Re: [SC-L] Interesting article on the adoption of Software Security

2004-06-10 Thread Damir Rajnovic
On Wed, Jun 09, 2004 at 10:37:45AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > I don't think this is correct. The costs for fixing bugs is higher > later in the product lifecycle (and the article cites confirming > data), but these costs might never materialize. Only a fraction of > all bugs are found, and th

Re: [SC-L] opinion, ACM Queue: Buffer Overrun Madness

2004-06-10 Thread Blue Boar
ljknews wrote: Okay, that's a bold statement. I'd better back it up. If you have a string-handling library of any kind, someone's going to come up with a program design that builds a twenty character string for a person's name, putting first name in the first ten characters, and last name in the

[SC-L] Secure Coding - is that the end of the story?

2004-06-10 Thread Michael S Hines
We've talked a lot about secure coding - but is that the whole story? What about other aspects of systems management - memory management (consuming memory, memory leaks, etc), process management (DDoS, overloading systems with processes and threads), DASD management (saturating storage capacity, c

Re: [SC-L] Interesting article on the adoption of Software Security

2004-06-10 Thread Crispin Cowan
Damir Rajnovic wrote: While this is true that only some of the bugs are fixed that fixing can have unexpectedly high price tag attached. No matter how do you look at this it _is_ cheaper to fix bugs as soon as possible in the process (or not introduce them at the first place). This is true in th

Re: [SC-L] opinion, ACM Queue: Buffer Overrun Madness

2004-06-10 Thread Jared W. Robinson
On Wed, Jun 09, 2004 at 03:34:52PM +0100, David Crocker wrote: > Apart from the obvious solution of choosing another language, there are at least > two ways to avoid these problems in C++: > > 1. Ban arrays (to quote Marshall Cline's "C++ FAQ Lite", arrays are evil!). Use > classes from the STL, o