* Matt Parsons:
Has anyone completed a python security code review?
I believe Google has, for their AppEngine product.
What would you look for besides inputs, outputs and dangerous
functions?
Does it involve mobile code? That would be quite a challenge.
There are also some historically
* Steven M. Christey:
Two areas that don't seem to immediately lend themselves to design/spec
level solutions are (1) transitive trust and (2) interaction errors
between multiple components that are all working correctly. I'd love to
hear from people who've had to solve these problems in the
* Steven M. Christey:
Yet smart people insist that it's still input validation, even
when presented with the example I gave. So So what's the
perspective difference that's causing the disconnect?
Some technologies are designed as if to discourage proper output
encoding. Most
At 11:45 PM +0100 11/2/07, Florian Weimer wrote:
My limited exposure to Cobol makes me think it is as unlikely to have
a buffer overflow as PL/I or Ada.
Usually, Ada programmers switch off bounds checking before shipping
code. I don't know why Ada has such a reputation for robustness
My limited exposure to Cobol makes me think it is as unlikely to have
a buffer overflow as PL/I or Ada.
Usually, Ada programmers switch off bounds checking before shipping
code. I don't know why Ada has such a reputation for robustness.
___
Secure
* Gary McGraw:
My darkreading column this month is devoted to insiders, but with a
twist. In this article, I argue that software components which run
on untrusted clients (AJAX anyone? WoW clients?) are an interesting
new flavor of insider attack.
I really wish this were something new. 8-(
* Kenneth Van Wyk:
1) the original author of the defect thought that s/he was doing
things correctly in using strncpy (vs. strcpy).
2) the original author had apparently been doing static source
analysis using David Wheeler's Flawfinder tool, as we can tell from
the comments.
This is not a
* Johan Peeters:
I agree that multiple choice alone is inadequate to test the true
breadth and depth of someone's security knowledge. Having contributed
a few questions to the SANS pool, I take issue with Gary's article
when it implies that you can pass the GSSP test while clueless.
But I
* Crispin Cowan:
I'm with you on the C and C++ argument, but what is immature about Java?
I thought Java was a huge step forward, because for the first time, a
statically typesafe language was widely popular.
Java is not statically typesafe, see the beloved ArrayStoreException
(and
I gather you are saying that the innards of Unix will force creation
of an unwanted directory entry on the Ada implementation of the required
null name support for packagename.CREATE . The Ada implementation
could rely on exclusive access to the file (surely Unix has that, right?)
You can
* Crispin Cowan:
ljknews wrote:
2. The compiler market is so immature that some people are still
using C, C++ and Java.
I'm with you on the C and C++ argument, but what is immature about Java?
I thought Java was a huge step forward, because for the first time, a
statically
* der Mouse:
Absolute security is a myth. As is designing absolutely secure
software.
I have high hopes in formal methods.
All formal methods do is push bugs around. Basically, you end up
writing in a higher-level language (the spec you are formally verifying
the program meets). You
* Brian A. Shea:
My slogan:
Unsecured Applications = Unsecured Business
Which is completely acceptable if you and your business partners are
aware of the risk level at which your are running your company.
Secure software costs more, requires more user training, and fails in
Certainly that part is OS-specific. On my VMS machine, X-windows processes
do not run as root.
The X Window server needs elevated privileges because it can trigger
DMA on the graphics card (and thus read arbitrary memory, unless
you've got an IOMMU). Chances are, however, that your VMS
* Kenneth R. van Wyk:
There's an interesting article out on Net-Security.org (see the full article
at http://www.net-security.org/article.php?id=697) that addresses why
software development organizations adopt (or do not adopt) a Software
Security development methodology. Check it out --
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