WELCOME TO IWPR'S REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA, No. 629, September 24, 2010

SPECIAL REPORT

UZBEK GOVERNMENT IN DENIAL ON MIGRATION  Official unwillingness to face up to 
migrant issues is major obstacle to effective protection.  By Shohida 
Sarvarova, Kamilla Abdullaeva

OPPOSITION TO CHALLENGE KAZAK LEADER  Planned referendum to press for 
president’s resignation doomed to failure, analysts say.  By Yulia Kuznetsova

KYRGYZSTAN DEBATES CUSTOMS UNION ENTRY  Obvious benefits to good trading terms 
with Russia and Kazakstan, but economists see pitfalls as well.  By Asyl 
Osmonalieva

INTERVIEW

TAJIKISTAN NEEDS CHILD-FRIENDLY JUSTICE  Juvenile rights advocate calls for 
joined-up reforms to reduce number of youth offenders given custodial 
sentences.  By Parvina Khamidova

TAJIK VILLAGE DECIMATED BY TB  Disease has reached emergency levels, but 
village is not designated as priority for government’s tuberculosis programme.  
By Biloli Shams

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SPECIAL REPORT

UZBEK GOVERNMENT IN DENIAL ON MIGRATION

Official unwillingness to face up to migrant issues is major obstacle to 
effective protection.

By Shohida Sarvarova, Kamilla Abdullaeva

Hundreds of thousands of Uzbeks working abroad enjoy few protections because 
their government is in denial about their existence, rights activists say.

As in neighbouring Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the labour force in Uzbekistan 
has gone abroad in large numbers in recent years in hope of escaping a dire 
economic situation at home and earning a decent wage in countries like Russia 
and Kazakstan.

Unlike the Tajik and Kyrgyz governments, however, the Uzbek authorities do not 
acknowledge the exodus – and the substantial sums the migrants send home – 
because the official line is that the domestic economy is booming. As a result, 
they make little effort to ensure migrant workers are covered by the right 
legislation, deny them pension and other benefits, and do nothing when their 
citizens suffer mistreatment or worse abroad.

The authorities’ position seems to be that since many of the migrants are 
illegal, they do not officially exist, so the Uzbek state need not step in if 
they are murdered or get into difficulties while abroad.

OFFICIALS DOWNPLAY SCALE OF EXODUS

The Agency for Labour Migration Abroad, which is part of Uzbekistan’s labour 
and welfare ministry, says the number of people working abroad only runs into 
thousands. But the non-government Initiative Group of Independent Human Rights 
Defenders cites estimates suggesting that between two and five million of the 
country’s 28 million people are out of the country, mostly in Russia and 
Kazakstan, but also in the United Arab Emirates and South Korea.

Tashpulat Yoldashev, an Uzbek analyst now living in the United States, says the 
outflow of labour not only makes a substantial contribution to the national 
economy through the money remittances workers send home to their impoverished 
families; it also relieves social pressures created by high de facto 
unemployment.

“Every migrant sends home at least 1,500 US dollars a year, which provides a 
decent amount of support for family members left behind in Uzbekistan,” he 
explained. “As well as earning wages, the migrants are enriched with new ideas, 
they acquire business skills, and some come back home and set up their own 
businesses.”

However, this contribution goes unrecognised. The Uzbek government continues to 
insist the economy is going from strength to strength, a claim which would be 
undermined by a public admission that people are leaving in droves to perform 
manual tasks in Russia.

Addressing the nation on Uzbekistan’s independence day, September 1, President 
Islam Karimov said gross domestic product had shown a 250 per cent increase 
since 1990, a year before the republic split off from the Soviet Union. He 
announced that average monthly wages would reach 500 dollars by the end of 
2010. While low by most standards, this figure looks unattainable since the 
government’s own figures show wages averaged 200 dollars in June, using the 
optimistic official exchange rate.

“For many years, Tashkent has been boasting of high economic growth, saying 
that up to a million new jobs are created every year, and not admitting to the 
high levels of unemployment in the country,” Yoldashev said. “At the same time, 
Uzbekistan is becoming the main supplier of unemployed labour to job markets in 
other [former Soviet] countries, particularly Russia.”

Abdurahman Tashanov of Ezgulik, a human rights group in Uzbekistan, added, “All 
this propagandistic glitz creates an impression of prosperity. The authorities’ 
obstinacy means labour migrants are deprived of even the minimum social 
guarantees.”

When IWPR contacted Uzbekistan’s labour migration agency about the figures, a 
representative who would not give his name denied there was a problem.

“There isn’t a flood. Everything is within normal bounds. Migration takes place 
within a legal framework,” he said by phone. “If there are illegals, that isn’t 
an issue for us to deal with.”

MIGRANTS EXIST OUTSIDE THE LAW

These comments by exemplify a key problem – the procedures for leaving 
Uzbekistan as a legally-registered migrant worker are so complex that the vast 
majority evade the system.

The Expert Working Group, a non-government pool of analysts in Uzbekistan, says 
the application process takes two weeks and is expensive for someone who almost 
by definition will be on a low income or else unemployed.

In any case, the migration agency is not in a position to find jobs abroad for 
many or most of the people applying. So many people take a chance and go off to 
Russia as illegal migrants, sometimes using private employment agencies in 
Uzbekistan that may not deliver on promises of work.

Hayitboy Yoqubov, head of the Najot human rights group based in Khorezm region 
of northern Uzbekistan, explained that once people have spent several years 
working abroad, they drop out of the welfare system, regardless of whether 
their status is legal or illegal. A bureaucratic system largely unchanged since 
Soviet times requires them to produce paperwork unavailable to them abroad.

“When someone works abroad, they earn money but once they come back home, they 
cannot count on receiving, say, a pension, as they need documents confirming 
they have worked in Uzbekistan or have made welfare contributions there, which 
they won’t have,” Yoqubov said, adding that for the same reason, “If a migrant 
has underage children back home, his wife won’t receive child benefit.”

GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEAK UP FOR NATIONALS ABROAD

Workers from Uzbekistan, like those from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, typically 
fill low-paid manual jobs on building sites, farms, the logging industry, 
catering and cleaning.

Yoldashev said many work 15 hours a day, six days a week, and live in 
“basements and other places unfit for human habitation, or in tents all year 
round”.

Those working illegally have no protection under the laws of the host country, 
and are left at the mercy of they employers. They cannot claim compensation for 
unfair treatment or accidents at work, or demand minimum pay. They are also 
vulnerable to abuse and extortion by police, who use the threat of deportation.

“Our illegal status is to the advantage of the boss I work for,” Shavkat 
Azizov, an Uzbek working in Kazakstan, said. “We don’t have any rights. We are 
fed poorly, paid a pittance and badly treated.”

Dosym Satpaev, a political analyst in the Kazak city of Almaty, said, “As long 
as Uzbek gastarbeiters have no rights, they’ll be prepared to pay off the 
police for the right to work. The paradox is that the number of illegal 
migrants is growing.”

Abuses of migrant workers’ rights are of course the host country’s problem, not 
Uzbekistan’s. But the Uzbek government does not speak up for its citizens in 
the same way as the Tajik and Kyrgyz leaderships, which have attempted to 
intercede with Moscow and agree basic terms, at least for the legal migrants.

The Uzbek migration agency points to a 2007 agreement with Russia that 
guarantees protection for the rights and interests of nationals of Uzbekistan.

But rights activists would like to see the government sign up to international 
agreements regulating all aspects of labour migration, from the initial job 
search through work abroad all the way to repatriation, such as the 1990 United 
Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families and the Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive 
Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of 
Migrant Workers.

Central Asians working abroad are not only exposed to hazardous conditions that 
can lead to accidents, they are also the target of racist attacks in Russia.

The Moscow Bureau for Human Rights said 11 Uzbek workers were killed and six 
were seriously injured in assaults in Russia last year. The Najot group said 
four more were killed this summer..

A migrant in the Russian city of Novosibirsk, who gave his name as Bahrom, told 
IWPR of an increasing trend for Uzbeks to simply disappear off the face of the 
earth. Relatives often went to the local Russian police for help, but nothing 
ever happened.

Yoqubov said most cases of murder and disappearance were never investigated by 
the authorities in the host country.

He is certain that if Uzbek government officials formally asked their Russian 
or Kazak counterparts to look into such cases, there would be more chance of 
action being taken. But he says that in his experience, this never happens.

“The office of the Prosecutor General of Uzbekistan has a department that deals 
with labour migration, and we’ve written to them a hundred times asking them to 
take steps to search for missing migrants. Unfortunately, I cannot give a 
single example to date of where the prosecution service or any other government 
agency has been able to help with the search,” Yoqubov said. “They virtually 
never give us a reply. Once they responded that since the illegal migrant 
hadn’t informed the authorities when he left the country, they couldn’t do 
anything.”

As well as active official intervention when migrants get into trouble abroad, 
Yoqubov would like to see a series of measures taken in Uzbekistan itself to 
ensure migrants are protected before they set up, such as bank accounts for 
them to pay in their wages and where money would be deducted to cover emergency 
funds.

“If these migrants found their jobs legally, they would be known to the 
embassy, they would make welfare payments to the Uzbek government, and the 
authorities would be more interested in their lives and would find the money to 
search for them [if they went missing],” he said.

Shohida Sarvarova and Kamilla Abdullaeva are pseudonyms for Uzbek journalists.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


OPPOSITION TO CHALLENGE KAZAK LEADER

Planned referendum to press for president’s resignation doomed to failure, 
analysts say.

By Yulia Kuznetsova

An opposition plan to campaign for a national referendum as a way of forcing 
Kazakstan's president Nursultan Nazarbaev to resign is so unrealistic that it 
is little more than a publicity stunt, analysts say.

People Power, a coalition between the Alga party and the Communist Party of 
Kazakstan, CPK, plans to launch the campaign at an event on September 25. To 
win approval for a referendum, organisers would need to gather 200,000 
signatures in which all administrative regions of Kazakstan must be represented 
in equal measure.

Announcing the referendum plan at a September 2 press conference, Alga leader 
Vladimir Kozlov said it was time for a change at the top in Kazakstan, and this 
should take place as an orderly, legitimate succession process.

Nazarbaev has run the republic for over two decades, since it was part of the 
Soviet Union.

“People who feel they’ve got the capacity to run the country know there’s no 
legislative route to power, so they might start seeking other ways,” Kozlov 
told IWPR. “And that would mean violence and chaos. We don’t need that.”

In April this year, neighbouring Kyrgyzstan was plunged into sustained 
political turbulence when the then president Kurmanbek Bakiev was ousted from 
power. The instability culminated in an explosion of ethnic clashes in and 
around the southern cities of Osh and Jalalabad in June, which left at least 
330 people dead and caused widespread devastation.

Kozlov said the legislation in place in Kazakstan was geared towards continuity 
rather than changes of power.

“Power must be handed on, otherwise let’s abolish the republic and proclaim 
ourselves a sultanate,” he said.

Kozlov made it clear he did not necessarily mean the opposition should come to 
power, as there were many potential successors in the ruling elite.

The immediate motive for the People Power referendum campaign is a recent law 
according Nazarbaev lifelong status as “Leader of the Nation”, which would 
leave him with considerable political clout and immunity from prosecution if 
and when he decides to stand down. The next presidential election is due in 
2012.

The law, published in government-run newspapers media on June 15, was signed by 
the prime minister and the speakers of both houses of parliament. Nazarbaev, 
who normally signs bills into law, has not done so – but nor has he vetoed it. 
In any case, laws come into force on the day they are published.

The official reaction to the People Power's proposal came the day after the 
press conference, when Yerlan Karin, secretary of the president’s party Nur 
Otan told the KazTAG news agency that it made no sense and was “an absurd idea”.

Karin said opposition groups were weak and lacked a real presence across 
Kazakstan, and were therefore incapable of managing the complexities of 
arranging a referendum. The result, he predicted, was that they would lose 
rather than gain public support.

He added that President Nazarbaev enjoyed the confidence and backing of a 
majority of Kazakstan’s population.

Many analysts, and even some other opposition politicians, agree that People 
Power stands little chance of bringing its referendum plan to fruition. They 
point out that one of the bloc’s members, Alga, is not even a recognised 
political party, as the government has consistently refused to grant it 
registration.

Anton Morozov of the Institute for Strategic Studies, which is linked to the 
president’s office, said the bloc members were not a strong opposition force.

“In all the time the [Alga] party has existed, most of its actions have not 
gone any further than various PR events and moves. This idea therefore can’t be 
seen as a serious threat to the current authorities,” he told IWPR.

Vladislav Kosarev, leader of the Communist People’s Party, a separate group 
from the CPK, said he believed Alga was motivated partly by its grievance over 
the registration issue.

“It’s understandable that in a situation like that, all the party’s members 
will be calling for the president’s resignation. But the party is by no means 
the entire nation,” he said.

Bolat Abilov, co-chairman of the opposition Azat National Social Democratic 
Party, expressed doubts about the feasibility of a referendum in the current 
political set-up.

In an interview for RFE/RL’s Kazak service on September 2, Abilov said, “Our 
own party has tried to organise referenda on various issues on several 
occasions, but none of these attempts succeeded. The authorities obstructed our 
efforts every time. And on a difficult subject like this one... I doubt it’s 
possible.”

Maxim Kaznacheev, head of the politics department at the Institute of Political 
Solutions in Almaty, said People Power lacked the nationwide reach needed to 
publicise the campaign and gather large numbers of signatures.

“We need to realise that this political bloc doesn’t have the information 
resources to get its referendum idea into the public consciousness,” he said.

Kozlov told IWPR he was well aware of the risks of challenging Nazarbaev, 
especially since Kazak legislation includes tough penalties for insulting the 
president.

To head off legal troubles, he wrote to the presidential administration and the 
prosecutor general’s office in July to clarify whether a referendum asking 
whether the president should resign could be classed as a criminal offence.

Kozlov says the prosecutor’s office has assured him a written response has been 
posted to him, but he has not received it. In the absence of a negative 
response, he said, People Power feels it can go ahead with launching its 
campaign.

Yulia Kuznetsova is a freelance journalist in Kazakstan.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


KYRGYZSTAN DEBATES CUSTOMS UNION ENTRY

Obvious benefits to good trading terms with Russia and Kazakstan, but 
economists see pitfalls as well.

By Asyl Osmonalieva

As Kyrgyzstan’s government seriously considers joining a customs bloc with 
neighbouring Kazakstan as well as Russia and Belarus, some economic experts 
have voiced doubts over the wisdom of doing so, at least in the near future. 

Kyrgyzstan’s president Roza Otunbaeva announced that her country wanted to join 
the customs union during a July meeting of the Eurasian Economic Community, 
EurAsEC, a wider grouping of former Soviet states.

Otunbaeva ordered a working group to look into the economic implications of 
joining the customs bloc, which is moving towards the eventual creation of a 
common market encompassing a population of some 170 million people by the end 
of 2012.

For the weak Kyrgyz economy, harmonising customs arrangements with Russia and 
Kazakstan is seen as essential if it is to continue trading with them on 
anything like equal terms. Last year, these two states accounted for over 28 
and ten per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade, respectively.

The introduction of common customs rules for Russia, Belarus and Kazakstan at 
the beginning of July was a step towards a new divide that will set members of 
the customs union apart from non-members. (See Customs Deal Brings Kazaks 
Closer to Russia 
http://iwpr.net/report-news/customs-deal-brings-kazaks-closer-russia

Previously, all EurAsEC members enjoyed a duty-free trading relationship with 
one another. Now outsiders will have to pay whatever import duties the customs 
union applies, so Kyrgyzstan’s leaders are calculating that they would be 
better off on the inside.

More broadly, Kyrgyzstan has wider economic and political reasons to stay close 
to Russia and Kazakstan, as both are major investors, while Moscow also 
provides significant aid and loans. Both countries play host to large numbers 
of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan.

Anarkhan Rahmanova, who heads the international trade department at the Kyrgyz 
Ministry for Economic Regulation, has been appointed to lead the working group 
on customs union entry, and says the value of trade with Russia and Kazakstan 
is a key consideration.

“More than 41 per cent of our trade is with customs union countries, so joining 
would enable to increase our exports to them,” she said.

According to Pavel Dyatlenko, a political analyst with the Polis Asia 
think-tank, Russia and Kazakstan are actively helping Kyrgyzstan recover from 
the ethnic violence that rocked the southern towns of Osh and Jalalabad in June 
and left a trail of devastation.

Dyatlenko says the Kyrgyz economy, and government finances in particular, are 
in such poor shape that it cannot afford to go it alone. With a yawning budget 
deficit for the current year, he said, “a great deal of money is needed to 
rebuild Osh and Jalalabad and to compensate for the decline in [foreign] trade 
revenues, investment, remittances from labour migrants and tourist industry 
income”.

He added that “Kyrgyzstan’s economy survives because it export raw materials to 
these countries, and re-exports large amounts of Chinese goods to them”.

Government representative Mukhtar Jumaliev told the 24.kg news agency in July 
that the customs union would not apply import duties to items produced within 
Kyrgyzstan, only to goods originally imported from elsewhere and then 
re-exported.

This will affect Kyrgyzstan’s position as Central Asia’s main retail point for 
Chinese-made consumer goods, which are exported all over the region.

China is Kyrgyzstan’s second-largest trading partner after Russia, accounting 
for 14 per cent of trade last year. If Kyrgyzstan does not join the customs 
union, it will find it much harder to export Chinese goods to Kazakstan at a 
profit – but if it does join, it will end up taxing imports from China at a 
higher rate.

China and Kyrgyzstan currently grant one another favourable terms within the 
framework of the World Trade Organisation, WTO, of which they are both members. 
Neither Russia nor Kazakstan is in the WTO, however, a fact which lead some 
Kyrgyz analysts to worry that their country would lose out by switching from 
one set of rules to another. Kyrgyzstan could end up having to apply import 
duties double the five per cent it applies to goods from WTO members.

“If we have to make a choice, it would be better to give priority to the WTO, 
which is a considerably bigger market than the customs union,” Uluk Kydyrbekov, 
acting director of the Bishkek Business Club, said.

But Jumakadyr Akeneev, an economist who was formerly Kyrgyz agriculture 
minister, believes the country does not face an either-or choice, since the 
terms of its WTO membership allow it to join regional economic associations. 
Nor is the difference in customs tariffs a major problem, as the WTO system is 
flexible and should allow an accommodation to be made, he said.

Other economists, while not dismissing the benefits of customs union 
membership, argue that Kyrgyzstan should hold off until Russia and Kazakstan 
fulfil their own long-held ambitions to join the WTO. Both countries are still 
in negotiations with the world trade body. At one point they were considering a 
joint application as a customs bloc, but they appear to have shifted back to 
negotiating entry on an individual basis.

“Kyrgyzstan has time to make its final decision on joining the new organisation 
[in the period] before the three customs members enter the WTO,” Dyatlenko said.

Asyl Osmonalieva is an IWPR-trained journalist in Kyrgyzstan.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


INTERVIEW

TAJIKISTAN NEEDS CHILD-FRIENDLY JUSTICE

Juvenile rights advocate calls for joined-up reforms to reduce number of youth 
offenders given custodial sentences.

By Parvina Khamidova

Recent legal reforms in Tajikistan including the introduction of a new criminal 
procedures code need to be taken further through the creation of a separate 
justice system for minors, experts say.

At present, offenders under the age of 18 are dealt with by the same 
prosecutorial and judicial system as adults, although detention takes place in 
separate institutions. International best practice is to try adolescents in a 
separately-constituted, specialised judicial process.

IWPR asked Gulchehra Rahmanova, legal programmes manager at the Centre for 
Child Rights in Tajikistan, to set out to why such a separate system is needed.

Gulchehra Rahmanova: There are several serious problems, among them the absence 
of a special, child-friendly system of criminal justice for under-18s. This 
would seek not to punish but to alter behavioural patterns, and would consist 
of specialist judges, prosecutors, investigators and defence lawyers.

Juvenile crime prevention measures are sorely lacking in Tajikistan. Police 
place young offenders on their records, but no one follows up with them to help 
them avoid committing further crimes. We don’t have special rehabilitation 
centres to help children get back on track after they have gone astray.

Children under the age of criminal responsibility – 16 for most offences and 14 
for grave crimes – are dealt with by the Commission for Child Rights. They can 
be detained for lengthy term. Between the ages of 11 and 14, they are placed in 
special schools, from 14 to 16 in vocational schools. Above that age, they are 
held in a specialised youth offenders detention facility. Mistreatment and poor 
conditions are problems in all places of confinement, including in pre-trial 
detention.

IWPR: How would introducing a juvenile justice system change things?

Rahmanova: It would bring the legislation, policies and practice of juvenile 
justice into line with international standards and establish a system that 
would afford young offenders proper treatment, respect for their rights, and 
dignity; and that would also curb crime and recidivism rates by responding to 
individual needs effectively.

IWPR: Can you give a sense of the scale of youth crime?

Rahmanova: I can’t speak for the whole country, but under a project conducted 
in Dushanbe, lawyers acted for 96 adolescents in 87 separate cases. Of the 
total, 33 defendants were given custodial terms, 44 given non-custodial 
sentences, and 19 had charges dropped. That’s just Dushanbe, and only children 
whose parents couldn’t afford to hire a lawyer.

IWPR: What progress has there been towards such a system?

Rahmanova: Amendments to the criminal code in 2004 include a ban on imprisoning 
juvenile offenders who have committed crimes of lesser or moderate gravity. The 
new criminal procedures code includes a special section on the treatment of 
under-18s.

At the same time, however, our legislation does not fully conform to 
international standards. For example, more authority needs to be given to 
police and prosecutors to allow them to seek non-custodial solutions for minors.

Last year, key ministries and state agencies signed up to a strategy of 
inter-agency cooperation on juvenile crime prevention. The interior ministry’s 
juvenile crime inspectorate underwent significant reforms in 2008, increasing 
staff numbers and refocusing the work so that officers spend most of their time 
on crime prevention.

Tajikistan’s Judicial Council has drafted plans to establish family courts. The 
current plan is that these courts would hear only disputes, but it has been 
proposed that they would also deal with criminal cases and rule on such matters 
as placing minors in care and in correctional facilities. Decisions on the 
latter currently rest with the Commission for Child Rights, which is part of 
the executive.

Although there have been some important steps towards reform, progress is very 
slow.

Responsibility for juvenile justice is diffused between the interior, justice 
and education ministries, the Judicial Council, the prosecutor general’s 
office, the Commission for Child Rights, and local government.

The various government agencies have demonstrated some commitment to achieving 
international standards of juvenile justice. However, there is no common vision 
of how the system would look, so approaches to reform are similarly fragmented.

IWPR: What is your organisation’s experience of working with state institutions 
on introducing a juvenile justice system?

Rahmanova: Since the outset, our organisation has been working closely the 
Judicial Council, the justice ministry’s department of correctional affairs, 
and the prosecutor’s office. It is also a member of the government’s Commission 
for Child Rights.

I would like to note that this work has been supported by UNICEF in Tajikistan. 
Thanks to this, we have developed pilot projects with centres in two districts 
of Dushanbe providing alternative justice. State agencies referred cases to the 
centres so that offenders would receive non-custodial forms of punishment and 
rehabilitation, and benefit from a psychological, social and practical services 
from social workers. The centres work closely with children’s families to 
identify and understand the motives behind their offences.

In seeking more effective progress for reforms, it’s very important to look at 
reforming the entire system rather than trying to change specific parts of the 
system without having an overall plan A national action plan for juvenile 
justice reform for the next five years has been approved by the Commission for 
Child Rights, using ideas from the Judicial Council.

IWPR: This summer, the Tajik parliament passed legal amendments designed to 
replace custodial sentences with fines for non-violent crimes. Critics of the 
move say there is little chance that juvenile offenders will be able to afford 
to pay fines and will end up in confinement anyway. How do you see it?

Rahmanova: Personally, I’m against this change as far as minors are concerned. 
For adults, it does create a more humane form of justice. It’s very rare for 
fines to be imposed on young offenders. It isn’t even about the size of the 
fines, given that most crimes are committed by children from so-called 
dysfunctional families where parents simply cannot afford to pay a fine. This 
was the case even before fines were increased. So this change isn’t going to 
contribute to making juvenile justice more humane.

In our own organisation’s experience, there has only been one case in the last 
18 months in which a judge has imposed a fine on a young offender, and this was 
because the individual had a job.

Parvina Khamidova is editor and coordinator for IWPR’s human rights reporting 
project in Tajikistan.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


TAJIK VILLAGE DECIMATED BY TB

Disease has reached emergency levels, but village is not designated as priority 
for government’s tuberculosis programme.

By Biloli Shams

The home  where the Karimov family used to live in southern Tajikistan now 
stands deserted. After seven members of the household died of tuberculosis a 
few years ago, a little girl who was the sole survivor was taken away to a 
children’s home. 

This was no isolated case – TB-related fatalities are such a regular occurrence 
in the village of Karagach that its mountain location has become known as the 
“valley of death”.

Tajikistan’s government has a concerted nationwide programme in place to combat 
tuberculosis, but Karagach seems to have fallen off the radar.

Residents say they are not getting the medication they need for what seems to 
be a virulent strain of TB, and some believe local officials are underreporting 
the mortality rate to their superiors.

The rates of infection and death are staggering – 17 people have died so far 
this year, and there is hardly a family in this community of some 380 that does 
not have at least one member with TB.

The Nosirov extended family, for example, has lost 13 people, from children to 
grandparents, since 1999 – the year many villagers say marked the start of the 
epidemic.

A visit to the village quickly reveals the devastating effect that untreated TB 
can have when extended families live together in cramped conditions. Without 
treatment, the infection will spread rapidly.

“Every year between 11 and 18 people die,” Karagach resident Zafar Zardakov 
said. “Why isn’t anyone alarmed by that? We had a case where three people died 
in one day…. 57 of our fellow-villagers have died in the last three-and-a half 
years, most of them young. They should have lived long lives.”

The chief doctor for Hamadon district, Asror Isupov, said X-rays conducted on 
318 Karagach residents had revealed 18 suspected cases. All school-age and 
pre-school children had been given TB vaccines.

Residents are concerned that adults are not receiving the same level of care.

Dr Isupov said most cases in the village involved a persistent strain of TB, 
and dealing with it would require expensive courses of treatment which 
Tajikistan could not afford.

The Tajik government is implementing a United Nations-funded programme that 
applies the World Health Organisation’s DOTS (“directly observed therapy, 
short-course”) methodology.

But current policy is to focus on certain regions, while others like southeast 
Tajikistan are left out – even though Karagach clearly looks like a priority 
case.

“Medicine has been allocated to treat 50 people across the country with the 
persistent strain of TB in the Machiton TB hospital. These 50 come from 
districts around the capital [Dushanbe], and patients from Hamadon and Vose 
districts [in the south] will wait in the queue,” Dr Isupov said.

Village nurse Zulfia Kholova is a member of the Nosirov family by marriage, and 
her husband Mirzo is among those with TB.

Kholova believes the local health authorities are reluctant to disclose the 
true extent of the problem, thus preventing sufferers in the early and advanced 
stages of TB from getting the different kinds of treatment they need.

“When I’ve submitted reports from the health centre, I’ve been told to put down 
causes of death other than tuberculosis for most of the cases,” she said.

Kholova believes a representative of Project Hope, a non-government health 
charity, was deliberately misled when he visited the Nosirov home and asked 
about the number of sufferers.

“When he asked – in Russian – how many had died, a district hospital 
representative who was accompanying him translated [from Tajik to Russian] with 
a completely different figure from what I had said,” she recalled. “I asked him 
in Tajik why he’d given a lower figure… and he replied ‘that’s how it should 
be’.”

Local resident Saidamir Nabotov is similarly suspicious of the way healthcare 
authorities are handling the TB epidemic.

After losing two teenage sons aged 18 and 22 to TB last year and a 26-year-old 
daughter this February, another son is now showing symptoms of the disease, 
although a recent X-ray showed up nothing.

“You can say that almost every family in the village has members with TB,” he 
said. “I don’t know why they are concealing the number of ill and dying people.”

Local healthcare staff approached by IWPR declined to comment on allegations 
that the epidemic was being downplayed.

The death and incapacitation of breadwinners from TB has had a devastating 
effect on villagers’ ability to sustain themselves. A lucky few have relatives 
working in countries like Russia and sending money back home.

Muborak Zabirova’s husband went off to Russia five years ago, but he stopped 
sending money back after hearing of illness in the family.

Zabirova’s 22-year-old daughter died of TB recently, and the family has had no 
income since the last breadwinner, her son Saifullo, 23, had to stop working 
six months ago and is now emaciated by the disease.

Although tuberculosis is airborne and transmitted from one person to another, 
many people in Karagach believe the very ground they stand on is infected.

Dr Isupov also believes the only solution is to resettle all the village’s 
inhabitants.

“They must be relocated somewhere else in their entirety,” he said. “The 
district administration has written specially to the government, but so far 
there’s been no response.”

Biloli Shams is an IWPR-trained journalist in southern Tajikistan.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.

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REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA provides the international community with a unique 
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The service forms part of IWPR's Central Asia Project based in Almaty, Bishkek, 
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