are therefore prevented from driving into China, while the Chinese are allowed to drive their own trucks to Khorog. Khorog resident Meralisho Mamadov earns up to 600 dollars for each 15-day stint of driving work. The opening of the road has simply been a miracle for me. Last year, I earned enough money not only to support my family, but also to send my children to university. This year, my son will work with me so he can build up his own capital, he said. Umed, a third-year student at Khorog university, earns up to 130 dollars for driving manufactured goods from Kulma all the way to Dushanbe. A rich businessman from the capital [Dushanbe] offered my friends and me a good wage if wed drive his cars. The only thing we needed was a driving license. We pay for food ourselves while were on the road, and once we reach our destination we receive our pay. We manage two trips in each 15-day period, he told IWPR. Drivers like Umed sometimes have to wait several days at the border before their goods arrive on the other sides. They sleep in their cars or in yurts traditional Kyrgyz tents which enterprising residents of Murgab, the nearest town, turn into makeshift hotels and canteens over the summer season. STRANDED IN CHINA Traders heading for China go as far as the Tajik checkpoint either in their own cars or in hired transport, walk across the frontier, and hire a Chinese car and driver on the other side. Then they have to move as quickly as they can to get their business done and get back before the border closes for two weeks. When we go to China, most of entrepreneurs think less about buying goods than about getting everything done on time and coming back across the border so as to avoid additional costs, said Badakhshan resident Gulbegim Alibakhsheva. According to another trader, Shavkat Otambekov, said getting caught out can be financially disastrous. The expenses for a trip to Kashgar and back, including accommodation and food for a stay of several days in the town, come to about 250 dollars per person, if you economise. If you go to Urumchi [administrative centre of Xinjiang province], the costs go up to 500 dollars. But if you dont get back in time, these expenses double, Shavkat said. Many traders fund their business activities by taking out loans, for example from a microfinance bank branch which the Aga Khan Fund, AKF, has set up in Khorog. The AKF, founded by the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the Ismaili branch of Islam, has been a major donor and development agency in Badakhshan, where local people are traditionally Ismaili rather than Sunni as in the rest of Tajikistan. A delayed return from China can upset a traders precarious financial planning. Madina Oripova, from the village of Barchid, took out a bank loan of around 2,000 dollars before setting out for China on a purchasing trip. It was my first trip outside Tajikistan, she said. The people travelling with me helped me, but I found it hard to get my bearings there and had trouble with the language. I bought goods and loaded them up, but unfortunately, time ran out and the border was closed. My goods ended up unsold, and I had to go into debt to pay off some of the bank loan. If the border had been open, this definitely wouldnt have happened. The regular closures of the border crossing have an impact on the wider economy of Badakhshan, pushing up retail prices on local markets Whenever we dont return from China on time, our income drops drastically and we have to raise the prices of the goods we sell, said local businessman Nazrisho Mironov. Not everyone wants to see the border opened all the time, as that would give the Chinese unrestricted access to Tajik markets, potentially swamping them with cut-price goods. Olga Saifulloeva, head of the economics faculty at Khorog university, agrees that Badakhshan will benefit from access to foreign markets and investment inflows. If the highway functions permanently, the markets of Tajikistan will be inundated with low-quality goods, which goes against the interests of local manufacturers, she said. Restrictions should be imposed here to give local manufacturers a chance to sell their goods on the local market. OTHER ROUTES STILL VIABLE In the meantime, many traders will continue to shy away from the obstacles of the Kulma crossing and opt for other, easier routes. Despite the growth in trade via Kulma, the bulk of Chinese goods still entering Tajikistan come from large wholesale markets in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan. Li Hin Wang has been selling cheap audio and video equipment at markets in Kyrgyzstan for the last three years, and when he heard about the Kashgar-Khorog route he considered moving his operation to Dushanbe. But he decided against it when, like so many others, he found his freight consignment held up at the border. It would have been more profitable for me to work with Tajik partners on a permanent basis. As in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan, the people here are very smart and know about trading. But because of the rules at the border, I suffered enormous losses and couldnt carry on. Sherkhon Azimov, a businessman from the Hatlon region of southern Tajikistan who travels to China to buy construction materials, still takes a long and costly detour via Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. The advantage is that he can travel by train, and whenever he arrives at the Kazak-Chinese border, he can be sure it will be open. At the moment I have no other option, because going by road via Badakhshan is too risky. Time is money for all my clients, and God knows how long you could be stuck on the border there, he said. Saodat Asanova is director of IWPR Tajikistan. **** www.iwpr.net ******************************************************************** REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA provides the international community with a unique insiders' perspective on the region. Using our network of local journalists, the service publishes news and analysis from across Central Asia on a weekly basis. The service forms part of IWPR's Central Asia Project based in Almaty, Bishkek, Tashkent and London, which supports media development and encourages better local and international understanding of the region. IWPR's Reporting Central Asia is supported by the UK Community Fund. The service is published online in English and Russian. The opinions expressed in Reporting Central Asia are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the publication or of IWPR. REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA: Editor-in-Chief: Anthony Borden; Managing Editor: Yigal Chazan; Senior Editor: John MacLeod; Central Asia Programme Manager: Saule Mukhametrakhimova; Editor in Bishkek: Kumar Bekbolotov. IWPR Project Development and Support: Executive Director: Anthony Borden; Strategy & Assessment Director: Alan Davis; Managing Director: Tim Williams. **** www.iwpr.net ******************************************************************** IWPR builds democracy at the frontlines of conflict and change through the power of professional journalism. IWPR programs provide intensive hands-on training, extensive reporting and publishing, and ambitious initiatives to build the capacity of local media. Supporting peace-building, development and the rule of law, IWPR gives responsible local media a voice. 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