Re: [SC-L] Harvard vs. von Neumann

2007-06-12 Thread Blue Boar
Crispin Cowan wrote: > Do you suppose it is because of the different techniques researchers use > to detect vulnerabilities in source code vs. binary-only code? Or is > that a bad assumption because the hax0rs have Microsoft's source code > anyway? :-) I'm in the process of hiring an outside firm

Re: [SC-L] The Specifications of the Thing

2007-06-12 Thread Steven M. Christey
On Tue, 12 Jun 2007, Michael S Hines wrote: > So - aren't a lot of the Internet security issues errors or omissions in the > IETF standards - leaving things unspecified which get implemented in > different ways - some of which can be exploited due to implementation flaws > (due to specification f

Re: [SC-L] Harvard vs. von Neumann

2007-06-12 Thread Steven M. Christey
I agree with Ryan, at the top skill levels anyway. Binary reverse engineering seems to have evolved to the point where I refer to binary as "source-equivalent," and I was told by some well-known applied researcher that some vulns are easier to find in binary than source. But the bulk of public d

Re: [SC-L] Harvard vs. von Neumann

2007-06-12 Thread Crispin Cowan
Steven M. Christey wrote: > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007, Crispin Cowan wrote: > >> Kind of. I'm saying that "specification" and "implementation" are >> relative to each other: at one level, a spec can say "put an iterative >> loop here" and implementation of a bunch of x86 instructions. >> > I agre

Re: [SC-L] Harvard vs. von Neumann

2007-06-12 Thread Steven M. Christey
On Mon, 11 Jun 2007, Crispin Cowan wrote: > Gary McGraw wrote: > > Though I don't quite understand computer science theory in the same way > > that Crispin does, I do think it is worth pointing out that there are two > > major kinds of security defects in software: bugs at the implementation >

[SC-L] The Specifications of the Thing

2007-06-12 Thread Michael S Hines
So - aren't a lot of the Internet security issues errors or omissions in the IETF standards - leaving things unspecified which get implemented in different ways - some of which can be exploited due to implementation flaws (due to specification flaws)? Mike H. - Michael

Re: [SC-L] Harvard vs. von Neumann

2007-06-12 Thread Crispin Cowan
Gary McGraw wrote: > Though I don't quite understand computer science theory in the same way that > Crispin does, I do think it is worth pointing out that there are two major > kinds of security defects in software: bugs at the implementation level, and > flaws at the design/spec level. I think