Re: [Reproducible-builds] concrete steps for improving apt downloading security and privacy

2014-09-21 Thread W. Martin Borgert
On 2014-09-21 20:04, Elmar Stellnberger wrote: A package with some new signatures added is no more the old package. It should have a different checksum and be made available again for update. Perhaps someone wants to install the package not before certain signatures have been added. If a

Re: [Reproducible-builds] concrete steps for improving apt downloading security and privacy

2014-09-21 Thread Richard van den Berg
On 21 sep. 2014, at 20:29, W. Martin Borgert deba...@debian.org wrote: If a package would change by adding another signature, then this would invalidate previous signatures. Package formats like apk and jar avoid this chicken and egg problem by hashing the files inside a package, and storing

[Reproducible-builds] Bug#762397: libgpg-error: please do not capture the current time during the build process

2014-09-21 Thread Jérémy Bobbio
Source: libgpg-error Version: 1.16-1 Severity: wishlist Tags: patch User: reproducible-builds@lists.alioth.debian.org Usertag: timestamps Hi! As part of the “reproducible builds” effort [1], it was detected that libgpg-error could not be built reproducibly. The build process capture the time of

Re: [Reproducible-builds] concrete steps for improving apt downloading security and privacy

2014-09-21 Thread W. Martin Borgert
On 2014-09-21 21:13, Richard van den Berg wrote: Package formats like apk and jar avoid this chicken and egg problem by hashing the files inside a package, and storing those hashes in a manifest file. Is there a chicken and egg problem? Only if one insists on embedding the signatures in one

Re: [Reproducible-builds] Bug#762397: libgpg-error: please do not capture the current time during the build process

2014-09-21 Thread Dominic Hargreaves
On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:45:14PM +0200, Jérémy Bobbio wrote: As part of the “reproducible builds” effort [1], it was detected that libgpg-error could not be built reproducibly. The build process capture the time of the build. This piece of information is not really helpful to anyone and

Re: [Reproducible-builds] concrete steps for improving apt downloading security and privacy

2014-09-21 Thread Paul Wise
On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 2:04 AM, Elmar Stellnberger wrote: A package with some new signatures added is no more the old package. That is exactly what we do *not* want for reproducible builds. It should have a different checksum and be made available again for update. The Debian archive