Re: [rt-users] Malicious MIME type handling

2010-02-03 Thread Dominic Hargreaves
On Tue, Feb 02, 2010 at 11:22:56AM -0800, Jesse Vincent wrote: > On Tue 19.Jan'10 at 13:15:59 +, Dominic Hargreaves wrote: > > I've noticed that there is some logic to override the mime type of > > HTML attachments ($TrustHTMLAttachments config) to avoid javascript > > XSS attacks in RT. > > >

Re: [rt-users] Malicious MIME type handling

2010-02-02 Thread Jesse Vincent
On Tue 19.Jan'10 at 13:15:59 +, Dominic Hargreaves wrote: > I've noticed that there is some logic to override the mime type of > HTML attachments ($TrustHTMLAttachments config) to avoid javascript > XSS attacks in RT. > > > Now, let me start by saying that my practical knowledge of some of

Re: [rt-users] Malicious MIME type handling

2010-01-26 Thread Jesse Vincent
On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 01:15:59PM +, Dominic Hargreaves wrote: > I've noticed that there is some logic to override the mime type of > HTML attachments ($TrustHTMLAttachments config) to avoid javascript > XSS attacks in RT. Sorry, I've been on Jury Duty since this came in and there was a sm

[rt-users] Malicious MIME type handling

2010-01-19 Thread Dominic Hargreaves
I've noticed that there is some logic to override the mime type of HTML attachments ($TrustHTMLAttachments config) to avoid javascript XSS attacks in RT. This was flagged up by a user who was, not unreasonably, confused that this meant that HTML attachments just resulted in the browser displaying