Re: [SC-L] White paper: "Many Eyes" - No Assurance Against Many Spies
> I have no problems with someone pointing out flaws in XYZ product > when compared to ABC product, provided: > a) they're an independent, uninvolved 3rd party > and > b) the two products are identical in feature, function, and purpose. Speaking personally, I'd say or c) The comparison is honest about its bias. That is, I have nothing against "my product is better than their product, and here are some flaws theirs has but mine doesn't". I have trouble with it only when it's disguised as an unbiased comparison. /~\ The ASCII der Mouse \ / Ribbon Campaign X Against HTML [EMAIL PROTECTED] / \ Email! 7D C8 61 52 5D E7 2D 39 4E F1 31 3E E8 B3 27 4B
RE: [SC-L] White paper: "Many Eyes" - No Assurance Against Many Spies
A couple key phrases come to mind when reading this: 1) conflict of interest (he's selling "a solution") 2) inappropriate comparison (embedded OS vs. general OS) I have no problems with someone pointing out flaws in XYZ product when compared to ABC product, provided: a) they're an independent, uninvolved 3rd party and b) the two products are identical in feature, function, and purpose. So there are "a couple trusted people" who do the core work. I wonder what their price is to put a flaw in the product? If they're smart enough to know the entire system, they're undoubtedly smart enough to hide a subtle flaw. Money? Compromising photos? Threats against themselves or families? What would it take? Frankly, I found the entire article nothing but a not-so-thinly veiled advertisement. Would he be so bold in comparing against VxWorks or QNX? Those are his direct competitors, not the general Linux kernel. If he wants to go head to head against Linux, he needs to specifically cite and compare against the embedded Linux distributions, be it uClinux or other. Kind Regards, -dsp > -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Behalf Of Kenneth R. van Wyk > Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 8:25 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [SC-L] White paper: "Many Eyes" - No Assurance Against Many > Spies > > > FYI, there's a white paper out by Dan O'Dowd of Green Hills Software (see > http://www.ghs.com/linux/manyeyes.html) that "It is trivial to > infiltrate the > loose association of Linux organizations which have developers > all over the > world, especially when these organizations don't even try to prevent > infiltration, they accept code from anyone." > > Although I don't agree with the positions expressed in the paper, > I still find it > interesting to hear what folks have to say. A story re the paper > has been > picked up by Computerworld and LinuxSecurity.com thus far. > > Cheers, > > Ken van Wyk > http://www.KRvW.com > >
[SC-L] MIT study on software development processes
Hi all, I just saw a Slashdot story (http://developers.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/04/30/1421223&mode=thread&tid=126&tid=156&tid=185) announcing an MIT study on software development processes used around the world. The report itself can be found at http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/papers/178_Cusumano_Intl_Comp.pdf I haven't read through the whole thing, but the slashdot entry indicates that the study found some interesting things, in particular the low use of specification documents in the design cycle. Although it doesn't seem to address security per se, I thought that SC-L readers might find it an interesting read nonetheless. Cheers, Ken -- KRvW Associates, LLC http://www.KRvW.com
Re: [SC-L] Re: White paper: "Many Eyes" - No Assurance Against Many Spies
At 7:31 PM -0500 4/29/04, Tad Anhalt wrote: > How did they bootstrap their system? In other words, how did they >ensure that they could trust their entire tool chain in the first place? > They hint that the whole system was written by a few trusted persons. Begging the question "trusted by whom?". Some organizations require "trusted by the agency issuing security clearances" for certain (primarily non-tool) software. >Did they write the whole tool chain as well? The scheme above protects >against future attack, but not against something that was there before >they started. I'm sure that they have an answer for that question, >it's a pretty obvious one to ask... Maybe I missed it on my read-through? > > That's the whole point of the Thompson lecture. The hole is really >deep. How far can you afford to dig? How do you decide what to trust? Ideally, if you find you cannot afford to dig far enough to satisfy your need, a revision of your business plan is required. > Green Hills Software obviously has a vested interest in convincing the >reader that it's worth paying them whatever it is that they're charging >for the extra depth... In some situations, it may be... That's a risk >management decision. And one solution acceptable in many conditions is determining whether the vendor has deep enough pockets that a lawsuit after the fact would mean something. I don't know much about finance, but I know that suing Green Hills software has more potential than suing the person from whom you got a copy of Linux. Not all checks and balances are embedded in the software itself.
Re: [SC-L] Re: White paper: "Many Eyes" - No Assurance Against Many Spies
Jeremy Epstein wrote: I agree with much of what he says about the potential for infiltration of bad stuff into Linux, but he's comparing apples and oranges. He's comparing a large, complex open source product to a small, simple closed source product. I claim that if you ignore the open/closed part, the difference in trustworthiness comes from the difference between small and large. That is, if security is my concern, I'd choose a small open source product over a large closed source, or a small closed source over a large open source... in either case, there's some hope that there aren't bad things in there. He makes three claims for greater security of his embedded OS: (1) A carefully controlled process for modifying source code. (2) Small size in terms of lines of code. (3) Auditing of the object code. Certainly, a small, well-audited system is more likely to be secure than a large, poorly audited one. Also, as there has been one discovered failed attempt to insert a backdoor into the Linux kernel, I agree that the potential for further such attacks exists. However, his claim that Linux can never be made secure because it's too large to audit every time it changes is overstated. He's ignoring the fact that few people (and even fewer in defence) will or should upgrade every time the kernel changes. Widely used Linux distributions rarely include the latest kernel, even if your organization is using the latest distribution. He's also confusing the difference between desktop and embedded Linux systems. Yes, his embedded OS is small, but an embedded Linux system is going to be much smaller than the desktop distributions. While kernel 2.6.5 may contain 5.46 million lines of code (counting blank lines and comments), much of that code is unlikely to be present in an embedded system. After all, 2.72 million lines of code (49.8%) are drivers, 414,243 (7.6%) lines of code are sound-related, and another 514,262 (9.4%) lines are filesystem-related. You're going to build your embedded system with the hardware drivers and filesystems that you need, not every possible device and obscure filesystem available. The same is true for userspace setuid programs, which I'll not count as I'm not sure which ones would be necessary for the types of systems under discussion. In summary, there are both fewer times and fewer lines of source code (and bytes of object code) that need to be audited than he claims. While auditing Linux is a more difficult task than auditing a smaller embedded OS, his claims are overblown since he ignores the fact that you only need to audit the parts and versions of the kernel (and OS) that you install and use when you install a new version. -- James Walden, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor of EECS The University of Toledo @ LCCC http://www.eecs.utoledo.edu/~jwalden/
Re: [SC-L] Re: White paper: "Many Eyes" - No Assurance Against Many Spies
Jeremy Epstein wrote: > I agree with much of what he says about the potential for > infiltration of bad stuff into Linux, but he's comparing apples and > oranges. He's comparing a large, complex open source product to a > small, simple closed source product. I claim that if you ignore the > open/closed part, the difference in trustworthiness comes from the > difference between small and large. It's a lot deeper than that. Here's the link to the original Ken Thompson speech for convenience sake: http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95 This should be required reading (with a test following) for everyone who ever touches code IMHO. Simple, elegant, understandable and devastating. It's the difference between proving that there aren't problems and hoping that there aren't problems. Linux is really a peripheral issue. The same arguments could be used against any operating system and/or software system that hasn't been designed and implemented from day 1 with this sort of issue in mind. A more interesting quote is this one: "A few people who understood Ken Thompson’s paper wrote to me saying that every operating system has this problem, so my indictment of Linux security on this point is meaningless. They ask: “couldn’t someone at Green Hills Software install a binary virus in the baseline Green Hills Software compiler distribution and corrupt Green Hills Software’s INTEGRITY operating system?” No, the FAA DO-178B Level A certification process systematically checks every byte of object code of our INTEGRITY-178B operating system to ensure that if malicious code is introduced at any point throughout the tool chain (compiler, assembler, linker, run-time libraries, etc.) it will be detected and removed. Since INTEGRITY has only a few thousand lines of privileged-mode code, not the millions of lines that burden Linux, this means of preventing viruses is feasible for INTEGRITY, but not for Linux." How did they bootstrap their system? In other words, how did they ensure that they could trust their entire tool chain in the first place? They hint that the whole system was written by a few trusted persons. Did they write the whole tool chain as well? The scheme above protects against future attack, but not against something that was there before they started. I'm sure that they have an answer for that question, it's a pretty obvious one to ask... Maybe I missed it on my read-through? That's the whole point of the Thompson lecture. The hole is really deep. How far can you afford to dig? How do you decide what to trust? Green Hills Software obviously has a vested interest in convincing the reader that it's worth paying them whatever it is that they're charging for the extra depth... In some situations, it may be... That's a risk management decision. Tad Anhalt
