How would we recognize good engineering?
It seems to me like the very same problem faced by the idea of software
liability law - that it is hard to define good engineering for software
security - would be faced by an incentive program. If "good
engineering" is fuzzy enough to give a big corporate
Gary,
Could you clarify your (and/or the BSIMM) position on "secure by design"
vs "designed to be secure"? You're encouraging the adoption of
secure-by-design building blocks, as a part of SFD2.1, but then warning
that "designed to be secure" != "secure". I can think of examples/ways
that what y
Regarding the code snippet -- it does depend on the environment -- point well
taken. But in this case (from what I can tell), unless you actually have the
file_exists() function *disabled* in php.ini, this is vulnerable to XSS.
- Greg
Sebastian Schinzel wrote, On 04/28/2010 04:03 AM:
> On Apr 28
nanosecond precision that
was widely publicized at first). A good example of complex code being more
difficult to secure.
- Greg Beeley
LightSys
Matt Parsons wrote, On 03/16/2010 10:41 AM:
>
>
> Hello,
>
> I am working on a software security blog and I am trying to find open
Steve I agree with you on this one. Both input validation and output encoding
are countermeasures to the same basic problem -- that some of the parts of
your string of data may get treated as control structures instead of just as
data. For the purpose of this email I'm using a definition of "inpu
> [...] White list validation is the answer to everything except the
> difficult choices developers have to make and often get wrong.
> [...]
> (past,present,future) of the data is that single application? How do you
> test the ability for developers to make the best decisions in imperfect
>
> 1. ONLY consultants and vendors have jumped on the bandwagon. Other IT
> professionals such as those who work in large enterprises have no
> motivation to pursue.
>
> 2. The target price for the exams will be an impediment as many folks who
> can't get reimbursed for taking them will not bo
> I agree that multiple choice alone is inadequate to test the true
> breadth and depth of someone's security knowledge. Having contributed
> a few questions to the SANS pool, I take issue with Gary's article
> when it implies that you can pass the GSSP test while clueless.
>
> There is indee
> [...] I do suspect that some of it is tied to the romance of
> certifications such as CISSP whereby the exams that prove you are a
> security professional talk all about physical security and network
> security but really don't address software development in any meaningful
> way. [...]
Tha
integrated into existing coursework.
- I found Corewars to be an interesting tool for starting to
exercise that "defensive coding" muscle. It gets students used
to assuming that their program will be abused and misused,
among other things :)
Greg.
Wietse Venema wrote:
> My experience is otherwise. Without detailed documentation I can
> usually see where in the life cycle the mistake was made: analysis
> (e.g., solving the wrong problem), design (e.g., using an inappropriate
> solution) or coding.
I tend to agree - for *many* design related
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